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metre guns, two 37-millimetre revolving cannons, and one short Gat-ling. She is barkentine rigged, with a plain sail a rea of 4480 square feet, and has a slightly ram-shaped, cast-steel stem. The complement is 100. The pneumatic-gun cruiser is to be armed with three of Zalinski's pneumatic dynamite guns of 10t-inch calibre, each of which is to throw a shell containing 200 pounds of high explosives for a distance of one mile, and to be capable of being discharged at least once in two minutes. The guaranteed speed is twenty lmots. 
UndE::r the law of August 3, 1881, autborizing the construction of two new ships, it was provided that these should be "sea-going, double-bottomed, armored vessels of about 6000 tons displacement, designed for a speed of at least sixteen knots au hour, with engines having all neces-sary appliances for working under forced draft, to have a complete tor-pedo outfit, and be armed in the most effective manner." Accorcling to the circular issued by the Navy Department, one of these was to be anar-mored cruiser, with a maximum draught of twenty-two feet, and the other a battle-ship, with a draught of twenty-three feet; both were to be built of steel, with double bottoms, to have numerous water-tigbt compartments fitted witb powerful pumping apparatus, and to be supplied tbroughout with perf~ct drainage and ventilation. A ram bow, twin screws, electric search-ligbts, torpedo outfit, and a protected steel-armored deck running tbe whole length of the ship and covering the boilers, engines, and mag-azines, were essentials; while b.igb power and economy were so equally demanded that, to a maximum maintained speed of seventeen knots when fully equipped, great coal endurance and small fuel consumption were to be added. In each vessel a space sufficient for two hundred and seventy people, for provisions for three months, and for water for one month, was required. The cruiser was to bave two-thirds sail-po,ver on two or three masts, each suppliecl with a military top :fittecl to mount one or more machine guns. The armament of this ship was to inclucle ten steel breech-loading rifles-four of 10-inch and six of 6-inch calibre-and a sec-ondary battery of four 6-pou:{lders, four 3-pounders, and two 1-pouncl-ers, rapid-:fire, ancl four 47-millimetre a.ncl four 37-millimetre revolving cannons, all of the IIotchkiss pattern, together witb four Gatling guns. There were to be :fitted six torpedo-tubes-one bow, one stern, and two on eacb sicle, of which at least one on each sicle forward was to be undcr water. The heavy guns were to load in not less tban two positions, ancl were to be protected by at least ten and a balf inches of steel armor, properly backed; the 6-inch guns were to be fitted with shields, and all the guns were to be arrangeu so as to obtain the .greatest horizonta.l and 
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vertical fire consistent wíth other conditions. Any vertical a.rmored 
protection at the water-line was to be at least eleven inches thick in tbe 
heaviest part, and thicker, if practica.ble. 
The armament of tbe line-of-battle ship was to consist of two 12-inch 
and six 6-inch guns, ancl of a secondary battery which included fout' 
6-inch, six 3-pounder: and two 1-pounder rapid-fire guns; of four 47~mil­
limetre and. four 37-millimetre revolving cannons, and of four Gatlings. 
The torpcd.o outlit was similar to that of the cruiser. 
Tbe plans submitted were opened on April 1st of this year, and not-
withstanding the difficulties w hich tbe displacement imposed upon the 
otber requirements, no less than thirteen designs were received from ten 
different competitors. The most important of these were offered by the 
Thames Iron Sbip Buiklmg Company and the Barrow Sbip Building 
Company, of Great Britain; by A. li. Grandjean, Esq, of France; and 
by Ohief Constructor Wilson, Naval Constructor Pook, and Lieutenant 
Cbambers, all of the United States navy. The designs were submit-
ted to a board, and this .finally rccommended the Barrow pla.n as best 
suited. for the armored. battle ship. So far as the armored cruiser was 
concemed, the Board reportcd. as follows: "The marked di.fferences in 
the essential features of the designs of armored cruisers of tbe Barrow 
Sbip Build.ing Company, Lieutenant W. I. Ohambers, A. H. Grandjean, 
and. t he Thames I ron Works and Ship Building Company, prevent their 
classification in the order of merí t. Each exhibits features which strong-
ly commend themselves, but the Board. does not consider it advisable for 
the government to build a vessel u pon any one of these plans." 
The battle-ship, though d.esigned by one of the most distinguished 
marine architects in England, has not in its present forro received 
tbe general approval of experts, for between it and. the plan submi~ 
ted by the Bm·eau of Construction there seem to be differences of mer-
its wbich are strongly in favor of the latter. The dimensions of the 
new ships are as follows: 
BAnnow SmP. 
Length between perpeodiculnrs, 290 fect; 
on Joad water- li ne, 300 fcet : extrem<: 
hreadth, 64 feet 1 inch ; mean drnught, 22 
feet 6 inches; uisplacemeot, 6300 tons. 
NAYY DEPARTliE::s-T SmP. 
Leogth betwccn perpeodiC'ulars, 300 fcet ; 
on Joau wnter-line, 310 feet ; extreme 
breadth, 58 f cet; mea o draught, 22 feet; 
displacemeot, 6600 tollS. 
The striking differences between these two ships are found in their 
relati ve stability and sea-going qualities. 1Ir. John, tbe designer of the 
Barrow ship, in a paper on" Atlantic Steamers," read Lefore the Institu-
tion of Naval Architects J•Ily 29, 1886, made the following statements: 
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" This question of stability will have to be carefully watched and studied within the next few years, hecause there is a tendency at present towards a rapid increase in the proportion of beam to length ; and as the draught of water in these large sbips is limited, we must be careful that in seeking higher speeds with increased beam we do not get too mucb stability, and so render the vessels heavy rollers and very uncomfortable as passenger-ships. It is possible the future may see vessels of greater beam than any yet afloat in the merchant-ser\rice ; but if so, it is almost inevitable that they will bave to be made bigber out of water in order to render them easy and comfortable at sea·, but even tbat bas its limits. Porhaps it is well to gi\re an extreme case, and here I will make use of onr olcl friencl Tlw O-reat Eastern . ... Now, for the purpose of trading it is quite clear that Tlw (heat Eastern cannot be loaded much deeper than other ships, while her beam is half as great again; and the conse-quence is, her stability, as compared with o ur modern passen ger- ships, is so excessive that she is bound to be a tremenclous roller among the hoavy seas in the Atlantic. Uer metacentric height, when loaded, was, I believe, stated by the late :Mr. Froude to be as much as 8.7 feet, which is from three to four times as much as is thought suffi.cient for ships in the present day, or consistent with their easy behavior at sea." Thus Mr. John himself regards 2.9 feet to 2.2 feet as the proper metacentric height for those steamers, and it is generaJly considered by modern designers that from 2.5 to 3.2 feet is most suitable for this clas~ of armored ships, and is conducive to easiness of motion in a _sea-way. Tbe value of tbis quality to a ship intended for sea-:fighting cannot be overestimated, for upon her steadiness as a gun-platform tbe aim and efficiency of her guns greatly depend. 
It will be noticed that this ship has exceptionally great beam, that of most ships of her class and displacement, varying from 54 to 59 feet, and judging from the sketches wbich have appeared, her water-line co-efficient is about 0.72. From an approximate calculation based on tbis assumption it is found that her metacentric height wm be about six feet. Tbe water-line coefficient may possibly be a little :finer tban 0.72, and tbus reduce the metacentric height, but if this ship is assumed to have a metacentric beight of three feet, her water-line coefficient would be 0.6288, which is an impossíbiliit;y, if her coefficient of fineness of displacement be that given in the published dimensions. Sucb a water-line and coeffi.cient of :fineness for 6300 tons displacement would pro-duce a perfect rectangle for a midship section. So that, unless her ilimensions are cbanged, she will surely be a heavy roller, and after 
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much sea duty she will suffer such severe strains as to require frequent 
and costly repairs. 
· The battle-ship designed at tbe N avy Department has very clifferent 
qualities, if the climensions already publisbed be correct. To possess a 
metacentric height of three feet sbe would require a water-line co-
efficient of 0.'753, and a midship-section coefficient of 0.89 to 0.90, which 
is a good proportion for s u eh a vessel. N ot only in sea-going qualities 
does the American design seem to be superior, but her battery is far 
more powerful and better <.lisposed in every way, while her speecl and 
endurance are equally as great as the plan recommended. Mr. John 
has adopted the echelon arrangement of heavy guns, a clisposition which 
both the English and Italian governments bave, after long trial, dis-
carclecl in their latest ships. When the first sketches of a design are 
macle, thls arrangement of guns is theoretica.Uy perfect, as it is supposed 
to give quite as much power of fire ahead aud astern as on each broad-
side; but \Yben the design is developed and practically tested, it is found 
tbat too much of the ship's efficiency in other respects is sacriiiced, that 
the power.ful end fire is not attained, and tbat the broadside is greatly 
weakened, owing to the obstructed arcs of fire. 
Besicles this, the guns, being placed at some distance from the mid-
sbip line, bave less accurate fire in rolling, and the ship's propensities 
· to roll aro encourage<l an<l are greater than would be the case if the 
guns were placed on tho midship line. It is also found that the blast 
from tbe beavy guns is destructive to superstructures and otber fittings 
on the upper deck. The Italians, indeed, bave placed stout ventilat-
ing shafts on their Itatia and L epanto to prevent the rearmost pair of 
heavy guns from being trained witbin t\\~enty clegrees of the fore and 
aft line. This is done so that the blast from these guns will not pros-
trate the gunners attending the other pair, notwithstanding the Jact 
tha.t those men are under the armor cover. The .Dnilio's forward 
smokè-pipe is placed entirely on tbe port sicle of tbe !ore and aft lino, in 
order to permit of one pa.ir of turret guns liring ahead. The upper-
deck, G-inch, central-pivot guns of the .A nd1·ea .Dot·ia class are now to be 
placed wholly within tbe superstructure, in order to be out of danger 
from tbe blast of the heaYy guns when the latter are fired neal' the line 
of keel, and the same cl1ange would bave to be made with the upper-
deck, 6-inch guns in the Barrow design. 
Similar objections exist to the Bm·eau of Construction design fqr 
an armored cruiser. Thls vessel, although possessing the bad features 
inherent in the echelon arrangement of heavy guns, does not bave tbe 
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best ideas of thc Barrow design, i . e., high freeboard, heavy guns mount-ed high above the water-line, and commodious quarters for officers and men. I3oth designs besides have the Yery objectionable ancl olcl-fash-ioned features of requiring the turrets to be revolved to fixed loacl-ing positions aiter being fired. The Bureau cru.iser, it may be saicl, is not saddled with too much metacentric height. She has ten feet less beam, her centre of gravity is abou.t one foot lower, and tmless her water-line coe:fficient is very full, she w:ill bave a metacentric height rather less. than what is regarded to be the best. 
It is not surprising, ho"vever, that the Bureau plans are so di:fferent in efficiency, for while the better plan, the battle-ship, is original with the N avy Department, the armored crui ser is a copy of, and no substan-tial improvement over, tbat of the Brazilian ship Riaohuelo designecl several years ago. This ship is considcred one of the best of her date, lmt great improvements in ship design have been made within the past few years, and it is against the tendencies of .A.merican inventive genius to take a step backward. 
The general plans of cruisers No. 4 and 5 were published in the New York H erald of J u ne 1st, together with the following data: "They are to be tvún-screw m'Uisers, 310 feet long on the water-li ne, 49 feet li inches extreme breaclth, 18 feet 9 inches mean d.raught, dis-placing 4083 tons. They are to bave machinery of 10,500 indicated · horse-power under forced clraft. Tbe maximum speed is 19 knots, r ig that of a three-mastecl schooner, spreading 5400 square feet of sail. They will ha ve a double bottom extencling through 129 feet of the length. The framing in this portion is 'on the bracket system. Before and abaft the clou ble bottom, above the protective dook, Z-bars form the transversa frames. Tbe protecti ve deck, w hi eh is nineteen inches a bo ve the water-li ne amidsbips, is fiat across the top, with sides which slope down to a clepth of four feet tbree inches below the water-line. The horizontal portion is two inches thick, the slope being three inches, reduced at both ends to one ancl a balf inches. It extends uninterruptedly fonvard and aft, and protccts the machinery, magazincs, and steering-gear, the ma-chinery being furtber defenclecl by the disposition of tbe coal-bunkers. The main hatches in this cleck are protected by armor-bars, ancl have co:ffer-dams extending to tbe upper deck. Tbe guns are carried on the gun, forecastle, and poop decks. 
"Armament.-The main battery, whicb consists o f twel ve 6- inch breech-loading rifles, all on centre-pivot mounts, with two-inch seg-mental steel shielcls, is arrangecl on sponsons so as to obtaiu the greatest 
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possible arc of fire. The forecastle, the poop, and the bridges bave been 
as much as possible availed of to shelter tbe guns. The tw·o guns for-
ward ancl the two guns aft converge their fire a short distance from the 
ends of the ship, and the broadside can be concentrated within 100 feet 
of the side. Four above-water torpedo-tubes are provicled on the berth-
deck, and two direct ahead under-water torpedoes in the bow. The sec-
ondary battery is composed of four 47-millimetre re>olvers, four 57-mil-
limetre single-shots, two 37-millimetre revolvers, ancl one short Gatling. 
The coal capacity is 850 tons. The complement of men 300 . .. . 
"To appreciate what is required to make nineteen lmots an hour at 
sea, we bave only to remember that the Umb1•ia and Eflrwriu are 500 
feet long, with more than 12,000 tons displacement and 14,500 indicated 
horse- power, ordinarily making 1St and on special occasions 19 knots 
an hour. K ow, to increase her speed to 20 )mots au ho ur, the Umbria 
wou1d require about 1~,500 horse-power, which means 5000 extra horse-
power for the extra knot. For a second extra knot would be required 
a.bout GOOO horse-power more, making about 25,000 horse-power neces-
sary to develop a speed of 21 knots." 
Gun-boats Nos. 3 and 4 are to be copies of gun-boat Ko. 1. No de-
signs for the floating batteries and the torpedo-boat bave been pub-
lishcd. The Stiletto is one of the famous Ilerreshoff boats, and is now 
being tcsted in consequence of a favorable report made by a board of 
ofTicers. On J uly 23, 1886, with a total displacement of tlïenty-eight 
·tons, sbe made an average of 22.12 lmots as the mean of four runs over 
the measured mile in a rough sea and fresb wind, and on July 30th 
sho attained an average of 22.80 knots. These were excellent results 
for a boat ninety feet in length, and promised that the type, with cer-
tain moclifi.cations, was equal to grectter demands. The trial data of 
this year bave not yet been published, though it is unofficially reporteu 
that her performance was equally as creditable. 
13 
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FRO~I the time of the introduction of cast-iron cannons in 1558 until 
a comparatively late period, cle,'elopment in navaJ artillery pro-
ceeded at a very slow rate. The securitx that was attained by the 
adoption of cast-iron was so great, as compared with the danger attend-
ing the use of the more ancient artillery, that tbe ne'Y guns were re-
gardecl as fully supplying all the demands of a suitable battery. The 
guns were muzzle-loaders, making the manipulation simple, tbc pre-
vious rude attempts at 
breech-loading being aban-
doned. The number of cal. 
íbres tbat were introduced 
was very numerous, partly 
to suit the weíght of tbe 
batteries to the shíps, ancl 
par·tly to accommodate thc 
fancy of the time for plac-
ing in clifferent parts 
of the ships guns vary-
ing much in size and 
destructi ve effect. The 
general character of 
the batteries and the BRONZE BREECJI·LOADIIW CANNON CAPTunED IN COREA, 
AGE UNJG\OWN. multiplication of cali , 
bres can best be illustrated by noting the armament of tw-o typical 
ships of the seventeenth century. 
The Royal P1"imoe, a British ship built in 1610, carríed .fifty-:five guns. 
Of these, two were oannon-petronel, or 2±-pounders; six were dmni-cannon, 
medium 32-pounders; twelve were oul;ve¡•ifns, 18-pounders, 1vhich were 
nine feet long; eighteen were demi-oultverins, nine-pounders; thirteen 
were ralcers, 5-pounders, six feet long ; ancl four were pO?·t-pieoes, proba-
bly swi vels. These guns were disposed as follows : on the lower gun-
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deck, tw·o 24-pounders, six medium 32-pounders, and twelve 18-pound-
ers; on the upper gun-deck the battery was entirely of 9-pounders; and 
the forecastle and quarter-deck were armed with 5-pounders, and the 
brood of smaller pieces which swelled the nominal armament. 
The Sovereign of tlw Seas, built in 1637. in the reign of Oharles I., 
was unequallecl by any sbip afioat in her time. She mounted on three 
gun-decks eighty-six guns. On the lower deck were tbirty long 24-
pounders and medium 32-pounders; on ber middle deck, thirty 12-pound-
ers and 9-pounders; on the upper gun-deck, "other lighter ordnance ;" 
ancl on her quarter-deck and forecastle, "numbers of murdering pieces." 
... 
nno;xzE BREECTl J~OADElt CSIW DY COJITEZ I:-< :\lEXJCO. 
In íhc obstinately contested actions between l3lake and \an Tromp 
in the Cromwellian time, the ships and batteries did not differ in any 
grcat dcgrce from those contemporaneous in construction with the Sov· 
eNign qf tlte SectB j and whcn we remember the inferior cbaracter of tbe 
pow<ler used in those clays we can account for the dUL·ation of some of 
the engagements between the English and Dutch ships which wcrc 
sometimes protracted through tht·cc cla.\'S. 
The brood of '' murclcring pi cecs " or smalJ calibre and little energy 
was, after mn.ny years, dispcrscd by the introduction of carronades-a 
short cannon of large calibre, which was found to bc a con\'enient sub-
stitute for the 8-pounders and 9-poundcrs on upper decks, and for the 
"ligbter ordnance," which "-as ineffccti,·e; but this cbange was brought 
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about slowly, as is seen by referring to the batteries of some ships 
which fought at Trafalgar. 
The Spanish seventy-fours in that action had fifty-eight long 24-
pounders on the gun-decks ; on the spar-deck, ten iron 36-pounder car-
ronades and four long 8-pounders; ancl on the poop, six iron 2±-pounder 
BREECU·J,OADER CAPTUUED IN THE WAR WITH ~!EXICO. 
carronades - total, 
seventy-eight guns. 
Tbe Victo?"!J, thc 
English flag- sbip, 
mounted on ber 
tbree gun- declcs 
ninety long 32, 2-±, 
and 12 pounders, 
and on the quarter-
deck and forecastle, 
ten long 12-pound-
ers and two 68-
pounder carronades. 
Tb e Sa;nt·issima 
T'I"Í/nidada mounted on tbe lower gun-deck thirty long 36-pounders; on 
the second deck, thirty-two long 18-pounders; on the thiJ.·cl deck thirty-
two long 12-pounders; ancl on the spar-cleck, tbirty-two 8-pounclers. In 
tbe British accounts sbe is said to ha ve had one hundred and forty guns, 
which number must bave included swivels mountcd for tbe occasion. 
At the end of the eigbteentb century tbe 18-pounder was the pre-
ferred gun for the main-cleck batteries of frigates, guns of larger calibre 
being founcl only on th3 lower decks of line-of-b:1ttle ship:>. The 18-
pounder was the maximum cali11re that was employecl on boarcl tbc sbips 
of the United Oolonies of North America in tbe war of the Revolution. 
The resources of the colonies dicl not admit of h"llilding ships to contend 
with vessels fit to take their pl:we in line of battle, but such as wcre 
constructecl were well adapted' to resist the small British cruisers, and to 
capture transports and store-ships. The so-calleu frigates of that day 
werc vessels varying from six hundred to a thousand tons, and, accord-
ing to their capacity, carried 12-pounders or 18-pounders in the main-
deck qatteries. There was usually no spar-Jeck, but the forecastle and 
quarter-deck, which were connected by gangways with gratings over 
the intermediate space, were provided with an armament of light 6, 9, 
or 12 pounders. A few carronades came into use cluring this war. 
At the conclusion of this war the Colonial flcct clisappearcd, and it 
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was not until the time of the depredations on the growing commerce 
of the United States by the Algerine corsairs t hat Oongress felt justi-
fied in incurring the expense of establisb ing a national marine. The 
sbips which were built under the law of 179-:l: were fully up to the most 
ad vanced ideas of the tim e, and some of these ships carried on thei r 
gun-decks a full battery of 2-:1:-pounders, thirty in number, while t be oth-
crs were armed with 18-pounders on the gun-deck, with spar-deck bat-
teries of 9 and 12 pounders, the carronadc not having been yet de:finitely 
adopted for spar-deck batt eries. 
It is not until the war of 1812 that we :find the carronade fully es-
tablishecl as the spar-cleck armament of frigates. The Constitution and 
the Guerri~re carried 32-pounder carronades of very similar weight and 
power in the place of the long guns of smaller calibre on the spar-deck. 
The original name of this piece of ordnance ·was the " Smasher," the 
leacling pm·pose of the inventor, General :Melville, of the British artil-
lery, being to fire 68-pouncler shot with a low charge, thus effecting a 
greater clestruction in a ship's timbers by the increased splintering which 
t his practice was known to produce. Carronades of small calibre were 
subsequently cast, which were adoptecl for spar-deck batteries of frigates 
and line-of-battle ships, 
ancl, as tbey grew in fa-
Yor, formecl the cntire 
battery of sloops-of-war 
and smaller vessels until 
about 18-±0, when the 
attention tbat had been 
BRONZE 12-POUXDER , "EL NEPTUNO," 1781. giYen for SOme yeai'S tO 
t he subject of naval 
ordnance began to assume tangible shape, and the effort was made to 
proceed in this matter in accordance with an intelligent system. 
The advantage of large calibre was firnil)' impressed upon those who 
occupied themselves with the orclnancc matters of the navy. As the 
fleet was developed, the 2-:1:-:pounder gave way to the 32-pounder, and for 
the lower-deck battery of line-of-battle ships the -:!:2-pounder was intro-
13·x-
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duced. Some 42-pouncler carronades were also introducecl as spar-deck batterics for tbese larger sbips. Witb the disappearance of tbis class of sbip the 42-pounclcr was abancloned, ancl the 32-pounder 'vas retained as the maximum calibre, different classes being assigned to clifferent sizes of ships. These classes were cliviclecl into the gun proper, with 150 pounds of metal to one of shot; the clou ble- fortified gun, with 200 pounds of metal to one of shot; and tbe medium gun, with 100 pounds of metal to one of sbot. The carronade of 
the same calibre, mountecl on a slicle, hacl a 
proportional weigbt of 65 pounds of metal to 
one of sbot. 
U. S. N. CARRONADE, BLIDE, AND CARRIAOE. 
In the interval between 1840 and 184:5 the clouble-fortifiecl 32-pound-er was replacecl by a gun of the same calibre of 57 hundrecl-weight, called the long 32-pouncler; ancl to suit the capacity of the clifferent classes of ships then in the serrice, there were mtrocluced the 32-pound-ers of 46 hunclred-weight, 42 hundred-"·eight, and 27 hundrcd-weight, in aclclition to the regular medium gun of 32 bundred-weight. This pe-riocl also marks the introduction of shell guns as part of the battery. 
To this time no explosive projectiles bad been usecl with cannons properly so callecl; their use had been limitecl to m01·tars and howitzers. The mortar was originally used for projecting huge balls of stone at bigh angles. The fi.rst practical use made of them for projecting bombs was in 1624, but tbe unwieldy weight of thc morta1.· and its bomb, the latter sometimes exceeding 300 pounds, prevented their use in field operations. To provide for this, light mortars were cast, which, being mounted on wheels, were denominated ho,vitzers. Frederick the Great of P russia brought this form of artillery to its highest develop-
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ment for field and. siege use, ancl the Continental ·powers of Europe 
ad.opted. it to a large extent for projecting bombs at high angles of fire. 
The mortar has nev-
er hacl a place in 
regular na val arma-
ments; it has been 
used afloat .for born-
bard.ment of cities 
and fortifi.ed positions, but never 
with a view to contencling w ith 
ships. 
U. S. N. MEDIIDI 32-POUNVER. 
Tbe success attencling the use 
of explosive projectiles at high ele-
vations did not leacl at once to their 
applicatwn to horizontal tiring from cannons. An important link in the 
progress of the idea resulted from the effort to avail of the advantage 
of ricochet firing with bombs. In 01·cler to effect this, the angle of ele-
vation had to be reduced to enable the bomb to roll along the ground. 
'l'he reduced angle of elevation ·was still greater than that used. for 
cannon, but the success of the experiment led. to the casting by tbc 
French of an 8-inch siege howitzer, whioh, in connection with tbe 
dcvelopment in the manufacture of fuses. mad.e it practicable to apply 
the idea of firing shells, like shot, horizontally, and the ohief object in 
view scems to bave been to operate against ships. 
The combining of tbe elements neccssary for the acbievement of 
this important step in naval artillery is by commou consent credited 
to General Paixban, o f the Fren eh artillery. who, though not claiming 
the inventwn of any of tbe numerous d.etails in,Tolved in the system, 
succeeded in so judiciously arranging the parts as to make the system 
practicable by which the whole oharaoter of naval armaments was 
revolutionized. 
FollO\Ying the progressive ideas of the age, shell-gtms were intro-
duced in the United States navy. 'l'bese were of 8-inch calibre, and. of 
weights of 63 hunclred-weigbt and 55 hun<l.red-weight. The guns wer·e 
shapecl in accorclance with the form adoptecl by General Pai.x:han, and 
were easily clistinguishable in the battery from the orclinary shot-gun. 
From this circumstance tbey obta.incd the title of Paixhan-guns, though 
there was nothing s-pecial in the gu:rí. itself to merit an appellation . Tbc 
whole system was Paixhan's; tbe gun was only a part of tbe system. 
It required many years to bring the shell-gun into such general ap-
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plication as to cUsplace the solid-shot gun. Tbey were assigned tenta-tively to ships in commission, and in 1853, hy a navy regulation, the hattery of a f1·igate was provided with only ten of these guns, which were collected in one division on the gun-deck. The Jirst vessel in the United States navy whose battery was composed exclusively of shell-guns was the sloop-of-war Portsmmtth., in 1856. This vessel carried a battery of sixteen 8-inch shell-guns of 63 hundred-,veight. These were among the first of a new pattern of gun for which the navy is indebted to the skill and study of the late Rear-admiral Dahlgren. 
Tbc detormin~tion of the best form for cannons 'V:as a question which had occupied the minds of artiDerists for some years. In the older guns the thickness of metal was badly distributed; it was too uniformly ex-tended along the cntire lengtb, not arranged in such proportions as to accord with the differing strains along the bore. Oolonel Bumford, of the United States Ordnance, had been among the first to consider this subject, and for many years the results of his experiments had guided construction to a great degree. General Paixhan made a further step in advance by reducing Yery much tbe thickness of metal along tbe chase of his guns, but it remained for Rcar-admiral Dahlgren to pro-duce the perfection of form in the gun so widely known bearing his name. In this gun the thickness of metal is proportioned to the effort of the gases in the bore, and all projections and angular changes of forrn are suppressed, gi ving to all parts a curved ancl rouncled surface. Tbe suppression of angular formations on tbe exterior of a casting bas a remarkable effect on the arrangement of tbe crystals while cooling. These arrange themselves normal to the cooling ·waves, v.·hich, if enter-ing from directions not radial with the c.v lindrical casting, produce con-fusionin their anangement, establishing planes of wealmess where the waves meet, which, in case of overstrain on the piece, assist rupture and determine the course of the fracture. 
\Vïth the introduction of the Dahlgren sbell-gun the transition of the artillery of the United States navy may be said to bave been com-pleted. The shell-gun of 9-inch and 11-inch calibres followed the 8~inch, ~md ~hips were armed with such as were appropriate to their capac-ity as rapicliy as the new guns could he manufactured. When fully equipped, the armament of the United States navy was superior to that of any other navy in the world. 
The substitution of shells for solid shot marks an important epoch in naval artillery. The probable effect of a shot could be predetermined and provided for ; that of a shell was unknown. In order to produco 
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serious injury with a shot, it was necessary to perforate the side of an 
enemJ. This was not indispensable with a shell; with the latter, perfo-
ration might be dispensed witb, as penetration to such a depth as would 
give efficacy to the explosion might pro,Te more destructiva to the bull 
than would absolute perforation. With the shot, damage was done to 
life and material in detail ; with the shcll, if successfully applied, de-
struction 'vas threatened to the entire fabric, with all it contained. 
Naval artillery entered a new phase; the rough appliances of the past 
would no longer answer all clemands. The founder could not alone 
equip the battery; the laboratory was callecl into use, and pressed to 
provide from its devices. The "new arm" clepended upon the successful 
working of the fuse of tbe sbel1, without which it was but a hollow 
substitute for a solid shot, ancl this cletail demanclecl the utmost care in 
prcparation. It was the perfecting of this device ·which, more than 
augbt else, delayed the general adoption of the new artillery for so long 
a timc after its ad mntages had been recognizetl. 
U. S. N. 9-INCU D.\llLGHI>N (9-JNCll SllOOTU-llOUE). 
The fuses that were used to explode the ancient bombs wcre long 
wooden plugs, bored cylindrically, and filled with powcler condensed hy 
tamping it to a bard consistency. The fusc casc projected from tbe 
bomb, and to avoid being bent by tho shock of clischarge, was placcd 
carefully in the axis of fire. Be1'ore tho discharge of the mortal' tbe 
fuse was ligbted by a match. In applying the fuse to sbell-guns fired 
horizontally, the problem was so to arrange it as to ignite it by the 
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flame of discharge, and so to support it in the wall of the shell as to prcvent any dislocation of tbe .fuse composition, the cracking of which would pCJ·mit the pcnetration of the flame into the mass. T.l.tis was successfully accomplished, and the Unitecl States navy fuse was justly famous, one feature of it being a simple but most e:ffective device called a" water-cap,'' which guarded against tbe injurious introduction of sand or water when the shell was fired en J'WMhet. The introduction of a safcty-plug in the bottom of the fuse case, which required the shock of discharge to clisplace it in order to open a way of communication be-tween the fuse and the bursting charge iu the shell, and the absence of all accidents in manipulation, inspirecl such confidence that the new arm ad vanced to favor, and both officers and meu were prou el to be idcn-tified with it. 
Previous to the introduction of sbells there had been in use incen-diary projcctiles, not explosi ve, but intended to set fire to an enemy's vessel. llot sbot were applicd to this purpose, but the use of these was chiefly confined to shore batteries, where a suitable heating furnace could be convenienUy provided. The projectile for this purpose chiefly used from ships was the carcass, wbich was a shot in which severa! radial cylindrical holes were formed which were filled with powder tamped to a bard consistency; these columns of composition were ig-nited by the flame of discharge, and continued to burn until consumecl. The flame issuing from these holes served to ignite consumable material in their vicinity. Tbc chief danger from a carcass was from lodgmcnt in the sicle of a ship ; if it landed on deck it could be remoYecl and thrown overboard, as there was no danger from explosion ; the addition of the bursting charge in the cavity of a. shell produced a projectile which was far in advance both for generating aflame and for pl'event-ing interference with its mission. 
The probable destructive e:ffect of shells explocling in the sides or on the opeu decks of ships was thoroughly recognizecl, ancl experiments at targets sufficicnt.ly proved it; but circumstances on a proving-ground and in action are so dissimilar that the experienoe of a naval cngage-ment was lookecl forward to with much interest, in 01·der to satisfy as to the e:ffect of the new projeotile in all the varying conclitions of a sea-fight. Referring to the history of the past thirty years, which marks the period of the general introductíon of shell-guns, it is remark-able how few engagements between ships bave taken place; but on every occasion of the use of sbells, when unarmored vessels were en-gaged, the e:ffect has been most decided and complete. Three instances 
UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY. 203 
only can be referred to of purely sea-:figbts, viz., tbe engagement be-
tween tbe Russian and Turkish fl.eets at Sinope in 1853, during tbe 
Orimean war, the engagement between the United States steamer IIafr 
tera.s ancl tbe Oonfederate cruiser Altibwma cluring tbe war of the re-
bellion, arrel the :fight between tbe Iücwsc~rge and the Alaba;ma during 
thc same w·ar. In tbe a:ffair at Sinope the Russian ships used shells; 
the Turkish had only solid shot. The result was the total destruction 
of the TuL"lrish force. Not one ship escapecl; all were bnrnecl or sunk. 
Tbe figbt between the Alab(Jflna and the J[atte?'as resultecl in the sink-
ing of the IIattm·c~.s; and tbe contest betwecn the Alabama ancl the 
J{ew·sarge enclecl the career of the Alaba?fl.c¿. And it may be noticecl 
tha,t but for the failure to explode of a shell that was embeclclecl in tbe 
stern-post of the Kewrsa1•ge, that vessel migbt bave accompanied ber 
antagonist to the bottom of the sea. 
Tl.te gallant attempt of Rear-aclmiral Lyons with tbe British wooden 
ft.eet before tbe forts of Sebastopol is an instance wbich pro,ed tbe usc-
lessncss of subjecting unarmorcd vessels to t.be steacly fire of fortiiied 
positions using shells from their batteries. 
One other instance of a sea-figbt can be citecl in tbe engagement 
in 18ï!) between two Ohilian armored vcssels and tbe ligbtly armored 
Poruvian tnrretecl vessel IIuascar. The Iluascr~r· was terribly over-
matched dnring tbis flght, but at its conclusion her boilers ancl engines 
wcre intact, arrel indentations on hcr sides showed that ber light armor 
hacl deflectcd a number of projcctilcs; but the cffect of the shells tbat 
had bmst on board of her was apparent in tbe g1'cat destruction of life. 
Tbc n~ry decisive engagement which took place at Lissa in 18GG, bc-
t\\'oen tbc Austrian and Italian fl.eets, should not be omitted in alluding 
to sca-figbts of a late period; lmt this action can bardly be quoted as 
one in which the element of shell-fi1'e can be recognized as the exclu-
si,·e cause of clestruction, for thc remarkablc impetuosity and dash of 
thc a.ttack arrel the desperate use o( the ram produced a crisis which 
ob\·iatcd the necessity for continuous hombal'(lment witb cannon. 
The nccessity of pro,·iding a dcfcnce against sbells was recognized 
both hy England and France dnring the C'rimcan war, and a protection 
of m·mor was supplied to some floating batteries built at that timc 
which wcre intcndecl to operate before fo,·tified positions; and at the 
conclusion of tbe war the English bnilt the 1raNior ancl the Frencb 
built La Gtoire. Tbese wcre the .first spccimens of iron-clad ships oi 
war. They w·ere capable of resisting successfully tbe entrance of shells 
from gnns of the period. It is tims seen that almost coincident witb 
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the general adoption of horizontal shell-firing, naval construction en-
tered a new phase, and ~L new problem was snbmitted to the naval 
artillerist. 
Against an iron-faced target the solid shot might be partially effect-
ive, but the impact of the spberical shell was harmless, and the explo-
SÍ\' e e.ffect of the bursting charge enclosed in it would be superficial. 
This "Tas amply demonstrated in actual practice during our war expe-
rionce, notably a,t :Mobile Bar, in the engagement with the Oonfederate 
iron-clad 7'ervnessee, the roughly constrncted armor of which vessel re-
sistecl a storm of our heaviest shells. 
Tbe impotoncy of the spherical shell against armor being recognized 
by foreign governments, they proceeded to develop the rifled cannon, 
which with its elongated projectile o:fferecl the means of e:ffecting the 
object of the time-to p01·forate armor with an explosive projectile. 
Our authoritíes, however, perseverecl in their faith in the smooth-bore, 
and held that the ?YJddng e:ffect of a spherical projectile of sufficiently 
large calibre was superior to that producecl by the perforation of a rifle 
projectile of inferior diameter. The 15-inch and 20-inch smooth-bore 
cannons were cast in accordance with this idea, ancl the racking sicle of 
the question was so obstinately held that the British govermnent im-
ported in 1867 from the United States a 15-inch gun for tbe pm·pose of 
dcterminíng by their own experiments what foundation there was for 
the advantages that were cla.imed for it. The gun was bought of 
TIORIZON1't~L SECTION OF lliLLWALL SlliELD. 
Ohar]es Alger & Oo., of Boston; it weighed nineteen tons, and tbrew 
a cast-iron spherical solid shot of about fom hundred ancl fifty pouncls. 
It was mounted at Shoeburyness, ancl was fired in competition with 
English rifled cannons of ü-inch and 10-inch calibres. The result of the 
experiments wcnt to show that against a target ~vitb a. power of re-
sistance inferior to the energy of tbe projectile the e.ffect of tbe large 
sphere at short range is more disastrous than that of the elongated 
rifle projectile of the same weight ; but that against a target able 
' 
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to resist the total energy of both the injury done by the rifle pro-
jectile is by far the greater. The comparative e:ffect is well shown 
on a target called the ":Mill wall Sbield," consisting of a plate ni ne 
inches in thickness, backed by Ilughes's hollow stringers-an arrange-
ment of target which to the time of the experiment had proved in-
vincible. The 15-inch smooth-bore spherical shot rebounded from the 
target six feet, leaving a 3-inch indentation on the plate, while the 
9-inch rifle projectile, weighing two bundred and fifty pounds, made 
complete penetration of the plate, passing two or three inches into the 
backing, and the 10-inch rifle projectile, weighing four hundred pounds, 
penetrated to the rear of the backing itself. 
It should be mentioned. in tbis connection that the United States 
government adopted during the war of tbe rebellion a rifled cannon 
]_Jroposed by Oaptain Parrott of the W est Point Foundery, X ew York, 
of which many were introcluced into both the navy and a.rmy, and did 
good service as long as the charges of powder were limited in weight; 
but when thesc guns were called upon for work requiring great enclur-
ance, they proved untrustworthy and dangerous to those who scn·ed 
them. At the naval bombardment of Fort Fisher several of them burst, 
causing loss of life on board the vessels of wbich they formed the ar-
mament. They were constructed of cast-iron, having a coiled hoop of 
wrought-iron shrunk around the breech. Tbey llave ceased to form a 
part of our naval armament. 
During tbe years of inaction in the United States that have inter-
venecl since these experiments, the smooth-bore partisans bave had time 
to reflect and to learn lessons of practical usefulness from observing 
what has been transpiring abroad. Opportunities bave been a:fforded 
to note the progres¡; macle in armor and artillery, and tbough the 
smooth-bore sbell is still operative against unarmored vessels, the ad-
vantagcs of the ri.fled gun under all the circumstances of navy expe-
riences have been admitted, and in tbc transition through wbich our 
nanll artillery is now passing we are not embarrassed by the presen-
tatio;J. of views antagonistic to thc principies on which it bas becn 
<letcnüned OLU' new artillery is to be constructed. The system at thc 
basis of our present acts is founded on a comprehensi \'e 'Tiew o f tbc 
whole subject, ancl is intencled to provide our ships with a sm·plus of 
o:ffensivc power ovcr what their capacity for defence might seem to 
call for. 
Our navy will possess a certain number of armored vessels for coast 
dcfence, and armored sea-cruisers are certain to be included m the list, 
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lmt tbc more numerous class will be unarmored, and the :first problem 
to be solved is that of providing for these a suitable armament. 
The work to be done by an unarmorcd cruiser must be done from a 
clistance when risking an engagement with an armored enemy. The su-
periority of armament must compensate for cleficiency in defensi ve power 
wbich precludes close quarters. To make these ships efl'ective they must 
bo armed with guns capable of doing an extraorclinary amount of work, 
and yet the size of the vessels will not a(lmit of their carrying guns of 
immense weight. In order to get this amount of work out of a compar-
A KRUPP GUN ON A NAVAL CAllRIAOE. 
ati\'ely light gun, we must secure great initial velocity for the projcctile. 
This can only be done by burning a large charge of powder, which in-
\'olvcs a long bore in wbich to burn it, while caro is necessary to secure 
a largc margin of strength in the material of \vhich the gun is construct-
ed. 'Ihose essential demands reqnired a radical change in the form and 
material of our present armament; they aJso forced a change in the 
method of construction. 
The snperior :fitness for cannons of steel ovcr cast-iron was recognized 
many years ago, but the d.ifiiculty of casting steel in large masses pre-
ALFRED KRUPP. 
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vented the introduction of steel guns, and the generally acceptable treat-
ment of cast-iron made it answer satisfactorily the demands for gtm-metal 
not subjected to unusual strains. Mr. Frederick Krupp, of Essen, in 
Germany, was the :first stee! manufacturer who succeeded in casting steel 
in large masses, and he produced a number of steel guns cast from cruci-
bles in solid ingots, wbich were bored, turned, ancl fashioned as in the 
case of cast-u·on smooth-bore guns. These guns held a position in ad-
vanco of other manufactures on the score of strength of material. But 
the introduction of tbe rifle system, the call for higher velocities, the 
increased charges of powder, with the consequent increase of strain, en-
hanced by the friction attencling the passage of the projectile forcecl 
along the bore, hacl the effect of calling attention to the weakness that 
was inherent in the method of construction of cannons. It is welllmown 
that au explosive force operating in the interior of a hollow cylinder of 
any thickness is not felt equally throughout tbe wall of metal; the parts 
near tbe seat of explosion are called upon to do much mor·e work in re-
straining the force generated than are the parts more remote. It has 
been determined that the strain brought upon tbe portions of the wall 
is in inverse proportion to the squares of their distances n·om the seat of 
cffort. Thus, in a gun cast solid, if we take a point two inches from tbe 
bore, and another four inches from the bore, the strain felt at those 
points respectively will be inversely in the proportion of four to sixteen, 
or, in other words, the metal at t\YO inches from the bore will be strained 
four times as much as that at tho distance of four incbes. From this it 
can be seen that the metal nea,r the seat of effort may be strained beyond 
its tensile strongth, while that more distant is only in partia! sympathy 
with it. Rupture thus originatcs at the interior portion, and the rest of 
the wall yielcls in detail. No adeliti on al strength of material can change 
this relationship between the parts; they result from a law, ancl show 
that this methocl of construction for a cannon is untrustworthy where 
the strains approach the tensile strength of the material. 
The rneans of providing against this succcssive rupture of over-
strainecl parts is found in the "built-up gun," in which an interior tube 
is surrounded by encircling hoops of metal, which are shrunk on at suf-
:ficient tcnsion to compress the portions which they enclose. This is the 
principie of "initial tension," which is the basis of the modern.construc-
tion of caJ1nons. By adopting this metbod, an ingot to form a tube to 
hum tbe required amount of powder can be cast of a light weight in 
comparison with what 'Yould be needed for a complete gun, and tho 
strength ancl number of reinforcíng rings to be shrunk around it can he 
14: 
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readily determined, proportioned to the known strain that will be brought 
upon the bore of the piece. The late clevelopments in the manufacture 
of steel by the open-hearth process remove all difficulty to procuring 
the necessary metal in masses suitable for all parts of the heaviest guns. 
BREECIT·LOADING RfFLE·TUBE READY FOR RECEIVING JACKET. 
The huilt-up steel gun is the one now adopted in Emope by the lead-
ing powel'S, and. it is the gun with wb.ich the United States nçlNJ will be 
armed.; but, before its final adoption, efforts were made to convert ol<l 
smooth-bore cast-iron guns into rifles, and to construct new guns partially 
of steel and partly of wrought-iron. As some of these methods of con-
version offered an economical means of acquiring rifled cannons, our 
naval authorities were led into the error of countenancing the effort to 
a moclerate degree. 
The system that was adopted was that originally suggested by .Mr. 
P. :M. Parsons in England, ·which was afterwards patented by :Major 
Palliser, R. A., and bears his name. It consisted in enlarging the bore 
of a cast-iron gun, and inserting a tube of wrought-iron formed of a bar 
arrangecl in the form of a coil whcn heated. The tube was expanded. 
by firing cha1·ges of powder, ancl afterwards rifled. The guns arc muz-
-------=....-~-
zle-loadel'S, anc!- are not increased 
in length beyond that 0f tbc cast-
iron gun which forms the casing 
for the tube. Thc length is tlms 
limited in order to preserve the 
preponderance of the piece, and 
because of the want of longitu-
dinal strength in the coil, which 
cannot be depended on beyond 
DREECH-LOADTNO RfFLE-.JACJ(ET, ROUGIT-BORF.D a few tOllS' strain i the arrange-
A~D TURNED. ment of metal in a coil provides 
very well for circumferential m· 
tangential strains, but in tbe Palliser con vel'Sion the longitudinal strength 
d.epends on tbe cast-il·on casing. The idea of the coiled wrought-iron 
tubc origínated with Professor Treadvtell, of llarvard University, in 
1841. IIe utilized. it by enclosing a tube of cast-iron or steel in the 
PUTTI~G THE J.:\CKET ON A 6-l);CTI BREECJI-LOADING RIFLE-TUBE. 
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sam e manner as it is applied in the wrought-i.ron Armstrong and W ool· 
wich guns. 
The administration of our naval ordnance has abandoned conversions, 
and has concentrated its efforts on the production of an armament of 
built-up steel guns. Tbc system of construction that has been adopted 
originated in England, but was for many years ignored by the gm·ern-
ment authorities. It involved the use of steel in all its parts, and this 
was charged as an objection, as coniidence in this metal was not estab-
lished in the minds of the English artillerists. That government com-
mitted itself entirely to the wrought-iron gun proposed by :Mr. (now 
Lord) Armstrong, whose system was a reproduction of that succcss-
fully experimented on by Professor Treachvell, and the enti.re force of 
the government works at \Voolwich and of the Armstrong works at 
Elswick-on-the-Tyne was occupiecl with the procluction of this style of 
orclnance. The English steel gun invented by Oaptain Blakely and llir. 
J. Vavasseur was ignored in England, but its merit could not be sup-
pressed, and its superiority bas forced a tardy recognition by that gov-
ernment. 
This gun came prominently into notice for a short time at the break-
ing out of the war of the rebellion: some guns were imported for tbe 
serrice o.f the Southern States. At the exhibition in London m 18G2 a 
Blakcly 8.5-inch gun v.·as onc of the features of attraction in the depart-
ment of ordnance. The principie o.f the construction was shown in tbis 
gun, consisting in sbrinking a long jacket of steel around au enclosed 
steel tube, the jacket extencling to the trunnions. :Mr. Vavasseur was 
the manager of the London Ordnance \Yorks, and was associated with 
Oaptain Blakely in the manufacttll'e of bis earlier guns, but the entire 
business soon fell into the hands of :i\lr. V"avasseu1', wbose name alone is 
associated with the succeeding developments of the gun. 
I n 1862 the guns manufactured by ::Mr. Jüupp were solid forgings. 
lle advanced but slowly towarcls the construction of built-up cannons, 
and it was not until the failure of some of his solid-cast guns that be 
entered on the built-up system. Ilis .first steps were to strengtben tbe 
rear portion of new g·uns by shrinking ou boops, and to increase the 
strengtb of old guns he turned down tbe breech and shrunk on boops. 
He confined tbis system of strengtbening to tbe rear of the trunnions 
until he was reminded of tbe necessity of strengtb along the chuse of 
the gun by the blowing off of the cbase of some 11-inch guns of his 
manufacture. llis svstem 'Yas tben morli..fied so as to im·oh·e reinforcing 
the tube of the larger calibred guns along its whole length with hoops, 
14* 
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and bis latcr and largest productions a1·e provided with a long jacket rc-
inforcing the entire breech portion of the tube-a virtual adoption oÏ 
the great element of strength which has always formecl the essential 
feature in the Vavasseur gun which is now adopted in the Unitecl States 
navy. 
In the building up of the steel gun for the navy advantage is so taken 
of the elastic cbaracteristic of the metal tbat all parts tend to mutual 
support. The gun proper consists of a stee} tube and a stcel jacket 
shrunk around it, reaching from the breech to and beyoncl the location 
of the trunnion-band. Outside the jacket and along the cbase of the 
gun there are shrunk on such hoops as the known str~tin on the tube 
may make neccssary for its support. The tube is formed from a casting 
which is forged, rough-bored, and turnecl, and then temperecl in oil, by 
which its elasticity and tensile strength are much increased. It is then 
turned on the exterior, and adjusted to the jacket, the proper clifference 
being allowed for shrinkage. The jacket, previously tumed and tem-
pered, is then heated, and rapidly lowered to its place. The front hoops 
BREECH·LOADING IUFLE AF'fER RECEIVING JACKET. 
over the chase a re then put on, and the gun is put in to a lathe and turned 
to receive the trunnion-band and rear and front hoops. The gun is then 
.fine-borecl and riflecl. 
Each part, as successively placed in position, is expected to compress 
the parts enclosecl tbrough the initial tension clue to contraction in cool-
ing. This tensi on is the greater the farther the part is removed from the 
tube ; thus the jacket is shrunk on at a less tension than are the encir-
cling boops. By this means full use is made of the elastic capacity of 
the tube which contributes the first resistance to tbe cxpanding influ-
ence of the charge. The tension of the jacket prevents the tube bemg 
forcecl up to its elastic limit, ancl it in turn experiences the effcct of tbe 
tension of the other encircling parts which contribute to the general sup-
port; thus no part is strainecl heyoncl its elastic l imit, ancl on the cessa-
tion of the pressure all resume their normal form und dimensions. A 
comparison of this methocl of common ancl mutual support of parts with 
that gi ven by the wall of a gun cast solicl will ser\Te to clemonstrate the 
superior strength of the construction. In order to achieYe this intimate 
A KRUPP llAM~lER. 
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TRANSPOR'riXG CANNON A'f BRE)IERJL-\.YEN. 
working of all the parts it is necessary that the metal of which they are 
respectively composed must be possessed of the same essential charac-
teristics ; in a word, the gun must be homogeneous. It was the absence 
of this feature in the Armstrong gun wbich has caused its aboütion. 
This gun was built up, and the parts "'ere expected to contr1bute mutual 
support, but the 'imnt of homogeneity between the steel tube and the 
encircling hoops of wrought-iron made it Impossible for them to w01·k 
in accorcl, in consequence of the diiferent elastic properties of the two 
metals, which , after frequent clJscluwges, rcsulted in a separation of sur-
faces between the tube ancl boops, when the tube cracked from want of 
support. 
In the construction of the guns for the United States na'i"y, as in tbc 
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new· steel guns now being manufactured in England, the theory of the 
built-up system is practically conformecl to; more so than by Krupp or 
the Fronch artillerists, who use a thicker tube than is considered judi-
cious at Woolwich orat the Washington navy-yard. Any increase of 
thickness of the tube beyoncl what is necessary to receive the initial 
prossure of tl1e charge is open to the objections made to the gun with a 
sol id waU, the proportion of the strain communicated to the hoops is 
reduced, and rupture may ensue from overstraining the tube. The 
thickei' the tube, the less appreciable must be the compression induced 
by tho tension of the encircling hoops. 
BREECU·LOADING RIFLE AFTER RECEIYING JACKET AND CUASE ROOPS. 
The gun is a breech-loader. The system adopted for closing the 
breech is au .American invention (see note, p. 25'7), but having been em-
ployed in France from the earliest experimental pe1·iod, it is known as 
tho French fermefluíre. .A screw is cut in the rear end of the jacket to 
the rear of the tube, and 
a corresponding screw 
is cnt upon a bi'eech-
plug. The screw threads 
are stripped at three 
equidistant places, tho BREECII·LOADING TIIFJ,E WITU JACKET, CHASE IIOOPS, 1 
A.ND JACKET HOOPS IN PLACE. SCl'CW and p ane SU!'faceS 
alternating, thus form-
ing what is called an "interrupted" or "slottecl" screw. The screw 
portions o f the breech-plug enter freely along the plane longitudinal 
snefaces cut in 
the tube, and 
being then 
turned one-
sixth of its cir-
cumfcrence, the screw of the plug 
locks in that of the tube, and the 
breech is closed. 
The success of this system of u. s. N. 6 r:;crr nnEEcrr-LoADINo RIFLE. 
UNITED S'l'ATES NAVAL ARTILLERY. 210 
breech mechanism was not so pronou11ced on its introduction as it is 
to-day. The plug forms the base of the breech of tbe gun, aml all the 
effort of the gases to blow out the breech is exertecl at this poínt. The 
impact upon the end of the plug is very severe, and bas a tendency to 
upset the metal, thereby increasing the diameter of the plug, whích 
would prevent its removal after the <líscharge of tbe piece. With 
quick-burning powder, as was generally in use for ca.rmons at the incep-
tion of the breech-loading experiments, this result ensued if tbe charges 
of powcler were carried abO\•e a certa.in limit, and the consequent re-
striction that was put upon velocities was a serious obstacle to the 
adoption of the system ; but the progress nh.at has been made of late 
years in the science of gunpowder manufacture has relieved the sub-
ject from this embarrassment, powder being now prov:ided which 
communicates very high velocities wh:íle developing pressures so mod-
erate and regular as to be entirely under the control of the artil-
lerist. 
The original guns, four in number, constructed with breech mechan-
ism on the Frenchfermetwre principle for the British government dur-
ing the Crimean war are now in the "Graveyarcl" at W ool wich Ar-
senal. 
The projectiles for tbe new armament are of two ldnds; both, bow-
ever, are shells. That for ordínary use against uparmored vessels is 
styled the commou shell, and is of cast-iron. The length bears a uni-
form proportion to the gun, being in all cases three and a half calibres. 
Tbe armor-piercing shell is made of forged steel, aud is three calibres 
in length. The following tablc gi ves the particulars, approximately, of 
the commou shell : 
Wco~lll. ~bargo. 
lncbH. -----:--:C:-:al,-lbr-•• - Poun•l-'- Pound1. 
GrN. J.cn¡¡tb. I . llursllng ¡ 
úinr·h hreech-londing rifle.... 17.07 3 . .'i9 6\J 2 
6-inch lm:ccb-loading rifle.... 20.90 3.48 100 4 I 
8-iuch hn:ecll-loadiug rifle.... 28.10 3.iH 250 12 
10-incll l.Jrcech-londiug rifle. . .. 3.3.00 3.1>0 500 22 I 
12-inch lm.:cciJ-Ioading rifle.... 42.00 3.50 S!iO 38 
16-inch l.Jrccch-londing ritle.... 56.00 3.fi0 2000 90 
'--------------=- ----'--- ----'-----'------ - - -' 
Tbe armor-piercing shell of the same weight is reduced in length) 
ancl its walls are tbícker; the bursting cbarge is consequently much 
reduced. The follo\\·ing are the particulars, approximately deter-
minecl: 
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Gt:,.. l ,cugtb. \Vclgbt. Chargc. -
Bursting I 
-- e;¡¡;.;- -lnfh("f.. Pound1. Pounds. 5-inch breech-loading rifle .... lli.07 3.01 60 
~.50 1 6-inch breech-loading rifle .... 17.91 2.98 100 8- iuch breecb-loading rifle .... 24.25 3.03 250 :" I 10-inch brecch-loading ritle .... 30.00 3.00 500 12-inch brecch-loading rifle .... 36.00 3.00 850 14 16-inch hreech-lonèling· rifle .... 48.00 3.00 2000 30 
The r if1e motion is communicated by one rotating ring of copper, 
whjch is placed at the distance of 1.5 inch from the base of the projectile. 
The uniform windage for all calibres is .04 inch; thus, taking the 
G-inch gun as an example, the diameter oi the bore across t he lands 
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is 6 inches, the diame-
ter of the shell is 5.96 
inches, the depth of the 
grooves is .05 inch ; thus 
the diameter of the bore 
acrossthegrooves is 6.10 
inches. In order to per-
mit the rotating ring to 
fill the grooYes, it must 
have a diameter of 6.14 inches; this causes a squeeze of .05 inch be-
tween the lands and the rotating ring. 
Therc is no subject in the development of the new naval artillery 
more important than the powder. That used with the 
old artillery is entirely unsuitecl to the new conclitiom: 
that obtain in the modern high-power guns. A brown 
powcler, introduced first in Germany, has exhibitecl de-
cidecl advantages over all others, and the 
efforts to reproduce it have been thoroughly 
COMXON SITELLS, U. S. N. 
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successful at the Du Pont :Mills. It is generally known as "cocoa " 
powder. Its peculiarity exists in the method of preparing the charcoal; 
this affects the color, and results in a brown instead of a black powder. 
\Vith this powder, experiments with the G-inch gun give a muzzle vcloc-
ity of over 2000 feet per second with a projectile of 100 pounds, using 
charges of 50 pouncls, ancl this result is obtainecl with less than 15 t011s 
pressure per square inch in the powder chamber. The grain is pris-
matic, with a central perforation, ancl as regarcls its rate of burning, is 
under complete control in the manufacture ; tbe form provides an in-
creasing surface for the fiame during tbe period of combustion, tlms 
rclie~ing the gun from abnormal pressures at the moment of ignition, 
but continuing the extreme pressure farther along the bore. The pto-
gressive nature of the combustion is Yery apparent when comparing an 
unburned grain with others partially consumcd, blown out from the gun. 
The gun-carriage, which is a separate study in itself, is carried to a 
high pitch of perfection, and presents many features being adopted 
abroad. Tbe importance of a suitable carriage can be appreciated by 
inspccting the following table, w hich exhibits t he enel'f!Y that must be 
controlled by it: 
W elght. Weise ht. 
Pe netri\· :\fuule 
Muu:le Muule thUI Iu V.tu:u-,..~· Wei~ht of W rlgllt o( 
Ous. or of J>ro- VeiCK:h y. Encrgy. Wrou~ht- ¡~r Ton Gun. Carrh•gc. 
Ch•ll<'l· Jetlllc. Irun. of Gun. 
-- -- - -----
Po untis. Pount11. Feet. Ft.-T CIIII . In che•. l-'t.-1'ona. Pc,und•. P()undi. 
,5-inch ~teel hrPech-lnnfling rifle .. so IlO 1!11~ ] ,~~!') 111.7 M2 f'i1 1ST 4,21~) 
U·inch Jottt~t:l hrt:cch-lnlldiug rifle .. !lli 100 1915 2,M~ 1!$.2 ~2i 11,01~) 
6,4110 
S-Iu e h • teci hreech· lnacling rille . . 12~ 2!)() ~or.o 7,2<.~ 1S. 2 5tifl 28,000 
14,000 
lO·ÍIICh HLC t~l hl'f"f"Ch-lnndill !.;" rifl~ -. 2ISO llOO 2100 15.285 ~iJ. 1 r,ss 5\240 32,452 
t·!-inch Mteel hret•ch-ltuuliog rifle .. 425 8:10 210~1 2r, , ~• ~:s 2i.U 6!1] 
44 t,ms .... 
1-l·inch :41eel brcech-lmHlin;.c r ifle 6i 5 13:\tl ~1110 4J ,2j0 32.2 ll.'íO i f'S tons 
.... 
lt.i·inch t~tcel lJrc~ch-lund ing ri fie . . 1000 2otl0 2)00 ül ,l l4 au. s Oi l 101 t' mM ... . 
This energy, total energy, expresses the work that the gun can per-
torm. It is expressed in foot-tons, and signifies that the energr de,'cl-
oped is sufficient to raise the weight in tons to a height of one foot. 
1'hus the projectile from the small 5-inch gun, weighing si.:dy pounds, 
fired \dth a charge of thirty pounds of powder, lea\'es the gun with an 
energy capable of lifting 1525 tons to the height o f one foot ! Compar-
ing this with the energy devcloped by the 100-ton hammer at the forge 
of Le Oreuzot in France, the encrgy of which is lGJO foot-tons, we ha,re 
a. most striking illustration of the powcr of gunpowcler, ancl the testi-
mony in the table as to the energy devcloped per ton of gun more for-
cibly exhibits the perfection of a manufacture which, with so littlc \Yeight 
of gun, can develop such gigantic power. 
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It is this power, united with a moclerate weight of gun, which will 
cnable our unarmored cruisers to hold their own with Yessels moderately 
armored. The po,Yer of tbe battery is greater tbau is requirecl to con-
tend with unat·morecl ships, there is a great surplus of power of ofl'ence, 
UNBURNED AND PAUTIALLY CONSU.\fED GRAINS OF U. S. N. POWDER. 
and the effort is very properly made to sustain this at the highest prac-
ticable point. The table shows that the 5-inch gun can perforate 10.7 
inches of wrought-iron at the muzzle; but the results gi ven in tables are 
based on cleliberate :firing made on a practice-ground, with the posi-
tion of the target normal to the line of :fire. Such conditions cmmot 
obtain during an action at sea, for, besides the modi:fied efl'ect caused by 
increased cltstance of target, it must be borne in mincl tha.t the side of 
an enemy's ship will be presented at varying angles, wbich introduces 
the element of deflectí on, than w hich no cause is more detrimental to 
penetration. Though the table states a fact, tbe practica! efl'ect of tbe 
projectile will be far less than is stated, hence the wisdom of providing 
a large surplus of power to compensate for the resistance to its oper-
ation. 
~..,11il__ 
~~  ___.l,lfllA,. T. f¡, Uf!) 
1> 
' I u I "Jl 'jf~ I I I I 
I "1 t-;--'ï:~ __ :-:::::::=._INI-------·l 
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It "'ill readily be conceded that the artillerist has a very responsible 
duty to perform in so clesigning bis gun that the parts shalllock and in-
terlock to guard against chance of dislocation in the structme. A study 
of the illustration o f tbe 6-incb built-up gun as constructed at tbe W asb-
ington navy-yard will show the system there adoptecl. 
In the list of guns each calibre is representecl by one gun. We 
bave not, as of old, several guns of tbe same calibre differing in weight; 
multiplicity of classes ·will be avoided; but this will apply only to the 
main battery, for bistory is singularly rcpeating itself at tbis time in the 
restoration of the "murdering pieces" wbich bave been cited as form-
ing part of naval armaments in the seventeenth century. The needful-
ness of machine guns for operating against men on open decks, for 
effecting entrance through port-holes, for repelling attacks in boats, and 
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for resisting tbe approach of torpedo-boats, is so widely recognized that 
no 'V'essel of \Yar is considerecl properlr equipped without a secondary 
battcr7 of these "murclering pieces." They a re mounted on the rail, on 
platforms projecting from the sides and in the tops. The types adopted 
in thc United States navy are the IIotchkiss revolving cannon and 
rapid-firing single-shot guns, ancl tbc smaller calibre machinc guns of 
, Gatling. Thc hea~Cier pieces, throwing shclls of six pounds weight, are 
very cffective against vessels of ordinary scantling. 
In contemplating tbe present condition of our new naval armament 
we bave the consolation of knowing that, so far as concerns the study 
of the subject generally and in detail, tbc designs, and the initial manu-
facture, all has been done that could haYe been done with the resources 
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available. 'Yhat has been achieved has been without the facilities that 
are proYided in modern gun factories; but notwithstanding all the 
drawbacks, it is probably safe to assert that no guns in the world to-
day are superior to those tbat have bcen fabricated at the ·washington 
navy-yard of steel on the new adopted pattern. The work at this ord-
nance yard is carried on without ostentation; thore ]s no fl.ourish of 
trumpots accompanying its operations; it is not advertised, and the peo-
ple do not yet know how much they owe to the ordnance o:fficers of the 
RA.PID·FffiiNG SINGJ,E·SIIOT IIOTCITKISS GUN. 
navy for the initiation of this new 1ndustry, which enables us to assert 
our ability to advance in this manufacture through the incontrovertible 
proof of work accomplished. The results are meagre in quantity, and 
at the present rate of manufacture it will require many years to equip 
our fl.eet with modern artillery; this should be remedied, as tbere is 
now no doubt as to the success of the prodnctions of tbis establishment. 
The plant should be enlarged on a liberal and well-maturecl plan, and 
the work should be encouraged by generous appropriations. 
It may not be generally lmown that the steel forgings required for 
tbe few 8-inch and the two 10-inch guns now in hand were imported from 
abroad, for tbe reason that they conld not he furnisbed of domestic man-
ufacture, from the want of casting and forging facilities in the United 
States for work of such magnitude. This was a de:fi.ciency in o ur reso urees 
that required prompt attention to secure us a position of independence 
in this important matter. The methocl of achieving tbe object was care-
fully studied out by a mixed board of army and navy officers, and prc-
sented in a document known as the '' Gun Founclery Board Report," · 
and the subject received the attcntion of committees from both llouses 
of Oongress. All of these reports virtua.lly agreed as to the method, but 
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there was a useless delay in action ; large expenditures of money were 
required, and there was hesitancy in assuming the responsibility of rec-
ornmending it. The object was of national importance, howe\!er, and 
public opinion demanded its accomplishment. The o:fficers of the navy 
ha ve proved their ability to carry on the work successfully; and if the 
opportunity be given they will establish the artillery of the United States 




T IIE U nited States no longer depend upon foreigners for guns or armor, inasmuch as the circular issued in August, 1886, by'the Navy 
Department inviting all domestic steel manufacturers to state the terms 
upon wbich tbey were willing to produce the steel plates and forgings 
required for ships and ordnance, has met wíth a prompt response. About 
4500 tons were needed for armor, in plates varying from 20 feet by 8 
feet by 12 incbes tbick, to 11.6 feet by 4.3 feet by 6 inches tbick; and 
of tbc 1310 tons of steel forgings, 328 tons were intencled for the 6-inch 
guns, 70 tons for the 8-inch, and 912 tons for the calibres between 10 
and 12 inches, both inclusiYe. The rougb- bored and tumecl forgings 
required by the contract were to weigh 3! tons for the 6-inch calibres, 
5 tons for the 8-inch, 9! tons for the 10-inch, 9! tons for the 10!-inch, 
and 12! ions for the 12-inch. From the time of closing the contract 
twenty-eight 6-inch forgings were to be delivered in one year, and the 
remainder within eighteen months. All the 8-inch were to be ready 
within two years, and the 10-inch and larger calibres within two years 
and a hali. The proposals openecl on the 22cl of last March showed 
that for the gun-forgings the Cambria Tron Company had bid $851,513, 
the Midvale Steel Company $1,397,240, ancl the Bethlehem Iron Com-
pany $902,230; ancl tbat for tbe armor-plates the Bethlehem Company 
hacl bid $3,610,707, and the CleYeland Rolling-mill Company $4:,021,561. 
Subsequently the Navy Department awarcled the contract to the Beth-
lehem Company, wh.ich agreecl to furnish all the required steel at a total 
cost of $4,512,938.29. 
The tests are so rigorous that a high quality of steel is sure to be 
procluced. The specifications require the forgings to be of open-hearth 
steel of domestic manufacture, from the best quality of raw material, 
uniformin quality throughout the mass of each forging ancl throughout 
the whole order for forgings of the same calibre, and free from slag, 
seams, cracks, cavities, flaws, blow-holes, unsoundness, foreign substances, 
UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY. 227 
and all other defects a:ffecting their resistance and value. While it is 
prescribed that the ingots shall be cast solid, latitucle is given to the 
methocl of production; but no matter what method may be employed, 
the part to be delivered for test ancl acceptance must be equal in quality 
ancl in all other respects to a gun ingot cast solidin the usual way, from 
which at least 30 per cent. of the weight of the ingot has been discarded 
fròm the upper encl and 5 per cent. from the lower end. 
For breech-pieces each ingot must be reduced in cliameter by forging 
at least 40 per cent.; in case tubes are forged upon a mandrel from 
borecl ingots, the walls must be reduced in thickness by forging at least 
50 per cent. Forgings are to be annealed, oil tempered under such con-
clitions as will assure their resistance and again annealecl, and no piece 
will be accepted unless the last process has been au annealing onc. The 
forgin~ must be left "1\rith a uniformly fine grain. 
All thesc excellent results are the direct outcomes of the report macle 
in 1884: by the Ordmtncc Board. 1st. That the army ancl navy should 
each haïe its own gun-factory; 2d. That the parts should be sbipped 
by the stecl-makers ready for finishing and assembling in guns; 3cl. 
That the goYernment should not undertake the production of steel of 
its own accorcl; 4th. That the "\Vatervliet Arsenal, "\Vest Troy, :N. Y., 
should be the si te o f the army gun-factory; ancl 5th. That the W ash-
ington navy·yard should be the site of the navy gun-factory. No ac-
tion was taken upon tbe recommendation to establish gun- factories; 
but at the firsL session of the Forty-ninth Congress an appropriation of 
$1,000,000 was made for the armament of the navy, of which sum so 
much as the Secrctary determined might be employed for the crcation 
of a plant. Uncler this pennission the gun-factory at the Washington 
11M'y-yarcl is now being cstablished. 
The construction of the breech-loacling steel guns for the new cruis-
ers has been energetically pushed. Slight modifications in the original 
designs were made necessary by the adoption of slower burning powder, 
which carried the pressure still farther forwarcl in the bore, and, in thc 
case of some foreign guns, causecl their destruction. Though our guns 
bave not sufferecl from any such accident, it has been deemecl a wise 
precaution to give the 8-inch guns of the Atlanta two aclclitional chase-
hoops, and to hoop all other picces of this calibre to the muzzle. 
From a memoranclum. kinclly furnishecl oy Lieutenant Bradbury, 
U nitecl States navy, it is learned that the number a nd calibre of the 
new guns now :finished, under construction, or projectecl, are as fol-
lows: 
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Dolphin .............. . 
Atlanta* .............. . 
Boston* .............. . 
Ohicngot ...• . .. . ...... 
Gun-uouL No.lt ...... . 
Gun-boal No. 2 ..... . . . 
Xcwnrk ....... . ...... . 
Balli more ............. . 
C.:hnrleston ............ . 
Miuntonomoh ........ . 
Terror ................ . 
I 
Amphitrile ........... . 
Monadnock ........... . 
Pm·itnn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1 Armored crui ser ....... . 
/ Armored untlle.ship:t .. . 
2 Gun-bonts ........... . 
I 
2 Oru_isers ..... : ....... . 
Flontwg uattenes ..... . 
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This gives a. total of two 5-inch, ono hundred and three 6-inch, ten 
8-inch, twenty-six 10-inch, and ten 12-inch. In his last report, Captain 
Sicard, Chief of Ordnance, states that "for the new ships approacbing 
completion we have eighteen 6-inch, three 8-inch, ancl tvm 5-inch guns 
f1nished, ancl three 6-inch ancl :five 8-inch well advanced, together with 
all the carriages for the Atlamta and Boston, ancl all for the CAicago, 
except the 8-inch .... With brown powder the following- are the best 
results obtained in the 6-inch and 8-inch guns. 
Cus. Powder. Muzzlo Prcssur~ Yclocity, 
-
Foot aeconda. 1'~ns. 
6·inch ................ American Brown. 2,105 15.6 
8 inch .... •••••••• o. W estphnlian Brown. 2,013 15.5 
"It will be observed," be adds, " tbat the muzzle velocities are as 
high, while the chamber pressures are consiclerably below those which 
the guns were calculated to support in service." 
During the preliminary trials afloat of tbe Atlamta's battery in July, 
a few minor faults were unfairly given au importance by the newspa-
pers w bich led the country to believe that the sbip ancl her armament 
were useless. Unfriendly crítics ventecl their spite ancl aired their igno-
rance in conclemnations ''Thich included all who had had anything to do, 
*Complete. t Building at Soutb Boston and West Point. 
t It is probable tbat tbe battery of the battle-ship will be two 6·inch, two lO·incb, ond 
two 12·incb guns. § Probably. 
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even in the remotest degree, with the design and construction of vesscl 
and gun. Indeed,. so bitter and persistent were they that for a time it 
seemed almost hopeless to expect any further good could corne out of 
the Nazareth of public opinion. It was not a questión of polítics, for 
. the journalists of every political faith ran amuck riotously upon the sub-
ject; nor was it a matter of morals, where, through intelligent discus-
sion, better things could be attained, for with brilliant misinformation 
and dogmatic clulness each scribe stuck his pin-featherecl goose-quill 
into the navy's miclriff-it being such au easy, such a safe thing to clo-
and then t hanked Ileaven he was a virtuous citizen. Finally, a board 
was appointed to inspect the ship and battery, and after a thorough 
examination it made the following report: 
"In obedience to the Departmentis order. of tbe 22d instant, the 
Boarcl convened on board the .Atlcmta, Newport, Rhocle Island, on the 
25th instant (July, 1887), and macle a careful examination of the ship, 
guns, carriages, and :fittings, ancl of the damage sustained during the re-
cent tm·get practice, as reportecl by the board of officers ordered by the 
commanding officer of the Atlanta. Thc Board proceeded to sea on the 
morning of the 25th instant, but were prevented from :firing tbe guns 
by a heavy fog wh.ich prevailed throughout the day. The ship was 
again taken to sea on the morning of the. 27th instant, and the guns 
were fired. No deficiencies "-ere noted in the guns themselves other 
than a slight sticking of the breech-plug in G-inch breech-loacling rifle 
No. 5 (this disappeared during the firing), some difficulty in the man-
agement of tbe lock of G-inch hreech-loading rifle No. 4, caused by slight 
upsetting of the firing-pin, and the bending of the extractor in G-pounder 
rapid-:fire No. 5. 
"The recoil and counter-recoil of the 8 a nd G inch gnns were eas.'" 
and satisfactory, except at. the seconcl :fire of the 8-inch brcech-loading 
rifle No. 1, when tbc gun remaincd in. (This was readily l'Un out with 
a tackle.) The action of thc carriage of 8-inch brcccb-loading rifle K o. 
1 at the :first :fire was due to "-ant of strcngth in the clips and clip cir-
eles, and at the second fire to want of sufficicnt bearing and securing of 
the dcck socket. It is belieYed that bad the dcck socket held, the car-
riage would not have bcen cl isa,blcd hy the giving way of the clips. TJ1e 
training gear, stcam ancl l1and, was uninjured; tbc gun was readily 
trained when run out to place. The action of the a.fter G-incb shifting 
gun No.± was satisfactory, notwithstanding that tbe front clips had a 
play of half an inch. The action of the broadside carriages of 6-inch 
guns K os. 5 and 18 was satisfactory, except the breaking of clips, thc 
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starting o f the copper ri vets in the clip circles, and the wood scre\\·s in 
the training circles. 
cc It is believecl from the action of the carriage of 6-inch breech-load-
ing rifle Ko. 5, when the clips were removeu, that the carriages can be 
safely usecl without clips. The clips, however, gi ve aclditional security 
ancl steadiness to the carriage, and assist the piïot and socket in bearing 
tbe shock of the cliscbarge. The firing of tbe 6-pounder rapicl-fire guns 
developed a wcalmess in one leg of the cage mount of No. 4, due to im-
peifect workmansl1ip, ancl showed also tbe necessity of locking nuts on 
the bolts that secure the mounts to the ports. The tower mounts of the 
3-pounder rapi el-fire guns are unsatisfactory. They cannot be moved \\ith 
facility; the line of sight of the gun is obstructe<.l at ranges beyond 1600 
yards, and the guns cannot be safely used as now fitted. For this reason 
3-pounder rapid- fire No. 3 was not :firecl. Tbe tripocl mounts of the 
1-pounder rapid-:fiee guns need stronger holding-clown arrangements. 
The to·wer mounts of the 47-millimetre revolving cannon are like tbose 
of the 3-pounder rapicl-:fire guns, ancl ha ve tbc same defects. The mounts 
of the 37-millimetre in the tops are satisfactory. 
cc Oareful observation of the e:ffect of the .firing upon the bull of tbe 
vessel failed to develop any damage other tban the breaking of the cast-
steel¡1ort-sills a;nd tbe starting of some light wood-work. The shock of 
discbarge was slight on the berth-deck, and observers there were unable 
to observe which 6-inch gun had been firecl. The cleck, bull, and fittings, 
with the exception of the port-sills, hinges to superstructure doors and 
vegetable lockcrs, ancl some of the light wood-work, bave every appear-
ance of strength and abmty to endure the strain of continuous firing of 
the guns. The blast of the forwarcl 8-inch gun, when fired abaft the star-
boarcl beam, will not permit the crews of the starboarcl 3-pounder rapid 
fire and 1-pounder rapid :fire to remain at their gtms. Wben the after 
8-inch gun is fired forward of the port beam, the crews of thc after 47-mil-
limetre revoh·ing cannon and of the port after 1-pounder rapid fire cannot 
remain at their guns. When the forward 6-inch shifting gun is fired on 
the port bow or directly ahead, the crew of forward 8-inch gun cannot 
eemain at their places. Whcn the after 6-inch shifting gun is .fired on 
tbe starboard quarter or directly aft, the crew of the after 8-inch gun 
cannot rcmain at their gun. The inability to fire parts of the secondary 
battery uncler certain conclitions is clue to the great arc of fire given to 
tbe 8-inch guns. This can bardly be called a defect. It is thought 
that a screen can be placed between the 8 and 6 inch guns which will 
enable them to be worked together forwarcl or aft. 
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"The pivot socket of the 8-inch carriage should ha ve a broacler bear-
ing surface, and shoulcl be rigidly bolted to the steel deck and to the 
framework of the ship in sucb manner as to distribute the strain over a 
larger area. The clips and clip circles of the 8-incb and 6-inch carriage 
should be made of steel. Tbe clips should bave larger bearing surfaces, 
and shoulcl be sbaped to fit the circle. The circle sbould bave clouble 
flanges, ancl be bolted (not riveted) on eacb ft.ange to tbe steel deck. 
Tbere sboulcl be no appreoiable play between tbe clips and tbe circles. 
All bolts used in tbe battery .fittings sbquld bave tbe nuts locked. 
"The clip rail of the tower mount sbould be altered to fit the 
mount. Tbis change will malce tbe compressors effective, and allow tbe 
guns to be used witb safety. Tbe port-sills sbould be replacecl by heav-
ier sills, made of the best quality of malleable cast-steel. Tbe plan of 
testing the bull, guns, and .fittings of the Atla;nta arranged by the Board 
contemplated a more extendecl use of tbe main battery, bnt tbe weak-
ness deYeloped in the port-sills and in tbe sockets of tbe 8-incb carriages 
renclerecl fu1·tber firíng inad visa ble." 
Wbate\er conclusion may be drawn from this report, tbere is one 
fact wbich may serve as an important corollary. In tbe latest drills of 
tbe ships on the N orth Atlantic station, tbe Atlanta won the champion 
pennant for tbe best gunnery practice, and this wíth guns aud carriages 
wbich were said to be completely disablecl. 
The safe employment of bigh explosives for war purposes is lookecl 
upon by many as a solution of certain \exed problems, and much time 
ancl money bave been given to the subject. From the nitro-glycerine 
products there has been a loudly heralded advance to melinite and robo-
rite, of wbich the great things expected have not yet been realized. 
Among the most promising attempts to use dynamite in a projectile is 
tbat made with the pncumatic gun, perfected by Lieutenant Zalinski, of 
tbe U. S. Artillery, who has courteously furnisbecl tbe following descrip-
tion of the system : 
"The pneumatic dynamite torpedo gun is a weapon which has been 
evolvecl for the purpose of projecting with safety and accuracy \Tery 
large charges of tbe high explosi ,-es. Wbile a gun in name and form, it 
is practically a torpedo-projecting macbine, tbc propelling force used 
being compressed air. The use of tbe compressecl air gives uniformity 
and complete control of pressures and total absencc of hcat. Tbis in-
sures en tire 2 bsence of dolent initial shocks from the propelling force; 
it also climinates danger of increasing the normal sensiti,eness of tbe 
higb explosiYes by heating while resting in tbe bore of the gun. Tbe 
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ability to reproduce, time after time, absolutely the same pressure neces-
sarily carries witb it great accuracy of fire. Tbe torpedo shell thrown 
by tbe gun is essentially arrow-like, and is very light and compact com-
pared to the weight of charge tbrown. This is a matter of no little im-
portance on shipboard, as a very much larger number can therefore be 
carried for a given weight ancl storage room. The torpecloes projectecl 
by this machine ha ve a twofolcl fielcl of action when acting against ships: 
fu'St, the over-water bull, second, tbe uncler-water bull. 
"The sbell is exploclecl by an electrical fuse. Tbis is brought into ac-
tion if striking tbc ovcr-water hull an instant bifore full impact. If tbe 
sbell misses the over-water bull ancl enters the water, explosion is pro-
cluced aj'ter the shell is thoroughly buriecl, thus obtaining the fullest 
tamping effect of tbe water. The delayed action of the fuse can be con-
trolled so as to cause the shell to go to the bottom before explosion en-
sues. Tlus is needecl at times when the torpeclo shell is used for counter-
rnining a system of submerged stationary torpedo defences. 
"Experiments a.gainst iron plates ha ve shown that it is essential to 
have the initial point of explosion at the rear of the shell. When explo-
sion takes place by simple impact from the front end, the injury to the 
plates is actually less than when a blank shell is used. 
"For these reasons the fuse has been arranged so that the initial 
point of explosion is at the 1·ean· of the shell. No attempt has been 
made to make a shell which can perforate armor before explosion. To 
do so would involve thickening the walls to such an extent as to mate-
rially recluce the weight of the charge carried. Besicles that, it is very 
doubtful whcther a shell fully chargecl with gm1powder can perforate 
any consiclemble thickness of armor without previously explocling its 
bmsting charge. ~iuch more will this be the case wherc the bursting 
cbarge is on e of the more sen siti ve high explosives. 
"Tbe pneumatic torpedo-gun system has various .ficlds of usefulness 
as an auxiliary war appliance. .Among these are the following: 
"1st. On swift-moving torpedo-boats; 2<1. On larger war-vessels, for 
general use and for clefence against surface ancl snbmarine torpedo-boats; 
3d. In land defences; Jth. For use in the approaches du ring lancl sieges. 
"Toq1edo-boats carrying the pneumatic guns can commence effectivc 
operations at the range of at least onc mile, as compared to not more 
than three hundred yards of the boats carrying the Wl1itehead torpe-
docs. Their torpedo shell cannot be stoppe<l hy netting, as is the case 
with the latter. The charges which can be thrown are also much 
greater. The guns to be carried on thc pneumatic dyna1nitc gun cruiser 
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now building for the United States go,ernment will throw shell charged 
with 200 and 400 pounds of explosiva gelatina. These guns can be fired 
at the rate of one in two minutes, aud indeed even more rapidly if required. 
"In the defence of a man-of-war no other means can as effectually 
stop the ad vance either of submarine boats or submerged movable tor-
pedoes. This is clue to the ability to explode the large charges when 
the shells are well submerged. Their radius of action will be so great 
as to avoid the necessity of making absolute hits. The chances of stop-
ping the attack are thereby very much increased. 
"A tube of large calibre can be fixed in the bow, so as to be of use 
when ad vancing to the attack with the ram. An 18-inch s heli, con-
taining 1000 pounds of explosive gelatina, can be thrown 500 yards in 
advance of the ship, and that, too, without danger of running into the 
explosion of its own petard, as wonld be the case in ejecting clirectly 
ahead ordinary torpedoes. This will be made more clear by the state-
ment of the relative speecl of the two classes. The pneumatic gun tor-
pedo has a mcan velocity of 400 knots for a range of one mile, as 
compared to 25 knots for a range of 200 yards of tbe Whitehead tor-
peclo. Furthermore, there is no danger of the sheil turning back, as is 
sometimes the case with the latter. 
"The opportunities of making an o.fiective bit will be much greater 
with the torpedo shell than with thc ram; it will be easier to point the 
vossel fairly at the enemy's broadside whon at the range of li ve hundTed 
yarcls than to bring tbe ram in absolute contact with the enemy's sicle. 
The gmt-tubes usecl are very thin (not exceecling three-quarters of an 
inch in thickness), and may be o f soctions of any convenient length. 
The other portions of the supporting truss, reservoirs, etc., are also of 
comparati>ely light weight. They could be of large calibres, and the 
clestructi ,.e effccts producible by large charges of high explosh-es will 
doubtless haYe a demoralizing effect upon the defence." 
Upon September 20th of tbis year a public trial was successfully 
made with the gun, the target being the conclemncd coast sur\'C.V 
schooner Silliman. After firing two shots to vorify the range, the gun 
was loaded with a projectile ,-.,.bich was fivo ancl a hali feet in length, 
containecl fifty- fise pounds of explosive gelatine, and was :fi.red under 
an air prcssure of G07 pounds. The torpcdo rushcd from the muzzle of 
thc tube with a loucl report; in thirteen secontls it plunged into the 
water close under the starboard quarter of the Silliman, and exploding 
almost instantly, threw a great Yolume of water one hunclred and fifty 
feet into the air. 
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For a moment the sohooner was lúdden from view, but when the 
mist olcared away it was found that her main-mast had toppled over the 
side. At a distanoe this seemecl to be all the damage in:fl.ioted, but a 
oloser mspeotion showed that all the woocl-ends on deck had been loos-
ened, that the cabin fittings had been thoroughly shaken up, and that 
water was running into tb~ hold. 
Soon 'afterwarcls a fourth sbot was fired. Tbis lancled very olose to 
the starboard sicle of the vessel, and ou explosion seemed to lift the 
8ilUmcm out of the water. 
The bull was very badly shattered; the water-tank, which had been 
firmly fastened to the sohooner's bottom, was blown up through the 
deck and :fl.oated on the wreckage, and the stump of tbe main-mast was 
capsized. The bow was held above water by barrel buoys, and the fore-
mast, whioh had heeled over to an angle of forty-five degrees, was sus-
tained by the steel rigging that bad beoome entangled in the pieces of 
wood .fioating to windward. 
MA ORINE AND RAPID- FIRE G UNS. 
ÜF the maclúne guns, the Gatling, Gardner, N orclenfeldt, and 1Iaxim 
systems are the best known. The adoption of the Accles feed in the 
Gatling eliminates largely tbc liability <?f cartridge jams, and inoreases 
the rapidity of fire at all angles to twelve bundred sbots per minute; 
when th1s rapid delivery of fire is not needed, Bruce's slower feed 
may be substituted. The Gardner gun is an e:ffective weapon, but it bas 
less rapidity of .fire and smaller range of vertical train than tbe Gatling. 
The Norclenfeldt rifle-calibre gun has not obtainecl the prominence of 
the others, aml the Maxim, in whioh the energy of recoil is ingcniously 
appliecl to the work of loading and firing, is growing in favor. Tbe 
IIotohldss revolving cannon was a wonderful step-the 37, 4'7, ancl 53 
millimetre calibres fi ring :i pou nd, 2t pouncl, a nd 3t pou nd explosi ve 
projectiles, with muzzle velocities of about 1400 feet per second. "Tbe 
heavier nature of revolving cannon," declares Oommander Folge1', 
United States Kavy, "proved somewhat umYieldy, and tbe change to 
the single barrel of increased lengtb, and using a heavier powder charge, 
was a natural one, and in keeping with the growil1g ballistic power of 
largo guns. Though no longer clenominated machine guns, tbe term 
now being generally applied to a oluster of barrels, the rapid-:fire guns 
are a direct outgrowth of the larger calibres of machine guns, and arc 
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classed with them as secondary battery arms. There arc now in the 
service of all the grea.t military powers rapid-firing guns of ±7 and 57 
millimetre calibre, firing respectively explosive shells of 3 pounds and G 
pounds weighi, at muzzle velocity of about 1900 feet per second. This 
will give with the 6-pound gun a range of about 2t miles at 10 degrees 
eleYation. These guns will deliver, under favorable circumstances, per-
haps ten aimed rounds per minute, and the sbells perforating tbe sides 
of au unarmored vessel, and bursting, after passing through into, say, 
twenty-fi.ve fragments, each with energy sufficient to kill a man, we 
llave here a weapon of unequaJled destructiva capacity. It is beyoncl 
question that the contlitions of combat between ships ancl forts are defi-
nitely changecl by the ad,·ent of tbese guns. Even armored vessels 
with covered batteries are at a disadvantage, as a hail of missiles will 
seek tbc gun-ports and conning-towers wherever an enemy, from the 
nature of circumstances, takcs close quarters. Experiment abroad has 
also demonstrated that the projecting chase (forward body) of a large 
gun is extremely Yulnerable, and liable to injury from the fire of the 
larger rapid-firing pieces. 
"This system, which is just now so important an adjunct to the 
main battery of ships of war, is of but recent development. The first 
order l'ecciYed for a weapon of this kind by the IIotchkiss fum came 
from the United States, and the guns now mounted in the new ships 
Boston, .Atlanta, and JJolpltin were delivered under it. Three calibres 
were obtained, viz., the 6, 3, and 1 pounder, as they are known in tbe 
United States navy, their usual names in other countries being tbe 57, 
4 7, and 37 m.illimetre guns. Since their introduction the demand for 
larger calibres by most of the prominent naval powers has been so 
pressing that the Ilotchkiss Company has produced a 9-pounder and 
has a 33-pounder in course of manufacture. It is believed that this last 
calibre represents about the límit of utility of the IIotchk.iss system, 
though the gain in time by the use of ammun.ition carrying the charge 
projectile and fulminate in one case will recommend it for use with 
much larger calibres, even where two men may' be required to handle 
the cartri<lge." 
The most important trials of rapid-fire guns during the past two years 
are thns clescribccl by Lieutenant Driggs, United States navy: 
"The various systems now in use, or heing developed, are the .Albi ni, 
.Armstrong, Driggs-Schroeder, Gruson, IIotchkiss, Krupp, :1Iaxim, N or-
denfeldt. Of these tbe .Armstrong has not been favorably receÏ\'ed on 
a.ccount of the cumbersome breech-closing arrangement. This consists 
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in two sicle levers attached to and turning about the trunnions; a cross-
hcad connects the two levers, and by an eccentric motion one of them 
ís pressed against or removed from the breech of the gun, thus closing 
or opening it. The Bausan has two of tbose guns, but with that known 
exception few, if any, bave been put in service. 
" The Gruson gun is said to be very similar to the Hotchkiss in its 
mechanism, though not as good. The Maxim and Hotchkiss are both 
well lmown. The N ordenfeldt, which in Europe is the greatest rival 
of tbe IIotchkiss, is entirely di:fferent from the guns heretofore macle 
uncler this name. In the single-shot rapid-.fire gun the breech is closed 
with a double breech-plug, which is revolved in the breech recess by a 
cam motion. The plug is divided transversely; the front half carries 
the .firing-pin, and has only a circular motion in closing and opening; 
the rear half acts as a wedge, thc first motwn being downward and the 
second circular, the front half then moving with it. 
"One of the most complete tests to which guns of this class have 
been subjected was that conducted by the Italian government in Febru-
ary of last year (1885). The trials \Yere made at Spezia, the following 
being offered for test: IIotchkiss r~pid-fire; improved Nordenfeldt 
rapid-fi.re on recoil carriage; Armstrong rapid-fire; and a rapid-fire gun. 
made at the Government W orks at Ven ice. ·The Armstrong gun was 
not fired; tbe others were :fired in the following 01·der: N ordenfeldt, 
IIotchkiss, and Italian. 
"Thc guns were mounted on board a small ship (the Vulcano) for 
firing at sea. A large target was fixed on the breakwater in the mid-
dle of tbe harbor of Spezia, and two smaller targets of triangular shape 
bad been anchored, one 550 yarcls insicle, and the other 550 yards out-
side, the breakwater. The Vulcamo was then placed 1300 to 1400 yarcls 
inside the breakwater, and fire begun against the large target with tbc 
Nordenfeldt 6-pounder gun, ·which was 'Yorkecl by Italian sailors. A 
:first series of eighteen shots were fired in forty-seven seconds, for rapicl-
ity of fire witb rough ainiing. A second series of sixteen shots were 
firecl in thirty-four seconcls. The rapiclity of .fire with rough aiming 
and untried men was thus respectively at tbe rate of twenty-three and 
twenty-eight shots per minute. Afterwards, ten case-shots were fired 
with tbe gun almost level, in order to see how the lead bullets were 
spread over the range. Some of them were seen to touch the water 700 
or 800 yards from the muzzle, ancl the whole range was well covered by 
the 150 lead bull ets contained in each of tbe N orclenfeldt case-shots. 
"The seconcl part of the programme consistecl of the firing at three 
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targets, respectively at 600, 1200, and 1800 yards, the ranges being only 
approximately known, changing the aim at every third shot, and .firing 
uncler difficulty, owing to tbe movement of the ship. Twenty-one com-
mon shells were :fired, seven at each target, witb good accuracy, and the 
s bells on strilcing the water burst better at the shorter than at the longer 
ran ges. 
" The :firing at sea was closed with one more series of ten rounds, 
fired rapiclly in twenty-six seconds, in order to see if the gun would act 
well after being heated by the eighty-fi\'e rounds which hacl already 
been firecl. Four of the last series were ring-shells, and lmrst on striking 
the water at tbe first impact, breaking into a larger number of pieces 
than tbe com mon shells. The K ordenfelclt gun was then mounted on 
shore for tests of penetration. The plates used were: (1) a 5t-inch solid 
wrought-iron; (2) a .J:...inch solid (Cammell) steel plate; (3) one .¡-inch steel 
plate, at an angle of :fifteen clegrees to line of fire. The two thick plates 
were backed by ten inches of oak, ancl at rigbt angles to line of :fire and 
one hundred ya.rds from the gun. The perforation was in every case 
complete, both with solid steel shot and chilled-point shells, tbese latter 
bursting in the wood behind. 'J;'he thin plate was then put at more 
acute angle to the line of fit·e, and only when this angle was sevcn de-
grees or eight degrees did the projectile útil to penetrate. The indicated 
muzzle velocity of this gun is 2130 feet, with a 6-pound projectile and 
charge of two pounds fifteen ounces. 
"A fe\v day!:> aftenYards the IIotchkiss gun went through the same 
trials a.ntl pl'ogramnn For rapidity forty rouncls were :fired with rough 
aiming in three minute.>, the rate being 13.3 per minute. The shooting 
was good, but the men serving the gun complained of being fatigued by 
the shocks from the shoulder-piece. The muzzle velocity was about 
1085 feet, or about 300 feet below that of the Nordenfeldt. Last of all, 
the Italian gun was 1ired, but as it was clesigned fo1' 1480 fcct vclocity, 
it was not brought in direct competition with the other two guns in 
power. The rapiclity of fire obtaincd, however, was abont twenty rounds 
per minute, and both tbe mechanism ancl recoil-carriage wodced well::~ 
"Tho Ilotchkiss ancl N ordenfeldt guns wcre tried in competition at 
Ochta, near St. Petersburg, in Scptembcr last (188G). The reports that 
have reached this country are ve1·y meag1·e, but are unanimous in favor 
of the Norclenfeldt gun. From wha.t can be learned, the fil'e "'as ilrst 
for rapidity, in which the T orclenfeldt discharged thirty rounds in one 
* From Army cmd Na11y Gazette, l!,c!Jruary 27, 1886. 
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minute, and the IIotchkiss twenty rounds in the same time, the initial 
velocity of the former being 624: metres (20±7 feet) per second, while that 
of the latter was 548 metres (1797 feet) per second. 
" The fire of both guns was directed upon a target at 1800 metres 
(1969 yards) range. The N ordenfeldt scored nine bits, while the llotch-
kiss macle none. It is more than likely that this failure wa::: due more 
to defective pointing than to any defect of construction. 
"The trial closed with a very interesting and instructive experiment. 
"Four targets were placed at 600, 800, 1000, and 1200 metres; each 
gun was to fire as rapidly as possible for · thirty seconds, changing the 
mnge each fire, from the 600 up to tbe 1200 metre target ancl back. 
During this test the Nordenfeldt is said to have discharged fifteen shots 
in tbe thirty seconds, and to bave made nine bits, wbile tbe Hotchkiss · 
l\"EW 6-INCH BREECU·LOADING RlFLE. 
scored but two bits and only discharged eleven rouncls in thirty-two sec-
onds. Ilere again the element of inaccurate sighting may be largely 
responsible for the di:fference in the number of hits, but the great dis-
parity in the number of rounds firecl must be due to the mechanical de-
fects in the Ilotchkiss system by which the action of its breech-block is 
too slow. Notwithstancling the reported success of the Nordenfeldt gun 
in the trials, the Russian govemment ordered a number of .Hotchkiss 
guns a.nd no Norclenfeldts." 
The latest experiments with large calibred rapicl-:fire guns were 
those of the Armstrong 36 ancl 70 pounder. The first piece di:ffers 
materially from the new 33-pounder IIotcbkiss; it is 4.724 inches in 
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calibre, H feet 2t inches length, ancl weighs 34 hundrecl-weight. It was 
:firecl ·with seven and a half pouncls of powcler ten times in forty-seven 
seconcls, or at a rate six times faster than that obtainecl with the serv-
ice guns of like calibre. The 70-pouncler was :firecl with both twenty-
:five-pouncl and thirty-poun<.l charges, at a spee<.l of from eight to ten 
rounds per minute. In the latest mount for the 36-pouncler the gun 
is supportecl on a rocking slide which pivots on transverse bearings, so 
that tbe piece moves only forwarcl ancl backwarcl on the slicle ; éleva-
tion and clepression are given by a shoul<.ler-piece attache<.l to the sli<.le, 
and the gun is securecl at any <.lesirecl angle with a clamp attachecl tq 
the sicle of the sli<.le. 
This clevelopment of rapid-:fire pieces opens anew the cliscussion as 
to tbe comparative values of large ancl small calibre guns. At the pres-
ent stage of the question it is safe to say that, however necessary the 
large calibre may be in armored battle-ships ancl coast-defence vessels, 
its usefulness in thin- skinned, high~ powerecl cruisers is questionable. 
Abroacl, the long-range guns which constitute the primary batteries are 
bcing reclucecl in calibre, while the secondary batteries of rapicl-:fire guns 
M'o increasing so much in size that before the next sea-war a nearly uni-
form calibre of four or :five inches will probably be established. 
The reasons for tbese changcs are not clifficult to understand. In all 
sca engagements 1wreaftcr type will :fight with type; that is to say, 
apart from the ròle which auxiliary rams an<.l torpedo-boats may play, 
armored ships '" ill oppose armored ships, an<.l unarmored cruisers and 
gun-boats will, wben intelligently hanclled, seek action only with vessels 
of similar character. To-day every unarmored ship afloat or uncler con-
struction can be penetratecl at the average :tighting clistance by a mus-
ket-bullet impellecl 'vith a little more than the ordinary velocity; and 
as there is a.bsolutely no protection, it seems a mistake to arm such vcs-
sels with the unnecessarily large calibres no'Y in use. Especially is this 
true when their employment is based mainly upon the remote assnmp-
tion tha.t such ships may have to attack fortilications. Smaller guns 
will do the work equally as well, if not better ; for the greater intensity 
of fire securecl by the certain action of a large number or easily bandled 
small-calibred guns is surely more valuablo than any probable aclvantage 
which might be derived from heaYier projoctiles :fired under cond1tions 
that make their offectiveness doubtful. 
1 
Whatever may be said to the contrary by mere theorists, the diffi-
culty of handling ordnance increases enormously as the calibres grow; 
ancl sea-o:fficers, who alone a.re the proper judges, insist that the monster 
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pieces of the present day a.re so umnanageable as to be nearly useless. 
Of course, where armor penetration is vital to success, heavy armaments 
must and will be employed; but when tbis factor need not be consid-
cred, a great many light guns, easily worked by hand, are the demands 
of the hour. The problem, fortunately, is nearer solution owing to the 
clevclopment now in progress; and when this is coupled with the rap-
idly increasing popularity uf the 5-inch breech-loading all-steel rifle, our 
country notably may congratulate itself that ordnance is reverting to a 
plane which other nations mistakenly ancl at great cost abanclonecl, and 
which the Unitecl States can readily attain. 
' ' 
SHIPS OF THE MINOR NA VIES. 
EARL Y in September of this year there sailed from England for tbe East :fi ve Chinese war-vessels of the latest types : tbe OMA Yüan 
ancl Oltinr; Yüa;n, fast cruisers ; the King Yüan ancl Lai Yüa;n, coast-
defence ships; and a torpeclo-boat as yet unnamed. Tbough the squad-
ron was commanclecl by Aclmiral Lang, a captain in tbe RoyalNavy tem-
poraril,r serving under the Chinese government, the otber officers were 
mainly, and the crews were wholly, natives who had passed through 
English cruising and training ships. The Ol1§h Yüa;n, 'Yas commancled 
by Oaptain Tang, who hacl uncler bim niue English ancl :fifteen Chinese 
officers ancl one hunclred and fifty men; the Ol1-inr; Yüa;n, was in charge 
of c~'i>tain Yih, and eleven English and fourteen Chinese officers, with 
the samc complement ; ·wbile the other ships were officered and manned 
much the same way. Tbere was, it is true, an English fieet surgeon, 
lmt each ship had its native medical officer and two chief engineers, one 
of whom was a Cbinese. "On leaving Spithead," stated the H erald 
cable despatch, "the fleet will proceed direct to Gibraltar, thence to 
Port Said, where it will take in coal; it will stop at Suez, Aden, Colom bo 
(where it will coal again), Singapore, llong-Kong, Chefoo, and Taku, 
joining at tbis place the fl.eet already asscmbled under Admiral Ting, 
and replacing there many of the forcigners by native officers. The 
voyage is expected to occupy se,·ent.Y-two days-füty-tn·o at sea and 
twcnty in harbor-and during this time the crews ''"iU be tboroughly 
pracLisecl in t01·pedo, gun, ancl other drills. This, of com·se, will in-
voh-e a cleal of hard work, snch as would try the endurance of English 
sailors, but the Chinamen will be allowed a plentiful supply o.f beef and 
beer." 
Modern cruisers ancl armed battle-ships requiring tbe highest intelli-
gence to flght, torpedo-clrills, beef and beer-and all for tbat outer bar-
barian whom our mobs murder just for a lark! ITere is a lesson for 
Congressmen ; here au e.xample and a possible menace for this defence-
less lancl. 
The Chinese navy, though of recent growth, consists to-day of seven 
lG 
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armored and ten unarmored ships of modern types, in addition to tor-
pedo-boats, and to at least thirty other vessels which are not so obsolete 
as nine-tenths of the ships this country has in commission. 
N early ten years ago the Cbinese government realized tbat its wood-
en corvettes, gun- boats, and armed junks were no longer ada.pted to 
warfare, and ordered from the V ulcan \Y orks at Stettin the two steel 
cruisers Nrun Slvu and Nrun Slwn. These are of 2200 tons displacement, 
~Lncl with 2400 horse-power ha ve developed 15 knots speed ; their arma-
ment is composed of two 8-inch ancl eight 4~-inch Armstrongs, and of 
lighter secondary pieces. In 1881 these ships were followed by the ar-
mored battle-ships Oken Yürun ancl Tinç¡ Y ürun, and by the steel cruiser 
Tchi Yürun. The battle-ships are built of steel, ancl have the following 
dimensions: length 296.5 feet, beam 59 feet, mean draught 20 feet, dis-
placement 7430 tons .. Their compound armor extends througbout a 
central citadel 138 feet long, and around a nearly elliptical redoubt sit-
uated at its forward end; tbe sicle armor is fi ve feet wide, and has a 
thickness of 14 incbes at the water-line, of 8 inches at tbe lower and of 
10 inches at the upper edge ; tbe protection to the redoubt is 12, and to 
tbe conning- tower S, inches tbick. Thc armament consists of four 
12-inch Krupps, echeloned in pairs within the redoubt; of two 5.9-inch 
Krupps mounted forward and aft inside of machine-gun proof turrets ; 
of eleven Hotchldss revolving cannons, and a supply of Whiteheacl tor-
podo-tubes. The. engines are of the three-cylincler compound type, and 
develop 7300 horse-power ancl 15.5 lmots. The ships bave double bot-
toms, minutely subdivided, and in addition to a cork belt forward and 
abaft the citadel a steel protecti ve cleck two inches thick curves to the 
extrcmities. The twin-screw stecl cruiser TcJ¿i Yürun is of 3200 tons 
clisplacement, and has two sets of two- cylindcr horizontal compound 
engines, which·develop 2800 horse-power and a speed of 15 knots; her 
dimensions are : length 236 feet 3 inches, beam 34 feet 5 inches, and 
draught 15 feet 9 inches. .The entire under-water body is covered by a 
curved steel deck, which is 4 inches thick, and extends 4 feet 9 incbes 
below the water-line; the space between this deck and the one above is 
used for coal-bunkers. " There are t wo machine-gun proof tm·rets on 
the fore and aft line, the base of the forward one being surmounted by 
a :fi.xcd tower armored ·with 15-inch steel, which extends to a height suf-
:ficient to protect the base of the turret, its machinery, and g'lm-ca.rriages. 
The armament is composed of two 8.27-inch (21 centímetre) Krupps in 
the forward turret, of one 5.9-inch (15 centimetre) Krupp in the after 
turret, of two similar guns on the main deck aft, of five Hotchkiss re-
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volving cannons, and of a supply of Whitehead torpedes, discharged 
through four above-water tubes." 'r. 
The swift protected cruisers Chil& Yüan and CM1n(! Yüan were built 
at Elswick; the unnamed torpedo-boat is of the Ya'l'?'OW typc; and the 
coast-defence vessels Kin(! Yiian and Lai Y.üan were constructed at 
Stettin. The clisplacement of the cruisers is 2300 tons, length 2G8 feet, 
beam 38 feet, depth 21 feet, and draught H feet forward and 16 feet 
aft. Each vessel bas two pairs of triple-expansion engines. Both the 
engine ancl boiler rooms are el ivicled in to water-tight compartments by 
transverse and longitudinal bulkheads, and the machinery is so arranged 
that either boiler can 110rk on one engine or on both, ancl the change 
necessary to effect this can be made while the vcssel is in motion. Tbe 
result of this intercommunication between each engine and each boiler 
is that the vessel can proceed so long as any single boiler and engine arc 
uninjured. 
In the four trial trips, two with and two against the tide, with all 
their weights, armament, and Chinese crews on board, they attained an 
average speed of 18.536 lmots. 
The vessels are built of steel, and have two decks, the lower onc 
consisting of four-inch steel plates, rising in the middle above the wa-
ter-line and inclincd at the sicles so as to <lip below it. The engines, 
magazines, rudder-heacl, and steering gear lie bolow, ancl are protected. 
by this deok. Tbe openings in the de-ck are encirclccl by coffer-dams. 
armorecl with steel plates, inclined so as to cleflect projectiles. Tbe 
bows are formed and strcngthenecl for ramming pm·poses. Additional 
protection is given to tbc vesscl by a partitign which is built on tho 
protecti\'e deck parallel to tbe sicle of tbc ship; tbis encloses a spacc 
that is eight fcet wide, and is subdivided into a great numbe1· of water-
tight compartments for the stowage of four hundred and fifty tons of 
fuel. Both ships haYe clouble bottoms, minutely subdi\·ided into watcr-
tight compartmcnts. 
The armament consists of three 21 -centimetre Krupp guns-two 
mounted forward and one aft-all on centre-pivot, sh ielcl-protectecl Va-
vasseur cardages ; of two G-in eh Armstrongs on sponsons, also Va vasseur 
mounted; of eight G-pounder rapid-fire Ilotchkiss; and of six G-atling 
guns. There are four above-water tol'peclo-tubes-two fixecl (one in the 
bow, firing ahead, and one aft, pointed astern) and two training, one in 
each broadside. 
* Lieutennnt Colwell, United States Nnvy. 
MODER~ S HI PS OF W AR. 
Tl1ere are two electric search-lights for each vessel, \Yith a nominal 
power of 25,000 canelles, while the cabins and rest of the ship are lighted 
with incandescent lamps. 
"It is hnmiliating," writes the A.1•my wnd ]{({fl)y Gazette, "but never-
theless an actual fact, that two of the cruisers of the Chinese squadron 
undcr command of Admiral Lang are superior in certain novelties of 
construction to any of our own vessels of tbis class. In point of speed 
the two unarmored ships which bave been turned out by the Elswick 
firm cannot be touche<l by our swiftest cruisers. They steam nearly 
ninetecn lmots an bour. The traversing and manipulation of their guns 
can bc effected with such rapidity that when saluting the garrison at 
Portsmouth recently it appeared aJmost impossible tbat the guns could 
bave been properly sponged betwecn each discharge, the two bO\Y guns 
cspecially keeping up a continuous roar. Only the two sponson G-inch 
guns arc from Armstrong's; tbey are mountcd on Vavasseur carriages, 
and .fitted with singula:rly simple brcech apparatus. The other three 
heavy guns are Krupp's 2l·centimetres (about St-incb). These last are 
protected with a shield of entirely unique construction. It is of steel, 
and commencing from the trunnion ring spreads out into a wide shelter 
sufficient to accommodate the entire gun cletachment. Tbe sights are 
also under coYer. The stern-chaser has a single shield ; the two bow-
chasers are inclnded ·within one. The torpedo apparatus is most com-
plete. In acldition to the two tubes opening aheacl and astern, which 
are well above the surface of the water, there are six others in ·connec-
tion with tbe torpedo-room. 
"But the hLtcst improvement which is observable on board is the steel 
ar:mored conning-tower, :fitted with Lord Armstrong's patent telcgraph 
and com:munications, for which a special royalty of four hundrecl pounds 
has to be paid. It is the most perfect scheme for conducting fighting 
operations that has ever corne uncler om· notice. A model for laying all 
the guns is prominently placed in front of the steering-wheel, which is 
under personal command of the officer m charge. On the lcft are tubes 
and telegrapbs by which he can converse with the officer in cornmand 
of tbc gun detachment, anu correct any mistakes observable in the lay-
ing of tbe guns. Then he can fire simultaneously, if desirable, or singly, 
if preferred. All stations on boarcl are also in communication with this 
conning-tower. IIence the entire fighting power of the vessel, torpe-
cloes and all included, is at the disposal of tbe officer in command within 
the conning-tower. Another useful modification bas been effectecl in 
these vessels. The conning-tower, which is at the foot of the foremost 
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:fighting mast, has close to it the signal station, also protected with steel 
armor, so that the signaller therein is absolutely secure, and close to the 
commancling officer, from whom he receives and to whom he communi-
cates outside signals." 
The torpedo-boat built by Yarrow is said to be the fastest of its 
size that has ever been launchecl, as it has reached a speed of about 
twenty-eight knots an hour. It is armed with two :fixed 14-inch torpe-
do-tubes in the bows, ancl one 14-inch training-tube on deck abaft the 
funnel. It is also supplied with a powerful armament of IIotchkiss and 
Gatling guns, and ~L strong electric search -light so arranged as to be 
worked either from the conning-tower or from the cleck. 
Tbe I{irzg Yüan and Lai Yüan, built by tbe Vulcan Company at 
Stettin, are powerful vessels, effective for either coast clefence or distant 
sca service. Their principal dimensions are : length 269 feet, beam 39 
feet 4 inches, depth 25 feet 6 inches, mean clraught 16 feet 8 inches, and 
displacement 2900 tons. They are built entirely of steel, with clouble 
bottoms extonding two-thircls of the length, and the under-water body 
is clivided by bulkbeacls into sixty-six water-tight compartments. The 
armor protection is compound, and consists of a belt six feet wicle ex-
tending tbe length of the macbinery and boiler space, having a maxi-
mum thickness of 9.5 inches at and above the water-line, and a míni-
mum thickness of 5.1 inches. This belt is terminated at either end by 
thwartsbip armored bulkl1eads, 5.1 inches thick. At tbe forward end 
of tbe òelt is a circular revolving tmret eight inches thick, on top of 
which is the conning-tower, with an armor protection of six inches. 
The under-water body is protected by a complete steel protective deck, 
1.5 inches thick over the top of, and tbree inches thick forward and 
abaft, the belt. A partia! cork belt abovo the protective deck gives 
adclitional stability. The engines consist of two sots of three-cylinder 
compound type, situated in two separate compartments, driving twin 
scre1\rs, and developing 3400 horsc-power with forced draft. The boil-
ers, four in number, are placed in two separate compartmonts. A speed 
of about sixteen ]mots was attainecl. The armament consists of two 
21-centimotre (8.27-inch) Krupps mounted in the turret; o f two J 5-cen-
timetre (5.91-inch) similar guns carriecl in recessecl pol'ts; of two 47-mil-
limetre IIotchkiss rapid-.fire guns; of fi ve 37-millimetre revol ving can-
nous; and of fo ur torpedo-clischarging tubes- three abovc-water ancl 
one in the bow below the water-line .. ;c. 
* Naval Intelligence, Gcncrnl Informntion Series No. 5. 
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AE additions to the lightly armorecl gun-boat Tíong Sing, built in 
1875, China ordered this year from the Vulcan Company two heavy 
coast-defence vessels of 7000 tons displacement an<l 6000 horse-power, 
and laid clown at Foochow an armored gun-vessel. The TslLao Yong 
and Y wng W alÍ are stecl cruisers built at Elswick, of 1350 tons displace-
ment and 24:00 horse-power; they ha ve developed sixteen lmots, and are 
armed with two 10-inch and four 4t-inch Armstrongs, with a secondary 
battery of two lighter pieces and six machine guns. The F ee-clwn, a 
small steel cruiser built at Sunderland, England, has triple-expansion 
engines, and is expected to develop thirteen knots. IIer armament con-
sists of two 6-inch Armstrongs and four lighter guns ; she is also :fitted 
to do cable work. Three cruisers of the ~Nan SAu type are being con-
structed in Ohinese dockyards, besicles several of the Kiu.mg 0/¿en class 
of gun-boats. 
The J apanese navy consists of forty vessels, of which eight only are 
modern. The classified armored fleet inclucles five ships, among them 
the Adsa;ma K(J!n, formerly 1..-nown as the Stonewall Jaolcson j none of 
these is of any importance except the central battery ship Fu Soo, which 
was launchecl in 1877. In J anuary of this year, however, the J apanese 
government ordered from the Société eles Forges et Chantiers de la 
Méditerranée two coast-defence vessels, to be built on the plans of l\1. 
Bertin, constructing engineer . of the J apanese navy. They are to be 
built entirely of steel, on the cellular plan, with two longitudinal and 
twelve transversa bulkheads. Their principal dimensions are: length 
295 feet 2 inches, beam 50 feet 6 inches, depth 3± feet 9 inches, draught 
aft 21 feet 2 inches, displacement 4140 tons. The armament proposed 
is one i2.6-inch (32-centimetre) breech-loacler, eleven 4.72-inch (12-centi-
metre) breech-loaders, six rapid-fire guns, twelve revolving cannons, and 
four torpeclo-tubes-one in the bow, one in the stern, ancl one each broad-
side. Two independent triple-expansion engines, dri,'ing twin screws, 
and required to develop 54QO indicated borse-power with forced cll·aft, 
a.nd 3400 with natural draft, supplied with steam by six three-furnace 
boilers in two groups, nu·nish the motive power. The estimated maxi-
mum speed is sixteen knots. A heavy protective steel deck and a com-
plete surrounding arrangement of coal-bunkers protect the engine and 
boiler space and magazines. The complement of officers and men will 
number fom hundred. In :March, Í887, a small armored gun-vessel, de-
signed by the same official, was laid clown at the Ishikawa-Shjma dockyard, 
J apan. The displacement is 750 tons, length 150 feet, and beam 25 feet . .¡.,• 
.,. "Recent Naval Progress." 
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Of the unarmorecl vessels, the sister-ships Ncvniwa Kan (alreacly cle
-
scribecl) ancl TalcatseMo are at present the most important, though
 six 
modern cruiscrs now under construction in Japanese dockyards 
\Yill 
soon be a<ldecl to the fieet. The navy is m.anned and officerccl ex
clu-
sively by natives, and the service is well administerecl ancl pop
ular. 
Owing to possible com.plications with Ohina, coast defence has becom
.e a 
li\•e national question, ancl the wealthy Japanese are subscribing l
arge 
sums for ships ancl forts. In adclition to these voluntary contributi
ons, 
the new tax which has been imposed will enable J apan to put he
rself 
in an excellent conclition for attack or defence. 
Thc other navies not clescribed in these pages bave atloat or unde
r 
construction but few modern ships-of-war. Still, there are vessels in
 the 
minor services which ought to be briefly describcd. One of these
, the 
..A.l/milrante Brown, of the Argentine navy, is a twin-screw, central-
bat-
tery steel ship which was launchecl in 1880. Her dimensions arc: le
ngth 
2-10 feet, bearn 50 feet, draught 20 feet 6 inches, and displacement 
4200 
tons. \Vith 4500 horse-power she attainecll3. 7 5 knots, and her coal en
dur-
an ce is given as 4300 knots at 10 knots speed. Her armament is m
acle 
up of eight 8-inch ancl six 4i-inch Armstrongs, ancl of four machine g
uns ; 
the armor is compouncl, nine inches thick on tbe belt and eight in
cbes 
on the batteq. Tbere is also building in England for this governm
ent 
a central casemate steel cruiser of 4±00 ~ons clisplacenient. The ar
mor 
on the cascmate is to be compouncl, ten inches thick, ancl the armam
ent 
is to be composed of eight 8-inch breech-loading Armstrongs, wi
th a 
secondary battery of rapid-fi.re guns and torpeclo-tubes. The estim
atecl 
speecl is fourteen knots. In adclition to these two vesscls the Argen
tine 
navy has two small coast-defence turret-ships, one 14-knot steel cru
.iser 
(tbc Patagonia, which is similar in appearance to the Unitecl S
tates 
steamer Atlanta), six gun-boats, eleven torpedo-boats, ancl a few o
thcr 
vessels of an unimportant character. 
The Brazilian navy has, exclusive of her capital torpedo-boat flotilla
, 
over fi.fty vessels, of which a dozen are classed as armored. These
 last 
arc mainly meclium draught, coast-service turret-ships ancl ri ver m
oni-
tors, though among them are the Riaclwelo and .Aquidaban, t\\~.in-
screw 
armored cruisers, ancl the Solimoes, an armored battle-ship. The Ria
eh~<r 
elo made a sensation when she fi.rst appearecl, and is still onc of thc 
most 
formidable vessels in the world. She is built of steel, ancl L.as the
 fol-
lowing dimensions: length 305 feet, beam 52 feet, draught 19 fe
ct ú 
inches, clisplacement 5700 tons. ller armor is compound, eleven in
ches 
thick on the belt and ten inches on the turret, conning-tower, and
 re-
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doubt. She has also a steel cleck, which cmves fonvarcl to strengthen 
the ram, and aft to protect the steering gear. Iler armament consists 
of four 9-inch 20-ton Whitworths (Armstrong altered) mounted in two 
ecbeloned turrets, and of six 5t-inch guns carried under cover in the 
superstructure. IIer secondary battery includes fifteen machine Norden-
feldts and :five above-water torpcdo-tubes. With 7300 horse-power she 
attained a speecl of 16.71 knots, and is creclited with a coal endmance 
of 4500 mües at 15 lmots speed. 
Tbe Aquidaban is of tbe same type and general appearance as tbe 
Riachuelo, but of smallcr dimensions. Iler length is 280 feet, beam 52 
feet, draugbt 18 feet, displacement 4950 tons. The compound armor is 
from sevcn to eleven inches in thickness, and sevcn feet in width on the 
water-line belt, and is ten inches. thick on the conning-tower and on tne 
oval redoubts which protect tbe bases of the two echeloned tmrets. 
The armored cleck and redoubt roofs are built of steel, from two to three 
inches thick. The armament consists of four 9-inch 20-ton guns mount-
ed in the tm·rets, and of four 70-pounders carried undcr the superstruct-
me. The secondary battery is made up of :fifteen 1-inch Nordenfeldts 
and five above-water torpedo-tubes. She de\'elopecl on trial 6251 horse-
power and a speecl of 15.81 knots, and made on the voyage from Lisbon 
to Bahia 3600 knots in 13 days ancl 17 ho urs, and from Bahia to Ri o Ja-
neiro 750 knots in 2 clays ancl 20 bours. Th.e average speed for the 
passage from Englancl to Rio was nearly eleven knots on a daily coal 
consumption of forty-three tons. 
Tbe Chilian navy has the two iron- armored, twin- screw, central-
battery ships Almirante OocMa;ne ancl Bla;nco Encalada, ancl tho lightly 
armorecl turrct-ship liuascar. Tbc Almi?·ante Oochmne ancl Blanco E?wa-
tada are 210 feet in length, 45 feet 9 inches in beam, 19 fect 8 inches in 
clraught, ancl 3500 tons in clisplacement. Tbe former carries four 9-inch 
a,nd two 7-inch brcech-loacling .Armstrong rifles, four lighter pieces, and 
seven machine guns. Before the alterations ancl repairs lately macle, 
tbc Blwnco Encalada hacl six 12-ton muzzle-loacling Armstrong rifles, 
four lighter pieces, ancl sevcn machine guns. The Il-uasear was built in 
1865, and is a slightly protectecl iron ship of 2032 tons displacement, 
1050 borse- power, and 12 knots speed. Uer battery consists of two 
10-inch muzzle-loading Armstrongs and two 40-pounclers. Iler wonder-
ful record on the west coast of South America has made her name as fa-
miliar in the mouth as a household worcl, and wbatever may ha-ve bcen 
the justi ce of the war, there never can or will be a question of the superb 
courage with which she was fought by her gallant officers and crew. 
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Ohili has three wooden corvettes, the Cluuxilnteo, O'lliggins, and Pilco-
mayo, one composite corvette, the Jfagella,nes, one steel cruiser, the 
Esmeralda, five gnn-boats, two paddle steamers, one despatch-boat, one 
transport, and eleven torpedo- boats. In April, 1885, The Esmeralda 
ran from Valparaiso to Oallao, 1292 nules, in one hnndred a.nd eight 
honrs, the cngines during the last eight hours barely turning over. In 
the exhausti ve trials made before her de part urc from En gland the hi gb-
est specd attained was 1St knots per hour. 'l'he Esrnemlda is said to be 
at p1·escnt in an inefficient condition, both as regards her speed and bat-
tet;y pow er. In N ovember, 1886, the Ohilian govern ment gave the Arm-
strong firm an order for a powerful, partially- protected steel cmiser, 
\\hich is to be of ±500 tons clisplacement, and to develop 19 ]mots 
speed. Uer armam.ent is to consist of two 10-inch, one 8-inch, and 
two 6-inch Armstrong breech-loaclers, with a secondary battery of four 
G-pounder rapicl-fire guns, eight llotchkiss revolving cannons, and eigbt 




SUBl\fARINE W ARFARE. 
T IIE practicability of submarine navigation was
 esta.blished by the Dutch over 
two hundrcd and fifty years ago. Then, as now, its underlyinp; idea, its cla
im 
for recognition, was the advantag'es the system gave in marine warfarc. 
Nor is 
its battle value overestimated; for snch a boat, if successful, cxercises an i
nfiuence 
that is great in material uses, that is enormous in moral cffccts. Its dcve
lopment 
has been slow; for though the problem was solved long ago, no practica
! rcsults 
were attaincd unti! witbin the ]ast thirty years. During the late war su
bmarine 
boats were for tbe first ~ime employed with such sufficient success that t
he great 
maritime powcrs bave considered thc type to bave an importance wbich 
justified 
im,estigation. They reached this conclusion because no plan of defenc
e cxists 
which could dcfy tbc operations of a weapon that attacks not only matter b
ut mi nd. 
1'here is no danger whicb sailors will not face; beca use tbeir en\'Ïronment
s are 
always perilous, and their t radi tions are rich with glorious records of sccm
ing im-
possibilities overcomc by pluck and dash. They are willing always, even
 against 
the hcaviest odds, to acccpt any fighting cbancc. They know that thc une
xpected 
is sure to bappen. The spirit that made FarTagut take the Iead of his diso
rganized 
line in l\lobile Bay still !ives; bis clarion cal l of "Damn the torpcdoes! 
Follow 
me!" is a sea instinct, born of brine and gale, wllich never dies. 
'\Yhatever coast fighting or port hlockading may demand, sea battlcs arc
 un-
changcd. llistory tcacbes that ships always closcd for action, and tha
t vesscls 
lighting each other from beyond the circling horizons, or bull down, w
ith long-
range g uns, are the drcams of shorc inventors. Guns and ships havc c
banged, 
but men and the sea arc changelcss. The fighting distancc of to-day
 is not 
much greator than it was in Nclson's or in Pcrry's time i and the next n
aval war 
will surely pro\'C that battle will be nearly as close a::; in Benbow's agc, \y
hen tbc 
gallant tars oombed innocuous four-ponud shots out of their pigtails, and 
battcred 
eaoh other within biscuit-throwing distance with dcftly shied chocking qn
oins. 
lt is fortunate, in the interest of good, squarc fighting, that the opem
tive 
sphere of submarine boats is Iimited to coast work. Fortunate, l>ecau
se w!Jile 
the bra,·ery and the grit arc thc same, the tbrcatcning of a dangcr whic
h cannot 
be squarcly met is apt to benumb the heart of the stoutest. A sailor 
bates to 
run i he docs 11ot carc to fight anotber day whcn the chance of the pr
esent is 
open bcfore him i but of what avail are the highost com·agc and skill a
gainst a 
dull, vcnomons dog of au cncmy who crawls in the darkness out of the deo
ps, and, 
silently attaching a mine or torpedo, !caves bis impotent foc to sure destr
uction? 
Submarine mines may be countermined i whon neccssary, defied i guns 
may 
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bc silenced a nd torpedo- boats so riddlcd by rapid- fire guns that they will be 
disabled bcyond thc radius of their cffccti\'e action; antomatic torpedocs may bc 
checkcd by netting, or by thc prompt manoouvrings of the attackcd vesse); ship 
may always figbt ship. But what is the chance for brain or brawn against a 
successful submarine boat, when the mere suspicion of its preseuce is enough in 
itsclf to break down the blithcst, bravest heart of oak. It 1s hcre that their moral 
effects arc cnormons. 
The history of their developmcnt may be brietiy told. In 1624 Cornelius 
Van Drebble, a IIollandcr, made some curions experiments under tbc Tbamcs. 
Jlis diving-boat was propcllcd by twelve pairs of oars and carried a dozcn per-
sons, among them King James I. In 1771 Bnshnell, of Connecticut, constructed 
a boat which ·washington described in a Ietter to Jefferson as bcing a "machinP 
so contrivcd as to carry thc inventor under water at any depth he chose, and for 
a considerable timc and distance with an appcndage chargcd with polvder, which 
he could fasten to a ship, and gÍ\'C fire to it in time suflicient for bis returning, 
and by mcans thereof dcstroy it." Fulton borrowed Buslmell's idea, and in 1801 
c.xpcrimcntcd successfully with it iu tbe Seine. He descended under water, re-
maincd for twenty minutes, and after having gone a considerable dist:mce, emerged. 
In 1851 a sboemaker named Phillips launched in Lake .Michigan a cigar-shapcd 
boat forty feet long and four feet in its greatcst diamcter. This was bis first 
attempt, but in the com·se of a few ycars be so far perfectcd bis arrangements for 
purifying the air that on one occasion be took bis wifc and children, and spent a 
whole day in exploring the bottom of tbc lakc. In tbc history of thcsc boats, as 
told in the report of tbc Board on .Fortifications, Pbillips afterwards descenclcd iu 
Lake Eric, near Buffalo, and never reappeared. 
:Many other attempts wcre made, the most successful bcing tbat of a Rus-
siau mechanic, who in 1855 built a dwing-boat which was undcr such perfcct con-
trol that be could remaín submerged for eíght hours. Tbe boat which sank the 
IIousatonic was a remarkablc submaríne vesse!; it was about thirty-five fcet Jong, 
built of boiler ü·on, and bacl a crcw of nine mcn, of whom eight worked the pro-
peller by hand, wbile tbe nínth steercd and governed the boat. She coulJ bc 
submergcd to any desired deptb or could bc propellcd on the surfacc. .A.ftcr 
various misbaps she went out of Charleston harbor, attacked and sauk the United 
States steamer IIousatonic, then on blockadc duty; as she never returncd, it is 
supposcd that tbe reflex action of tbc torpcdo dcstroycd her. 
In the report quoted above the results alrcady attained in submarine naviga-
tion arc tbus summarized by Captaiu l\laguire, U.S.A.: 
l. Submariuc boats bave been built in wbich se\'Cral persons bave dcsccndcd 
(with safety) for a great distance below the surface of the water. 
2. Submarine boats bave been propclled on and under thc surface in all di-
rections. 
3. Thc problem of supplying the neccssary amount of respirable air for a 
crew of severa( persons for a number of bours l1as been solved. 
4. Stcam, compressed air, and clectricity bave been used as tbe motive power. 
5. The incandescent eiectric light has been used for illuminating the interior 
of submarine boats. 
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6. Seeing apparatus bave been made by which the pilot, white under water, 
may scan the horizon in all directions. 
7. A vesse! has been in time of war dcstroyed by a submarine boat. Tbc 
latter, it is tme, was also snnk, but it was for reasons that are no longer in force. 
As yet no petfectly successful boat of this type has beeu tried in any naval 
war, but thcre is no question that they will bc uscd at the very first opportunity. 
Compared with a surface boat, thc submal'Ínc has tbc following advantages : 
. 1. It docs not need so mncb specd. Thc sut·facc boat demands this quality so 
as to get quickly within striking range of its torpeclo, and then to escape spcedily 
out of rangc of macbine guns, etc. 
2. Its submersion in the presence of tbc enemy prevent!! tbc engines being 
hcm·d. 
3. Thcre is no smoke nor glare from tbc fires to cause its detection. 
4. The boat aud crew, being under water,.are protected from the fire of ma-
<"h inc guns and rifles. 
5. It iG enabled to approacb tbc encmy ucar enough to make effective even an 
uncontrollable fish torpedo. 
6. It can be used with safety as a rcconnoitring or despatch boat. 
7. It can examine tbe faults in the lines of submarine mines, and replace 
mines explodcd in action. Abroad, the Xordenfcldt boat has awakened the most 
intercst, and here the American submarine monitor holds the first place. 
Thc form of thc Nordenfeldt boat is that of a cigar or of an elongated cylin-
<lcr tapering away to a fine point at cach cnd. Thc outcr case, built of stout 
Ktccl, is calculated in its constrnction to resist snch a prcssnre as wonld enablc 
t he boat to dcscend e ven beyond a depth of fifty fcct, although that is set as the 
maximum for its diving opcrations. Thc cigar shape docs not at first sight com-
mcnd itsolf, cvcn in tbe eycs of nau ticnl mcn, on accoun t of its supposecl ten-
dcncy towards a rolling motion. 'l'he cxpcricnce, howcver, gnined with thc boat 
cxhilJitcd for thc bencfit of naval experts at Carlscrona, in Scptcmber, 1885, has 
sltown that Yery good sea-going qualitics can bc dcvclopcd in a craft built upon 
snch fines; for this small vesse! has weathcrcd more than one gale in the Baltic, 
to say nothing of thc sevcre storm it cucountcrcd at tbc cntrancc to tho Kattegat 
whcn procccding f rom Gottenburg to Copcnhagen for tbc experimental trials. 
This quality resnlts from the fact that each cnd of thc boat forms a tank, 
which is fi lled with water, and as there is no extra buoyancy in those dircctions, 
and consequently no tendency to lift at tbosc parts as with au ordinary vesse! in 
a sca-way, the vesse! riscs and falls bodily iustead of pitching. It has becn found 
that by gomg at a moderato speed and taking tbc seas a point or so on tbc bows 
the boat makes 1·ery good weather, as the waves, brcaking on thc snout, swecp 
o1·er tl1e forc part and expcnd their force bcfore any portion of them can rcach 
thc central section. 
Steam, which is employed as motive power, is perfectly trustwortby as an 
agent. There is nothing about its action, or the appliances connocted with it, that 
is bcyond the grasp of au ordinary engineer, whcreas such can hardly be said as 
yct in respect either to electricity or the other agencies by which im-eutors bave 
sought to obtain motion. The difriculty, howevcr, has always been how to retain 
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steam pressure for any grcat 
lcngth of time without carry-
ing on combustion. Tbis in 
tbc Nordenfeldt boat is secured 
in the following ingenious man-
ncr : A large reservoir or llOt-
water cistern (mm·ked Q in tbc 
plate) is placed in the fore part 
of tlw boat, in communication 
with the boilcr. The stcam 
from the Jatter passes tbrough 
a numhcr of tubes in the reser-
voir N, tims raising the tempcr-
aturc of its contents unti] tbc 
prcssure stands at the same de-
grce in botb. \Ybile the boat 
is at the smface, the maxirnum 
pressure once attained, as Jong 
as combustion is carried on, 
supplies quite enough steam 
both for driving the engines 
at full speed and for maintain-
ing tbc contents of tbc cistcrn 
in the proper superhcated con-
dition. \Vhcn the boat is sub-
mcrged and tbc furnace do01·s 
arc closeq combustion ceases, 
and tnc steam given off by 
thc l1ot water in the boiler and 
cistcrn is sufficient to kecp tbc 
cngines going for several hom·s. 
Submerswn to tbc various 
depths required is secured by 
the motion of the vertically 
acting screws, S S, driven by 
small three- cylinder engines. 
The boat is so ballasted as al-
ways to have spare buoyancy, 
and while a few revolutions of 
the screws will send her untlet· 
water, the arrest of tbeir motion 
is all that is reqnired to bring 
bct· to tbe sm·face again. Jn 
tllis arrangement, as even the 
non-tcchnical reader will read-
ily understand, there is a great 
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element of safety, the rising motion being entirely independent of 
any machinery 
which might refuse to act at the required moment. Anotber ad
vantage is also 
gained in the ease with which the horizontal position is maintaine
d by regulating 
the speed of the screws. To assist in keeping this position there
 is a horizontal 
rudder or fin, R, at the bows, which, by a very ingenious arrangem
ent of a plumb 
weight with other mechanism in conncction with the steering tow
er, works both 
antomatically and by hand. Tbc torpedoes are carried on tbe 
outside of the 
boat, as shown at F. They are Swartzkoph or \'\Tbitebead, as the
 case may be, 
and arc rclcased by electrical action nnder the control of tbe capta
in, standing on 
the platform at P. Cisa cnpola of stout glass by wbich a view is
 obtained occa-
sionally when the boat is ruuning snbmergcd. 
Oonstruction Details.-The following arc tbc dimensions of the Turk
ish boat: 
length 100 fect, beam 12 feet, displacement 150 tons, speed 
12 knots, and 
coa) enclnrance snfficient for travclling 900 miles. Tbc engines 
(E) are of the 
orclinary inverted compound sm·face condcnsing type, with two 
cylinders, and 
with 100 ponnd prcssurc indicatc 250 horse-powcr. Tbe circu
lating and air 
pumps being actnated by a scparate cylindcr, the main engine is le
ft free to work 
or not, while a vacunm is always maintaincd to assist the various
 other engines 
with which the boat is fitted. In this respect it should be men
tioned that all 
the engines are specially designed with such valve arrangement
s as will make 
the utrnost use of thc vacuurn, it having bcen found tbat while th
e boat is run-
ning bcneath the surface as much power can be developed below th
e atmospheric 
line as abovc it. 
Tbc boiler, B, is of tl1e ordinary marine return-tube type, with tw
o furnaces, 
and the hcating sm·face is about scven hundred and fift.y square fe
et. The tanks 
at each cnd of thc boat contain abont fifteen tons cach, and ther
e is a third of 
Se\'en tons capacity at the bottom of the central compartment
 for regulating 
bnoyancy. Thc coal is stored around the l1ot-water cistern as well
 as at the sides 
of the boilcr and over the central ballast tank. 
Tllree men and tbc captain can efficiently work this boat, althoug
h she may 
carry a crew of seven, who conld remain in hcr for O\·er seven hou
rs beneath the 
water withont experiencing any ditliculty in respiration. ~o attem
pt is made as 
iu some systems to pnrify thc atmosphere by chcmical means, as 
it is said to be 
quite nnneccssary. 
The Pmctical Management.-Tbe boat. is opcrated in tbc following
 manner: 
Steam baving becn raised to the rcqnired pressure, the funncl i
s lowered, and 
water is Jet into tl1e ballast tanks to bring the craft clown to the p
roper trim for 
action. In tbis condition tbc screws, S S, are sufliciently nndcr w
ater to obtain 
the requisite thrust. The boat may still proceed at the slll·face fo
r some time if 
the encmy be distant, bnt the conning-towcr should Lc closed, a
nd the cupola 
hatch and tbe furnace doors shut, before there is any chance of d
isCO\'Cry. Thc 
vertically acting scrcws being started, the hoat is thcn submcrged
 to the eupola, 
and continues approaching unti], according to circumstances, it be
comes prudent 
to disappear entirely. Thc direction is takcn at the !ast moment, a
nd maintained 
by compass unti! within striking distance, when a torpede is rclease
d, and the boat 
immediately turns in another direction. 
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In May of this year there was lannched at Barrow a Nordenfeldt boat 110 
feet in length and 13 feet in diarnetcr. The engines are capable of devcloping 
good power, and a speed of 12 knots on tbe surface was realized. The boat was 
tri cd on the Bosporus du ring J uly under govern ment supervision, and as these 
were satisfactory, it seems likcly that a number of similar vessels will be built next 
ycar for the Ottoman navy. 
The original submarine monitor Peacemaker is well known tbrough its trials 
on the lludson River in 1886, but since then so many improvcments bave been 
made in the direction of increaseu efficicncy that it is confidently expected the 
boat j ust designeu will surpass its former successes. It must be uuderstood in 
the bcginniog that its esseotial principie remains the sarne, all the important im-
provements beiog the outgrowth of the experience gained in previous experi-
ments. 
Broaclly defin ecl, tbe new craft has a miclsbip section, wbich throngh its high 
centre of buoyancy and low centre of gravity gives great stab il ity of form, or, to 
rnake it plain to the non-technical render, it differs from the ordinary cigar aod 
tortoise shaped boat in beiog more nearly like tl1e sectiou of a pear, the apex 
of which forms the keel. Its longitudinal section is not unlike the form gen-
erally used, though the lines are such as ha,·e been fonod to give tbe form of 
least resistaoce and the highest speed. 
I t is built of steel, with frames and spacings sufficient to stand the pressnre of 
the lowest depth to w11icb the boat is or can be expected to go. Thc oid dimen-
sions were : length 30 feet, depth 7 feet, and beam 8 feet. In order to obtain 
incrcascd speecl tbc present vesse! will be 50 feet in lcngth, 8 fect in beam, and 8 
fcet in depth, with a displacement of from thirty-five to forty tons, or an amount 
sufficient to carry the weights of the interchangcable boiler, of the sixty l10rse-
power cngine, aod of the provisions ancl fuel necessary for a surface cruise of one 
week, and, when nccessary, for a constantly submerged cruisc of twelve l10nrs. 
The advantagcs claimed for thc ncw boat are that sbe is so self-snstainíng as 
not to neecl tbc assistance óf any other vesse! ; that sbe is not au accessary, but 
has in herself all essentials of defencc ; and that sbe answers all possible neccssi-
t ies for submarine work of any kind whatevcr, whcther in peace or war. The 
increascd speed will , it is l10pcd, gi ve her power to attack modern vessels under 
way. vVhen submergecl, as was proved fast summer, she sent no bubblcs of ai r to 
the surface, and had neithcr a wake nor a wash to militate against the possibili-
ties of an absolutely secret attack. Besides these ad\·antages, the boat is said to 
be a safe surface- cruising \'essel, forming no target for the clestructive action of 
an enemy's attack, and at the same time having a capacity for disappeariug so 
readily under water aud avoidiug the possibility of discovery that the encU1y will 
bc unable to tell when, where, or how the assault upon him may be rnade. 
As in a former trial an accident proved the danger of an exposed conoing-
tower, the Submarine :Monitor Company bave providcd a fio or g uard for protect-
ing the new belmsman's lookout and compaoion-hatches. The waterlock appli-
ance employed in the original boat has now au additional use in supplying a 
mode of egress and ingress, the opening being made telescopic, so as to permit 
surface runs in comparatively rough water. \Vhen submerged, the smoke-stack 
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acts telescopically, and is closed with a water-
tight valve. To a>oid the necessity of divers 
going out of thc boat whcn under water, there 
arc vnrious openings at places in the exterior 
skin to which rubber sleeves or arms, with a ra-
dins sufficient to cover almost all practica! neces-
sities, will be fitted. These aperturcs do not con-
stitute planes of wcakness or dangcr, because thcy 
are normally closed by stout water- tight dcad-
lights. 
Thc 'Vcstinghousc engine is cmploycd, as its 
construction prevents, by the packing uscd, any 
radiation of beat and the consequent elcvation of 
tempcration below. The air-tight doors and bnlk-
heads work laterally, and the conning-dome is 
made of stecl, with snch apertures as will cnable 
the hclmsman to ha\"e, when on the surface, an 
all-round view, and whcn submcrgcd, a sufficient 
light to let him in the daytime read, at a dcpth 
of thi rty fcct, the timc by his watch. 
Should thc nccessity arise, whcn submcrged, 
thc purity of the atmosphere bclow is preserved 
by passing thc air through caustic soda, thus 
climinating carbonic acid gas, and by rcinforcing 
thc loss of oxygcn from tanks of comprcssed air. 
ln thc original experiments thc boat was frc-
quently submcrgcd six hours ata time, and thc 
crcw of two mcn bad no othcr air supplied than 
tbat which the boat carrièd down with hcr. 
Bcsides thesc chemical means thcre ar·e r11lr 
bcr tubes floatcd by buoys, with nozzlcs which 
protrudc above the wash of the sm·face water. 
'l'here is in cach tube an automatic vah"c, which 
prcvcnts water coming through thc pipe at thc 
timc thc air is bciug pnmped in, and the dcpth 
below the smfacc to which outsidc air can bc 
supplicd is limited ouly by the len'gth of thc pipe. 
In tho platc, A rcprescnts a patented inter-
changcablc boilcr, ip which eitl1er hydro-carbon-
ate fuel or caustic soda can be usecl, in both cases 
stcam bciug tbc motive powcr. Thc interior boil-
cr for thc use of the caustic soda is surroundcd 
by a jackct, into ~vhich the steam exhaustcd from 
thc cngine can be used before it becomcs so sat-
urated as to rrcatc a back pressure ou the onginc, 
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límit is attaincd, and tbc snrface is rcacbed, thc soda can bc blown off into au 
ontcr receptacle provided for the pnrposc, and then rcheated and rechargcd. The 
hydro-carbon fuel is ordinary mineral oil, carried in tanks of sufficieut capacity 
for a sm·facc run of a week. It may bc emphasizcd as au important fact that this 
mcthod of exhausting into tbc jacket of the boilcr avoids thc possibility of any 
bubbles appcaríng on the surface, as was notably tbc case with the carlier Lay 
boats. 
Before diving, the caustic soda, wltich bas bcen already heated by the combus-
tion of the oil to thc proper degree, acts in place of the ordinary fuel, thus consti-
tuting a sort of perpetual motion, until tbc point of saturation is reachcd, and back 
prcssurc in tbc engine rcsults. 
Thc boat, whcn on thc surface, is run with tbc oil fuel, but as soon as it hccomes 
ncccssary to divc th is fire is cxtingnished, the after-hatch is opened by unlocking 
thc door of the bulkhead scparating thc after from thc bulkheaded end of the vesse], 
and by a system of fans the hot air from the fire- room is driven outboard. Then 
thc after tclcscopic hatch is recfed and secured, the soda is thrown from the re-
ceptacle whcrc it has been heated into the jacket of the caustic-soda boiler, the 
fires arc put out, the smokc-stack is taken in and securely fastened, and the ma-
chinist, lcaving the enginc- room, goes through thc bulkhcad door in to Lhe for-
ward compartment, whcre he has complete control of the machinery and boiler by 
mcans of a duplicate set of ganges and ]evers. In case of an attack, the man de-
tailcd for opcrating the main torpedo is left in the after compartment, whcre he 
has access to that weapon and to thc buoy, reel, and other mcchanical appliances 
cmployed in its operation. 
The helmsman, who controls the stcering apparatus that governs the horizon-
tal and perpendicular rud'dcrs, also opcrates with llis fcet the )evers which are 
connectcd by links to the throttle thut supp1ies stcam to cy1indcrs K K. These 
last function likc the \Yestinghouse brake, and arc connectcd with pistons to the 
cylindcrs J J. Through their agency water is at will admitted into or forccd ont 
of tbc largcr receptacles, cither from onc end or from both cncls simultaneously. 
Thc effcct of discharging water is of com·se to incrcase the buoyancy of the ves-
sc!; and of admitting it, to decreasc this quality so that without changing struct-
nral weights the boat is enabled to rise or sink perpendicularly, or, by admitting 
more water in one end than in the other, to take a downward or an upward 
com·sc. Though this docs away with the neccssity of the horizontal rudder, it is 
kept as an additional resource for steering. In case of accident to the connect-
íng pipes or machinery tbc vesse! is supplied with water receptacles and hand-
pmnps, which arc able to govern its submergence so that should all other mechan-
ism break down the boat is so complctcly nnder the control of the opcrator that 
it can at all times be brought to the surface. As an additional safeguard, therc 
is on the outside of the boat a quantity of ballast which can Le readily dctached 
by thc arms or slecves prcviously described, and so effectÍI'ely that tbc reserve 
bnoyancy tl1lls gaineu will alone carry thc boat to the sm·facc. 
In addition to the main torpedo and buoy resting in the cylindrícal apertures 
aft, other torpcdoes, connected by spans, are carried on deck. The mcthod of 
thcir cmployment in attack is to go under thc body of the vesse) athwartship, and 
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to liberate them. As they are fitted with magnets, they will, it is claimcd, when 
freed, attach themseh'es to the bilges of the enemy's vesse!, while the Peacemaker 
can continue her cruise and let them act automatically, or, backing off to a dis-
tance greater than the depth of water in which she then is, safely explode them 
by conventional electrical appliances. With the increased speed of the present 
boat there arc varions methods of attacking vesscls of war when under way, 
among thcm .one which is somewhat similar to that described aboYe. 
The Peacemaker, when under the body of the vesse! athwartship, would liber-
ate a buoy, B, that is connected with a torpedo, T, by a chain, the length of which 
depends upon the depth bencath the buoy the torpedo is desired to float. The 
steel tow-line to thc torpedo is payed out from rec! G to a suflicient length, and 
then by going ahead with thc boat the torpedo is drawn close under the opposite 
side of vesse! from buoy B. In this position thc torpedo can be exploded by 
electricity. 
If nccessary, by liberating buoy B, while crossing tbe bow on tbe starboard 
side of thc fore-foot of a vesse!, the forward motion will draw the torpedo, T, 
close in to ·the opposite si de ; then, by a system o f push-pins on the torpcdo, the 
operator learns that it is in closc contact and ready for explosion by electricity. 
Should the enemy's vesse! be at anchor the tide can be employed for the purpose 
of bringing the buoy on one side of the vesse! while the t01·pedo is on the other. 
Thc boat is supplied with the ordinary incandescent lights, or apparatus for 
lighting the interior for night attacks. 
TORPEDOES. 
AMERICA has contributed to modern warfare many of its most valuable inven-
tions. In tbc decadc of 1850-60 the steam frigates of the .Jfcrrimac class rcvo-
lutionized the naval constructions of tbe world, and became the models for the 
war-ships of the great maritime powcrs. In the same period our coast defences 
rcached the high-water mark of modern dcvelopment, and, soon to be crystalli?.ed, 
there were seething in the brains of American inventors ideas of guns, ships, and 
projecti les which madc history. Though to-day o ur crcated con tri hutions to quick 
peace through arrested or irresistible war are meagre, still many of the thcories 
which make possible modern ordnance and ships are the fruits of American gcn-
ius and industrv. 
Is the futu;·e to be as fertile in thought and deed? Arc tlJC destroyers of 
Ericsson, the dynamite safety shells of llaycs, the guns of Zalinski, the torpedocs 
of llowell, Sims, or Berdan, thc tmTets of 'l'imòy, the submarine monitors of 
Tuck, the gun-carriages of King or Buffington, the ordnance of Sicard, Benétr-
arc these to prove that Yankee brain and brawn are potent yet for the mastery 
of the problem? 
The country has no plainer duty than to foster òy cvery care American idcas 
working in nationai ways of thougbt. It is rich, public sentiment is ripe and 
responsive, and Congrcss sbould encourage in pcace the experiments which may 
make war impossible. In the question of ship armament and sea-coast fortifica-
tions notably, tbc value of torpcdoes is now so gcncrally recognizecl that the 
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definite selection of some type has attaincd an importance which demands most 
careful consideration. All experts agree that they are vital, but there is not that 
consensus of opinion which within límits affirms exactly what should be done. 
Thc Fortification Bo~u·d in their report say: "It is not generally considered 
possible to bar the progress of au armored fleet by the mere fire of a battery ; 
some obstrnctions sufficient to arrest the ships within effcctive range of the gnns 
is nccessary. The kind of obstruction now relied upon is the torpedo, in the 
forro of a suhmarine mine, and, except in special cases, explodcd by electric cur-
rents which are so managcd that thc opcrator on shore can cither ignitc the mine 
undcr the ship's bottom, or allow the ship to explode it by contact. In deep 
channels the submarine mines are buoyant; in comparativcly shallow waters 
thcy are pJaccd upon the bottom-the objcct in both cascs bcíng to touch or 
ucarly approach the hui! of the vesse!. Submaríne mines are not accessaries to 
defcnce, but are essential features wherever they can be applied." 
'l'he Senate Committee on Ordnance and \Var-sbips reported: "Conccrning 
another class o f torpedoes, 'fixed' or 'anchored' or 'planted,' technically known 
as submarine mines, tbere is a great popular misapprehension. Their value is 
greatly over-estimatccl. They require picked and trained men for their manage-
ment, electrical apparatus for their discharge and for lighting up the approaches, 
stations on shore secure against sudclen assault, a flanking fire of canistcr and case 
shot and of machinc guns (themselves protccted), light draught picket-boats, and 
the overshadowing protection of armored forts and heavy guns. None of these 
things can bc extemporized. Thc submarine mine alone is of little use, and it 
must accompany, not precede, more costly and less easily prepared means of 
defence." 
There is, however, a more definite agreement as to the value of torpedo-boats. 
The Fortification Board declare : "Among the most important mea ns of conduct-
ing an active defence of the coast is the torpedo-boat, which, although recently 
developed, has received the sanction of the nations of Europe, each one of which 
now possesses a large number of these vessels. Their use will be quite general. 
First, in disturbing blockades, and preventing these from being made close, as no 
fleet would like to lie overnight within striking distance of a station of these 
boats; secondly, in attacking an enemy's ship enveloped in fogor smoke; thirdly, 
in rclieving a vesse! pursued by the cnemy; and fourthly, in defending the mines 
by night and by day against attempts at conntermining, and in many other ways 
not neeessary to recapitulate." lp1prcssed with thc utility of this mode of dcfence, 
the Board recommended the construction of one hundred and fifty of these boats, 
and tbc organization of a special corps of officers and meu from the navy trained 
to their use. 
In England, Commander Gallwey does not hesitate to say tl1at the torpedo-
boat is for harbor defence so superior to tbe submanne mine that he would not 
be surprised if before long it superseded the latter altogether. In France, 
Ohm·mes insists tl1at an armored vesse! will run tl1e most scrious risk if a torpedo-
boat is allowed to approach unobserved to within one thousand to fifteen bun-
dred feet; that the torpedo Wlll surely triumph over the iron-clad, and that 
armor has been vanquished, not by the gun, but by the torpedo. 
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A NAVAL RESERVE. 
AMONG the problems to be solved by an efficicnt naval administration there is 
none more d ifficult or of greater 1mportance than the formation of reserves of 
scamen. Our late war expesed the nation's weakncss in sailors. At the begin-
ning of hostilities the fleet, on paper, consistcd of forty-two ships of all classes, 
mainly sailing-vessels, with a few paddle-wheel steamers, and less than ten screw-
vessels with auxiliary powcr. Its pe,.sonnel comprised seYen thousand of all 
grades. And yet, to blockade a coast of over three thousand miles in Icngth, 
thc Secretary of the Navy had at his disposa! but three effective vessels, and a 
reserve of only two hundred seamen on all the receiving-ships and at all the 
naval stations. 
As late as tbc first of July, 1863, there werc not men enough to carry out 
efficicntly tbc work imposed upon the navy, and of the thirty-four thousand blue-
jackets twenty-five thousand were landsmen. Secrctary \Velles, at the en el of the 
same year, complaincd that there werc no reserve seamen, tbat the supply for im-
mcdiate and imperative duties was so iuadequate that one of tbe largest and 
fastcst steamers destined for important foreign service had been detained for 
months in consequence of thc need of a crew, and that many other \·essels were 
very much short of their complements. Tho cause of this was want of foresigbt, 
of prndence, of national common-sensc even. \Ve did not Jack the material from 
which crews could bave been drawn, for in 1860 over seventy-five thousand men 
sailed in the American merchant marine, fifty thousand of whom, under any sys· 
tem of enrolment suited to our national instincts and prejudices, would, bcfore 
thc end of 1861, bave been available for dnty on sh.ipboard. 
In peace thcre had becn no organization, so when war came we werc almost 
helpless, and as Jate as thc end of 1863 not twenty per cent. of the men who 
should have been ready for service were in govcrnment ships. Let doctrinai'res 
theorize as thcy may, this was not tbe fault of our maritime class, for thousands 
of sailors and fishermen who bad already cntered the army were by fqrce of 
law denied the opportunity cithcr of enlisting in, or of being transferrcd to, 
the navy. In addition, tbe opcration of the draft was madc dctrimcntal to tbc 
naval interests of the conntry, for it \' iolated the Act of May, 1792, which ex-
empts from military duty all mariners actually cmploycd in the sea sen·ice of 
any citizen or merchant within the U nit~d S ta tes. Furthermore, the govern ment 
unjustly discriminatcd against the seaboard towns, for not only was the seafa:·ing 
class, which is fostered and cherishcd by all mm·itime go,•crnments, withdrawn 
from thc element to which it has becn accustomed, but in addition sailors actually 
afioat were taken from thcir ships and compellcd, under the penalty of law, to 
enter the land service. It was not unti! 1864 that Congress finally enactcd the 
law wbich enabled seamen scrving as soldiers to be drafted into the navy. 
Ilow different would bave been the state of atfairs had thcre existed in 1861 
som e system of go\•ernment administration. as to the creation o f naval reserves, 
or, more far-reaching still, had we been free from that illogical distrust which 
posscssed the whole country! The fear of too much centralization was the stock 
in trade of p,rofessional patriots, and the people, hampered by traditions which 
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had corne down to us from our English ancestors, saw in any attempt towards 
efficient war prepar-ation in times of peace all the dangers they had been taugbt 
to belie1·e existed in standing armies. 
England acted more wisely, for she had been taught a grim lesson by bei' 
adversities, and without fear we might bave profited by her example. In the 
history of the Peninsula war, Napier, after picturing tbe horrors of the fearful 
April night when Badajoz was stormed, asked, bitterly, 
"Aud why was all this striving in blood against insurmountable difficulties? 
Why were men sent thus to slaughtcr whcn the application of a just sciencc 
would bave rendcred thc opcrations comparativcly easy? 
"Recnuse the English ministers, so rcacly to plm1ge into war, were quite igno-
rant of its excrcises ; becausc the English people are warlike without being mili-
tary, and, under the pretence of mnintaining- Jibcrty wbich they do not possess, 
opposc in pcace all useful martial establishments. In the beginning of eacb 
war England had to seek in blood for tbc knowledge necessary to insure suc-
cess." 
Eqnally bas this always beco the attitude of the American people towards 
every attcmpt made in peace to prepare for war. Besides this national distrust, 
prejudiccs had to be overcome which have existed both in tbc navy and the mcr-
chant mm·ine. Our naval officers have ncver made any determined effort to create 
a reserve, eitber because they ha1·e not fully grasped the correlation and interde-
pendcnce of the navy and the mercbant marino, or because they ha•e doubted the 
wisdom of spending upon an outside issue appropriations whicb, given to the 
navy, would produce a more immcdiatc and tangible rcsult. But from both points 
of view they are wrong, "for a navy unsupported by a merchant maríne is a hot-
housc plant which may produce great results for a while, bht cannot endilre the 
strain of a ]ong protracted campaign." From tbe merchant marino the personnel 
of the navy in war must come, and it is a fallacy to believc that by a small addi-
tion to our ordinary navalresources we woniJ be able to cope with the navies of 
othcr maritime powers, or that in a long war an efficient and numerous reserve is 
not of grcatcr importance than a few more seamen permanently maintained in the 
navy during peacc. 
To the ruerchants ancl sl1ip-owners the question is one of vital 1mp011ance. 
The earliest and most disastrous conscquence of war will fall upon the sbipping 
in te rest. U nd er any system of defen ce the nccessities of the navy must with-
draw seameu from the merchant sen·ice and raise tbc rate of wages. li, then, by 
timely precautions during peace, we can diminisl1 the probability that war can 
occur at all ; if wc are ready upon the outbreak of war to show tbat our home-
ward-bound sbips arc safo; if we can abolish or moclify thc risk tbat the employ-
ment of seamen woulcl be abrnptly suspcndcd by embargo or intcrfered with by 
imprcssment or drafL; if wc can attach tl1e sailor to hi s country, a!'ld prcYcnt him 
from seeking employment uncler otber tlags, surcly the owners of our ships and 
mcrchants will reap tbe greatest advantagc. Abroad tbc importance of the sub-
jcct has becn fully recognizcd. France, undcr a system which l1as existed for 
over two hundr·ed and fifty years, maiutains a reserve of 172,000 meu, who are be-
tween tbc ages of eighteen and fifty ; 65,000 of thesc are between the ages of 
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twenty and twenty-six, 15,000 arc usually kept afloat, and 6000 more are quar-
tcred on shore. Germany has 15,000, and Eugland nearly the same number. 
Notwithstanding the decadencc of our shipping interest wc ha\'C a Jarge force 
from which to draw. The madtime population of this country numbcrs over 
350,000, of whom 180,000 arc available for thc fleet. This num ber of coursc in-
cludes all those in any way connected with sea industries, and embraces coasters, 
tishcrmen, whalers, yachtsmen, boatmen, and all workmen in ship-building yards 
and equipment shops and stores. 
To mau our sl1ips in time of war three means are open : voluntary enlistment, 
draft or impressment, or employmcnt of men enrolled in a naval reserve. It 
would be unreasonable to depend altogether upon the loyal and unselfish patriot-
ism of necessitous men sen'Ïng before the mast, and there IS a chance that mere 
cnthusiasm would not induce a seaman to join the navy if cmployment was being 
offered elsewherc at increasing rates of pay. Impressment under any name is 
unpopular. In its commou form it is illegal, and the di·aft is ever a !ast resort 
and always a dangerous measure. Nothing, then, remains as a certainty but to 
tum towards the na,·al reserve as the best means of manning our fleet. In time 
of war not only would the men enrolled come forward willingly and be immedi-
atcly a\·ailable, but deserters would bave the machinery of the law put in motion 
for thcir apprchcnsion, and popular feeling would be as earnest in snpport of 
thcir arrest as it would be opposed to all attempts which enforced the arbitrary 
powcrs of draft or impressment. 
No system cxists abroad cntirely suited to our necessities and our national 
instincts; but, generally spcaking, that adopted in England comes nearest to what 
we shou1d cmploy. Naturally our lake sailors, coasters, fishermen, and yachts-
mcn would form the main body of tbc resen•e. These shonld be enrolled, dh·ided 
into classes, bc gi,•en eacb year a certain fixed sum of pay, with an inarcase for 
each day's drill, and at stated times they shoulcl be embarked for grcat gun prac-
tice at sea, so thcy might !carn somcthing of man-of-war routine and discipline. 
The officers could be drawn from tbc merchant matine, from the graduatcs of the 
school-ships, and from former officers of thc regular and voluntcer services who 
arc now in ci vil life. 
FORCED DRAFT. 
TuE snbject of forced draft is of great importancc, and, as a corollary of high· 
speed developn1cut, is being stndicd with kecn interest. Therc arc wide differ-
ences of opinion not only as to thc proper systems, but cven as to the val u e of thc 
principie. The literature as yet is rather meagrc, but an excellent compilation of ex-
isting material will bc fou nd in thc la test publication of tbc X:n·al Tntclligence Otrice. 
"A forced draft in tl1c furnaces," explains the .ilfarine .E11ginetr of Septcmbér, 
1867, "can be gcnerated in two ways: first, by cxhausting the nptakes and fun-
nels of tbc products of comlmstion, when a grcater flow of air will necessarily 
take place through t]JC fire-bars; and secondly, Ly increasing thc pressure of the 
air in the fnrnaces beyond that of the atmosphere. Thc steam-blast in marinc 
boilers is wcll known to engineers as a means of quickly getting up tbc steam after 
I 
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its prcssure l1as dropped ; but the locomotives on our railways afford a very good 
illustration of how boilers may be contiuuously worked undcr f01·ced combustion 
throngh a jet of steam exhausting the smokc-box and funnel of the products of 
combustion. 'fhis system of creating a draft involvcs a very large expenditure of 
steam and water, and as it is a sine qua ~on in these days of high pressure that 
only frcsh water should bc used in boilers, and also as only a limited supply of 
this clement can bc carried in a ship, it follows that the plan of indncing a forccd 
draft by mcans of a steam jet in the funnel cannot be well adopted in marine 
boilcrs. 
"1\<fr. :Yiartin, thc inventor of the well-kuown furnace doors, substitutes a fan in 
Lhc uptake for the steam jet, aud so arranges his fuunel that in the event of the 
foJ·cctl draft not bcing required the gases of combustion arising from natural d raft 
will not bc impeded in their exit to the atmospherc. llc claims for b is invention 
that it does away with all necessity for closing in the stokc-holds or furnaces, and 
that in war-ships funnels could be dispcnsed with, as thc gases and smoke could 
be discharged anywhere from the fans. lle also claims that by bis plan of pro-
ducing a draft the boiler-tubes become much more cfficient as heating sm·faces, 
and that the ends of the tubes in the fire-box are not so liablc to be but'ned away, 
and that therefore tbere will be less chance of the boiler lcaking round the tubes. 
'fhcrc appears to be some grounds for these latter assumptions, for it is a well-
known fact that the tubes of locomotive boilers, which arc worked, as we have 
scen, on the exhaust principie, do ''ery much more work than those of marine 
boilers bcfore they are ferruled or rolled. It can also be shown by a very simple 
expei'Ímcnt that when tbc gases are sucked or drawn through the tnbes the flamc 
cxtcnds a nmch greater distance along thc tube than when the gases are driven 
through the tn bes. In this latter case the flame impinges on the tu be-plates bc-
forc separating into tongues and entering tbe tubes; but when sucked through 
the tongues of flame commence at some little distancc from the plate before pen-
etrating thc tubes, and the ends are not thcrcforc bnrned as when the flame im-
pinges directly on them. I t may be urged, howevcr, against Martin's system that 
owing to the greatly increased volume of the products of combustion duc to their 
tempcrature, fans of from three to four times the size of tbose used in otber sys-
tems arc required; also, that ib e upk'lkes ha ve to be made lm·ger and beavier to 
take in the fans; and lastly, that the fans tbemselves are likely to be quickly ren-
dered incfficient tbrough working in a tempcraturc of at least a tbousand degrees. 
These objections prove so formidable that up till the present time Martin's plan of _ 
creating a forced draft has made 'little or no headway. 
"'rhe other plan for creating an artificial draft in marinc furnaces is to force air 
into them by means of fans. 'fhis is done eitber by closing in tbc wbole of the 
stoke-hold and filling it with air of a pressure greater than that of the atmosphere, 
or by pumping the air direct into t.he furnace. This latter is the usual practice in 
the mcrcantilc marine, where economy of fuel is sought after. Mr. Ilowden seeks, 
by first hcating the air, and then forcing it by means of fans in to tlJC furnaccs and 
ash-pits, to insure a very rapid and complete combustion of the coel. R is plan 
has heen carricd out in the Atlantic liner Ohio quite recently, and the results as 
publishcd lcad one to expect that with a little more progress iu the direction in 
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which he is working our ships will be dri,·en across the Atlantic without 
the ex-
penditure of any fuel whatevcr. The fact of heating the air to a tempera
ture of 
two hundred degrces bcfore it ent~rs the furnace cannot go very far in a
ffecting 
cither the rapidity or the completeness of the combnstion of thc fuel, and
 it cer-
tainly cannot affect the economy. \Vhere tbe fire-grate arca is small co
mpared 
with the total beating surface, good evaporative rcsults are Jikely to bè ob
tained; 
aud in the Ohio the fire-grate area was certainly smaller than is usual for th
e samc 
sized boilers fitted witb forced draft. Tbe trip of tbe OMo to AmCI·ica ha
s given 
somcwhat di:fferent resnlts to those of the official trials, and it is a question
 wheth-
cr any saving in wcight, eithcr in the apparatns required to prodnce force
d draft 
under this system, or in the economy of fuel to .bc derived from it, has b
een ob-
taincd more tban exists in the system of closed stoke-bolds. 
"Thc only plan that seems to hold its own is the closed stoke-hold syst
em, 
and the results tbat bave been obtained witb it in the navy are so satisfacto
ry that 
Messrs. J. & G. Tbomson are about to adopt it in the two large Inman liners 
they 
are now building; and also se•cral other firms are about to introduce it in
 prefer-
cnce to all other plans for increasing the efficicncy of their boilers and pro
moting 
greater cconomy. Iu the Royal Nm'Y space and weight arc of such ,·ital
 impor-
tance that the boilers bave to be constrncted on principies tbc very rev
erse of 
those which exist in boilers specially designed for high cvaporative w
ork per 
ponnd of fuel ; and it is not, thcreforc, to bc wondered at that the consu
mption 
of fuel per indicated horse-powcr has not been reduced since the introduc
tion of 
forccd draft; but, on tbe otber baud, the capabilities of thc boilers ha ve b
een ex-
panded far bcyoud the expectations of. a few years ago. Iu the mercantile
 marine 
therc is no reason whatever why the system of closed stoke-holds for crc
ating a 
forced draft should not combine economy with greater efficiency in the bo
ilers." 
Thesc conclusions arc not uuiversally accepted, as will be seen in the 
fol-
lowing cxtract from thc article contributed by Assistant Engincer R. S.
 Griffin, 
United States Navy, to the Naval Intelligence Office publicat10n mentioned
 at the 
beginning of this subject. 
"The forcecl-draft trials of the Archer ciiiSs," he writes, "go far towards s
ns-
taiJJÏng the objections raised by Mr. llowden against tbc closed stoke-h
old sys-
tem. The trials of the Arc/ter, B1·isk, and Cossack had to be discontinued 
on sev-
era] occasions, owing to leakage of the boilcr-tubcs; and when it is reme
mbered 
that tl1ese trials are for only fonr hom'S, and that no provision is made fo
r hoist-
ing ashes, it bccomcs a qnestion of serious considcration whether the main
tenance 
of this high power for such a short penod brings with it advantages at a
ll com· 
parable with thc continued clcvelopment of a reasouably bigh power with 
an eco· 
nomical expenditnre of coal, such as is possible with the closcd ash-pit sys
tem. 
"A number of steamers bave been fitted with llowdeu's system duriug
 the 
past year, among others the Celtic, of the \Yhite Star Line, and the O!tio,
 of the 
International Navigatiou Company. One of the Jatest steamers fittcd w
ith this 
system is the City of Venice, wbose eng iJ,es were converted from compo
und to 
quadruple expansion. ller boilers were dcsigned to develop 1800 indicated
 horse-
power with eighty square feet of grate, but on trial sbe could only work o
ff 1300 
indieated horse-power, owing to some derangement of the·valves. She wa
s after· 
.~ 
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wards tricd with hnlf tbc grate surface in use, when it was dcmonstratcd that 
therc would be no difficulty in devcloping the power so far as the boilers were 
conccmed. Unfortunately, no data as to weight of boilcrs, space, or heating 
smface are obtainable. 
" Jn 1886 the .Alliance was supplicd with new boilers, fitted with a system of 
forced draft designed by the Bureau of Stcam Engineering. lt was origiluwly the 
inteniion of the Department to put six boilers in this vesse], as in the .Entcr-
prise and .Nipsic, but with the introduction of the forced-draft system, which was 
purcly experimental, this numbet: was reduced to four, having a total grate sur-
facc of 128 squarc fect. The boilers werc designed to burn anthracite coa) with 
natural draft, and wcrc of course unsuited to the requirements of forccd draft, 
thc ratio of heating to grate sm·facc being only 25.6 to 1, and the water sm-face 
and stcam space bcing small. Tbc maximum iudicatcd horse-powcr developed on 
trial was 1022, but any attempt to run at tb is or at increased power for any length 
of timc was attendcd with so much priming of the boilers that the trial had to be 
discontinued. Altcrations were made in thc boilers to prcvcnt the priming, but 
no continuous trial was had previously to thc sailing of the Alliance. The results 
obtained on a measured base were, however, sufficient to demonstrate tbe practica-
bility of the system, and to show that a higbet· power could be maintained with the 
four boilers at forced draft than with tbc original cigbt boilers at natural draft. 
"The practica] working of the system at sea presents no difficulty, as a recent 
nm of the .Alliance has demonstrated. On a contin nous run of ten hom·s, using 
only two boilers with sixty square fcet of g rate (the grate surface of each boiler 
having been rcduccd to thirty), the mean içdicated horse-power was 668 and the 
maximum 744, being respecth·ely 11.1 and 12.4 indicated horse-power per square 
foot of grate. There was an entire absence of priming, and no difficulty was ex-
pericnced in operating the forced-draft apparatus, the length of the trial having 
been determined by the arrival of the vesse] in port. The coa) burncd was \Velsb, 
of fair quality, the consumption being 29.9 pounds per square foot of grate. 
·' The efficiency of the system may be judged by the rcsults obtained from an 
experimental boiler at the \Yashington Navy-yard. The boiler was of thc marina 
locomotive type, and had a ratio of heating to grate surface of 32.73 to 1, with a 
water space of 245 and a steam space of 163 cubic feet. The coa] burned was 
ordinary Cumberland Yalley, bituminous, and the cvaporation, when buming as 
much as forty pounds per square foot of g 1·ate, was 6.61, wl1ilc with 37.5 it was 
7.24, and tbis with a moderate air prcssnre-1.5 inches in asb-pit and one inch on 
furnace door." 
It is unfair to attempt the explanation of this system without accompanying 
drawings, but it may be stated that the air, drawn by fan-blowers from the heated 
portion of the fire-room, is forced t1Houg~ a passage into the ash-pit and furnace, 
a portion of tl1e cm-rent bcin[:; directed by an intcrposed plate through the holes 
in the furnace frame. By the agency of a doublc row of holes the greater por-
tion of the air which enters the furnace pas!:es around thc frame, thence through 
other apertures to the space between the furnace door and lining, and finally to the 
furnace tbrough the space between the lining and furnace frame. The supply of 
air when firing or hauling ashes >s shut off by a damper. 
APPENDIX II.* 
TIIE QUESTION OF TYPES. 
The following Jetter appeared in the Times (London) of April 4, 1885: 
"Sm,-~Iay I request the favor of space in the Times in which to comment upon the 
opinions recently expressed by Sir Edward Reed and other writers respecting the designs 
of the Admi1'al class of ships in the Royal Navy, aud the four centraJ.citadel ships which 
were !aid down subscquently to the Injlt¡:r:ible? 
"IIaving been closely associated with Mr. Barnaby in the desiguing of all these ships. 
with the exception of the .tljax and Agr~memnon, I cau spcak with full knowledgc of both 
the history and iutentions of the designs. 
".:\I01·eover, my share of the responsibility for tbe professional work involvcd in those 
dcsigns remains, althongh my officinl connection with the constructive department of 
the Admiralty was severed years ago. It need hnrdly bc nd<led that the remarks which 
follow simply em body my own opinions, nnd that I write ncitber as nn apologist for 1\Ir. 
Barnaby nor as n chnmpion of tbc ship·huilding policy of thc Admiralty. 
"'l'he sweeping condcmnntion which has bccn pronouuced against the most recent 
English battJe.ships is based upon the cousiderntion of one featurc only in their fighting 
cfficiency, viz .. the cxtent o f the armor protection o f thcir sicles in tbc regi on o f the 
water·line. There has been no discussion in the lctters to wbich I bave referrcd of the 
comparative speecls, armaments, or other qnalities of the Frenell and English sbips. But 
the fact that the Frenell sbips nre armor·helted f1·om end to cud, while the English ships 
ha ve no vertical armor on considerable port ions o f thc lcngth nt the rcgion o f thc wntcr·linc, 
is considered by Sir Edward Recd so serious a matter tiJat he says, 'Tbc Frenell ar· 
mored ships must in all reason bc expectcd to dispose of thesc Eoglish ships in a vcry few 
minutes by simply rlcstroying their unnrmored parts.' 
"From tllis opinioo 1 most strongly dissent, for reasons which a re statcd below: a nd 
I veoture to assert that if attcntioo is directed simply to thc possible efiects of gun.fire, 
white tbe possibly grenter risks incidental to nttacks with thc ram anc! torpedo are alto· 
gethcr neglcctcd, thcn there is ample justification for tbe l>clief that the English ships of 
recent desigu can do batlle 011 at !cast equal tcrms with their contemporaries iu tbc 
Freuch or any othcr navy. 
"In all recent annored ships, if tbe wholesalc and extremely rapid destruction of the 
unnrmorcd portions of the sbips which Sir Edward Rced contemplates actually Look place, 
vcry considerable risks would undoubledly result; but iu my judgmeut tLese risks arc 
not sensibly affectcd by the di.fferent distribution of the armor on the ships of tbc two 
greal uavies. And, further, there is every reason for doubting whcthcr sucb wholesale 
destruction of the unannored parts could be cffected with the nppliances which are 1.1ow 
~tvailablc, o ot merely in 'a fcw minutes,' but in a very considerable tim e, a nd under tbc 
most favorable conditions for the attack. Nor must it be forgotteo thnt armor, eveo of 
the greatest tllickness, applied to the sides or decks of ships is not impenetrable to the 
atlack of guns alrendy aflont. while the mitraille, wbich is driven back into a ship wben 
armor is penetrntecl, is probahly ns destructive as any kiud of projectile cau be, and at· 
tncks directly the vital parts which the armor is intended to protect. 
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"In support of thcse asserlions I must ask permission to introducc certain dctniled 
slntements wlúch appear to be nbsolutely necessnry to a discussiou of the subject, !Jut 
wbich shall be made as brief and untechnical as possible. 
"lt nppears tbat tbe points raised by tbe discussion may be grouped under two heads. 
First, does the shortening of tbe beU in the English ships introdnce snch serious dangcrs 
if lhey ha ve to do battle witll tbc Fren eh ships? Secondly, wbat should be considcred 
the principal uses of armor-pla_ting in modern war ships? 'l'lle second question may 
bc considercd to include the first; but it will bc convenient to take tbe questions in the 
order in wbich they bave been placcd, as, aftcr all, the grcntcst imrnedinte interest cenlres 
in the comparison between existing ships. 
"At tbc outsct it is important to remark thnt in the most recent designs of armored 
ships for all navics, increasc in spced, armament, nori thickness of armor has beco as· 
socinted with IL decrease in the area of the broadside protected by armor. Further, it 
has bcen considered important in most cascs to distribute the armored positions of the 
heavy gnns in the sbips in ordcr to rednce thc risks of complete disablcment of the princi-
pal urmnmeot by one or two lucky shots which may happen when tbe heavy guos arc 
conccnlmtcd in a single citndcl or battcry. This distribution of the heavy guns alsr 
givcs greatcr efficicncy to the auxiliary armament of ligbtcr guns, and cnables these hcav.} 
guns to he plnced at a considcrably greater height above water than was usual in former 
days, so that the chanccs of the guns beiog prevcotcd from being fought in heavy weatber 
nrc diminished, and their power as comparcd witb tbe lowcr guos in carlier sllips is iu-
crenscd, espccially wbcn firing witb deprcssion. 
"'l'he days of tbc • completely protected iron-clnd,' with the broadsidc armored tbrough-
out the lcngth from tbc upper deck clown to five or six feet below tbc watcr-line, bave 
Jong gone by. 'l'he 'central battery and belt' system bas also been practically dropped, 
whcthcr the battery 0ootained broadside guns or formed a citadel protecting the bascs of 
thc turrets. In short, on modern battlc-ships there now rcmnins only a narrow belt of ar-
mor, rising from :fivc or six fect bclow tbe loarl-line to two or tlu·cc feet abovc it. 'l'his 
narrow strip of armor in tbc Frenell ships extends from end to end, and is associatcd with 
n protectivc deck worked nt tbc bcight of tbc top of the belt, and formiog a stroug roof to 
tbc hold spaces bencath. In tbc English ships of the Admü·al ch1ss tbe hclt of armor cx-
tends somewhat lcss thao half the total leogth, protecting one hnndrcd and forty to one 
hundred and fifty fcet of the ccnlrnl portion of the ship (in which are situate the cngincs 
and boilers), and protccting a Iso tbc communications from the barbette towers to the mag-
azines. At tbe extrcmilies of the belt slroog armorcd bnlkhcads arc bnilt across tbc ships. 
'l'bc protectcd dcck is fitted at the uppcr cdge of thc bclt over the central portion. Beforc 
and abaft the bulkheads, wbcrc there is no si<lc nrmor, the protcction consists of a strong 
steel dcck, situated from four to five fect below water, and extending to tbc bow and 
stern respcctively. Upon this under-watcr deck arc placed coal-bunkers, cbaio-lockers, 
fresh-watcr tanks, store-rooms, etc., the spaces between it and tbc deck next above bcing 
subdividcd into a large nurnber of water-tight compnrtmcnts or cells by means of lon-
gitudinal and lransverse bulkhcads. A watcr-tight top or roof to tllese compartrncnts is 
formccl by platiog over the main deck-beams with thin steel at thc same height above wa-
ter as the top of tbc armor-belt. In this rnanncr tbc unarmorcd cnds above tbe protective 
deck arc not mcrely packed to a large extcnt with wnter-cxcludiog substnnces whcn the 
vesse! is fully ladcn, but they are minutely suiJclividcd into scparatc compartments, whicb 
can only he thrown into communication with onc anotber by mcans of very cxteosive in-
juries to the partitions. . 
"In all tbc morlern Frencb ships, ns wcll ns in the Admiml class, a light steel super-
structurc of considerable height is built abovc the Jevcl of the bclt-dcck; tbe living quar-
ters of the crew aud tbe stations of the auxilinry armament are container! witbin this light 
erection, wbich also surrounds the armored communicntions from the barbette towcrs to 
tbc magnzines. In tbis manncr a ship with a arnall hcight of armored frecboard is con-
verted into a high-sided ship for all purposes of ordinnry navigation, sea-worthiness, and 
habitability; wbile spaces are providcd in which a more or less considerable numi.Jer of 
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light gnos can bc foug!Jt coocurrently with the henvy guns placed in thc nrmor-protccted 
stations. Tbc rauicnl d iffereoce, therefore, between thc French sh ips and tbc Admi1·al 
class, indcpcodeotly of otber consiòcmtioos than the armar protectioo of thc watcr-line, 
consists in the omission of the side armor at the extremi ties, and the use instead or the side 
nrmor of the strong under-water deck with cellular subdivision and other arran-gements for 
adding to the protectioo and securing the buoyancy of the spaces at the ends, into whicl1 
water mny find access tbrough the thin sides if thcy are shot through and seriously dnm-
nged in aclion. If the complctely belted F rencb sbip has lo fight a vesse! of thc Admi1'al 
class, the )aller has· obviously tbc g reatcr chance o f damage to the natTow strips of thc 
sides lying above the nnder-water deck Lefore and abaft the ends of the belt. If tbc ac-
tion takcs place io smooth water, wheo Lhe ships arc neither rolling nor pitcbing, but are 
simply in motion, the chanccs of hitting thcse narrow strips in the water-line region might 
not be very g real; lmt it must be admitted tbat cven the ligbtest guns would penetra te tbc 
tbin sides of the Eoglish ships and ad mit more or less considemble quantitics or wtller 
into the cnds. If, on the other hand, the fight takes place in a sea-way, with the ships 
rolling aod pitching, thcn the relati ve imporLance of pcuetration of these narrow strips of 
tl!e euds of tlt e E oglislt ships I.Jecomes much Jcss, because the belt armor of thc Freuch 
ships will be brought out of water for a considerable length of tlte bow nud the stern by a 
very moclcratc angle of pitclt ing, or by tbc passage of a comparatively low wave, anc! be-
cause rolliug motion of thc ships will altcrnately tmmerse o1· emerge thc belL armor, eveu 
at tlte midships part, wlterc it has its greatcst tltickness. In fact, as I bave more thau once 
said pnblicly, it is clearly au error to limtt criticism to tlte lougitudinal exteut of the I.Jelt 
armor in mòderu ships, and to excludc considerat ion of the verLical extent of the armor 
alJO\'C nnd below thc load-line. Apart from any discussioo of thc questiou from tbc ar-
tillcr ist's point of view, or any attempt to determine thc probability or otberwise of tlte 
wholesalc dcstructiou of the unarmored pOt·tions of modern battle·sbips I.Jy sltell-tire f rom 
lnrge guns, or by the projecti les from rnpid-firing and rnachioe guns, it is perfectly obvious 
to auy onc who will examine into tbc maller thnt the r isk of damnge to tltc light super-
stntctures situated above the belt must be greater thnn the corresponding risk of damnge 
tl) thc nnrrow strips of ~idc area exposed at the uunrmorcd ends of tbc .Admirat class, bc-
twecn the level of thc bclt-decl< nnd the watcr-line. 
"Sir Spenccr Robinson, nftcr lt is inspeclion of thc models sltown h im at the Admirnlty, 
rccognizes the fact tltat in tltc Frenell bclted slti])S (of wltich the .Amiral IJupcrré is an 
cxnmple), if tlte light sides above tlte belt-dcck arc destroycci or very seriously riddlcd in 
action, the ship would be cnpsized in a vcry modcmte sen-way. He furtltcr cmphasizes 
tltc stntcmeut tltnt thc ships of the .Admirat clnss in tlte English m,vy, if similarly treatcd, 
would also capsize undcr thc snme conditions, and he appenrs lo be surprised nt thc ad-
mission hnving becn made. 'l'he fuet is tltat tltcrc hus never becn any nsscrtion tltat tlte 
Admiml class would bc safe ngainst cnpsizing independcully of assistance giveo to thc 
nrmor-belted porLions I.Jy tltc unarmorcd structurc situated nbove. On tlte contmry, f rom 
the first, in the design of these sbips. it wns recognizcd tltat thcir stahility, in tlte sense of 
tlteir power to resist being capsizcd, if inclined to evcn moderàlc angles of inclination, 
was not guarantccd by the armor-belts. In this rcspect tltcy wcrc in idcntically tuc same 
position ItS all other nrmored sh ips witlt sballow water-linc úelts and isolntcd armored bat-
tcries placed high abovc water. 
"\Yhat has beco said respccting thc Admirnl class is tltis: If thc unnrmorcd eods nhove 
the protectivc deck wcrc complctely thrown opcn Lo tbe sca. then the initial stability (that 
is to say, the sti1Iness of the ships or their ,powcr to rcsist small inclinat ions from thc up-
right) wou ld sl ili be guarant('cd by thc central nrmored partions. So f ully did we appre-
cinte tltc fact that the li fc of the sltip in nction (ns dcterrnincd by hcr power to resist large 
Jnclinations) depends greatly upon thc assistnnce given by the unarmorcd snperstructmes 
to tlte nrmor-bcltcd par ts, tbat we wcrc carcful to make the structuml nrnmgemcnts of the 
superstructures above tbc bells such that thcy could bcar a vcry considerable amount of 
riddling and dama.~e from shol anti shell without ccasing to contribute in the most impor-
tant dcgrec to thc buoyaucy nud stability. 
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" Thcrc arc double cell u lar sides between tbe belt a nd up per clccks; the ma in bulk-
hends nre cnrried up high above water; hatcbes and opcuings are trunkcd up nnd protect-
cd by co1Ier-dams. In short, evcry possible precaution is tnken to subdivide into com-
pnrtments, and tlws límit the spaces to which water can tiud access wben tbc outcr sides 
are penetratecl or shattered, as well as to faci litate the work of stoppiug temporarily shot-
boles in tbc sides. 
"Now, without in tbc least intending to discredit tbe work of the Frencb designers, I 
bave to stnte thnt no corresponding or cqual precautions bave been takcn in tbe portions 
of tbcir ships lyiug abovc the belt-decks. Anclthe absence of tbesc fe~tures iu tbe Frenell 
ships is a great relati ve aclvantnge to tbe English ships. O f coUJ·sc tbere is uotbing to bin-
der thc FrenelL from imitating our practicc, but they are conten t to take the risks imrolvcd 
in a simplcr construction, und in so doing thcy sbow tbeir practical disbelief in the doc-
trine of armor-protected stahility. I arn nware tbat some eminent nutborities do not con-
cur w itb this vicw, ancl maintain tbat stability and buoyancy should be guarantecd by 
armor. 'f f) this point I will reYert hereafter, but for tbe present I nm content to say that, as 
hetween thc Frenell ships and tbc Admiral class, tbe most serious risks of damagc by gun-
fire in nction are of tbc same kind, nnd, practically, arc not affected by tbc sbortening of 
tiJ e nrmor- bclts iu tbe English ships. 
"Next I would refer to tho difiercnces which are undoubtecl ly involved in shortening 
the bclts of the E nglish ships. In the first place, by dispensing with the side armor tow-
ards the cxtrcmitics a very considerable saving is effectecl in the weight and tbe cost of 
the armor tittcd to tbc ships. Mr. Barnaby hns recently given nn illnstration of this, 
wberc a ship, in other respects unchnngcd, hns to be increasecl from 10,000 to 11,000 tons 
in displacemcnt in order to carry the shallow armor-belt to tbc ends. In tbe Collingwoocl 
hersclf quite ns lnrge a proportionate incrensc of size would be involvcd in having a thick 
armor-bclt f rom stem to stern. Tbis saving in wcigbt a nd cost of armor migbt, of coursc, 
be pmchnsed too dearly, if dispensing witb the armor involved possibly fatal risks to tbc 
ship. Ilowevcr tbc result may be nttaincd, tbere is universal agreemcnt that a sbip-of-war 
should hnvc hcr buoyancy, stnbility, nnd trim guaranteed as far ns possible ngninst the 
efiects of damagc in nctiou. Now, in the Admiral clnss this maller was very cnrefully in-
vestigatcd before tbc dcsign was npprovetL In order to prevent dernngement of the trim 
of the vessels by ponetration of thc light sides abovc the protective deck at onc cntl, 
arrangemeuts were made in tbe design by means of which water can be introduced in to thc 
spaces occnpicd by coal-bunkcrs, etc., before the sbips go into nction. 
"The cxtent to wbich water mny bc introduced is n mat ter o ver which the capta in 
would necessarily bave controL But evcn if tbe wbole of the nnoccupied spnces wcre 
filled witb water, tbe incrcase iu drnught would not exceed fonrtcen to eighteen inchcs, 
anèlthe Joss in speed would not exceed balf a knot. If only tbe coal-bunkers were flood-
ed as a preliminnry to action, tbe chance of any serious disturbnnce of trim, and couse-
quent loss of manreuvring pmver or spced by damage to the light sides above ti1c protec-
ti ve deck ancl near the water, woulcl bc very small, and the 'sinknge • of the vesse! would 
be decreased considerably. But taking the extreme case, with the cnds completcly lillecl 
and a sinkage of fourteeu to eightecu inches, a sbip of the Admi1·al class wonld go into 
uction with pmctically her full speed nvailable, and witb hcr ends so protected by under-
water deck and tbe water admitted above that deck tbat damagc to tbe tbin sides by shut 
or shell penetrating at or near t!Je water-li oc would not produce cbanges of trim or altera-
tions of clrnught to any greater extent thnn would be produced if the armor-belt hnd bccn 
carried to the stem and stern. Nor would the admission of water in to tbe ends render UJc 
vessel unstable. 
"It has beco urgcd tbat the sinkngc duc to filliog tbe tauk ends with water is a disad-
vantage, because it brings tbe upper edgc of tbe bclt armor in tbc Aclmbral class uuout 
fourteen to eigbteen inches uem·er tbe water tban the upper cd~rc o f tbc bells o f the Frcncb 
sbips. If tbc greatest danger of the ships was to bc measurccl by the smnllncss of tbeir 
'reserve' o f ' armor-protected uuoyancy' (that is to say, by the buoyancy of tbe part o f 
the sbip lying above ber fighting water-Jine and below the !Jelt-dcck), tben t11e Admirat 
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class would not compare fa.vorably with the f ully belted French ships. But
 I bave 
alrenrly explained that this is not the truc rneasure of the greatest danger arising f
rom the 
efiects of gun-tire, and that it would be ..t mislake to assume tbat in either the F rene
ll or 
the English ships the armor-belted portious of tlle vessels guarantee tllcir safety wh
eu dam-
aged iu action. 
"As bctween the .Lidmiml class and tbc ceutral-ci tadel ships of tlle Illjle:cible 
typc 
there is a difl'erencc iu fh is respect which has been much commented npon. W
llen tbe 
cnds of thc citadel ships are fi lled witb water, the armored wall of the citudel still 
rcmains 
severa! fcct above water ; w hcreas, iu tlle .L1dmi1·at class, the top of the belt uuder
 similar 
conditions is vcry near tbc water-level. All that need bc saicl on this poiut is t
hat, not-
withstanding the grcatcr hcight of the armored wall above water, the citadel shi
ps llave 
prnctically no grcater gum·antee of safety agaiust capsiziug by means of armor-p
rotected 
stability than the .Aclmiml class. In both classes the armoreò p01tions requi re th
e assist-
ance of the unarmored to secure such a rangc and amount of sLability as sllall efl
'ectually 
gnarantee tbeir security when damaged in action. And, as bas been stated abo
vc, this 
condition is truc of all armor-clads with uarrow armor-belts. 
" One otber objection to the shortened be1ts yet remains to be considere<! . 
" It is urged tbat when the thiu ends are broken through or damngcò by sllot or s
hell, 
j ngged or protrnd ing boles will be formecl in the plating near the water-li ne, aud
 then if 
the ships are driven at speed, the water will tlow into the boles in large quantit
ies, anc! 
produce serious changes of trim nnd loss of speed. I u support of tbis conteutio
n, refPr· 
ence is made to the published reports of experiments maòe with the Jnjiezible'
s model 
about eight years ago. It is impossible to discuss the matter fully, and I must t
hcrefore 
content myself with a statement of my opiuion, formcd nfter a tareful personal 
oi.Jserva-
t ion of these model experiments. First, it canuot be shown from the experime
nts tbat 
tbc presence of a shallow belt of armor reaching two to three fect abo,·e tlle st
ill-water 
Jinc would make any sensible difference in the daugers arising from the circum
stanccs 
described. !Ioles in thc tbin sides nbove this belt would admit water in Jarge qu
antities 
on the bell. deck when the vesse! was under way, and i f it could flow along tb
at cleck 
changrs of trim and other disagrecable consequences wonld resnlt. f:iccondly, it is
 ccrtain 
tllftt tbc numcrous bnlkbcads and partitions, cofl'er-dams, etc., lmilt above the b
elt-deck 
level in the Admiml class for tbe very pm·pose of Jimitiug the fiow of entcrin
g water 
woulò greatly decrease any tendency to check the speed or cbange the trim. \
Yhether 
tbc bell be short or loug, it is evident that gapiug holes low dow n in the light si
cles will 
make it prudent for a captain to slow down somewbat if he wishes to l<ecp the w
ater out 
as much as possible. But betweeu such pruòcucc nnd tlle danger of disnstcr th
cre is a 
widc gulf. 
"Summing up tl1c forep;oing statemcnts, I desire to record my opin ion, based u
pon 
com¡)letc personal knowledge of evcry clctail in the calculations and dcsigns for 
thc Acl-
mimt class, that tbc disposition of the bclt-annor (in association witb the orotectiv
e dccks 
and celin lar sides, water- Light subdivision, etc., existing in the unarmort'd portion
s of the 
vesscls situatcd above the protcctive òccks) is such that the buoyancy. stabili t
y, trim, 
specò, and manreuvriug capabilities arc well guarantced ngainst cxtensh·e dama
ge from 
shot and shcll fi re in action. A nd, furthcr, tlmt in tbcse particulars the Admirat c
lass a re 
capa ble of mecting, nt least on cqunl terms. their contemporary ships in the F renel
l navy. 
"I must adu tiJat I am uot hcre institutiug any compurison betweeu the 'figh
ting 
efficieucies' o f the sh ips o f the two flcets; u or ha ve I space in this lctter to do so.
 Opin· 
ions have differect, and will probably al \\'nys dilier, a.~ to the relative importanc
e of the 
dilrerent qualities whicb go to make np fight iug cfficiency. Tllcrc is no simple 
formula 
admitting of general application which enables the compnrativc fighting valnes 
of war-
sh ips to be appraised. As tllc conditions of navnl warfare change and war ma
terial is 
developed, so thc balance of qualities in shi p òesigning has to be reudjusted, anò e
stimnt<'S 
of the fighting powers of existing ships bave to he revise<!. And. further, dilicrcnt
 òcsign-
ers, world ng simultl\ ncously, distri bute the displacemcnt, whicb is their sum total 
of en pi-
tal to work u pon, according to tl!eir own judgments of wllat is wiscst aud best for 
thc par-
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ticular conòitions whicll the slüps built from tllose dcsigns IJave to fulfil. The designer 
who llas thc lurgcr displacement to work upou llas the better opportunity of producing n 
more powcrful ship; lmt it by no menns follows that he will secure so good a combinn-
tion of qualities ns n ril•al obt!lins on a smuller displacement. And hence I cannot but 
disscnt from the doctrine tiJat displacement tonnnge is to bc acccptcd as a fair measure 
of relati ve fightiug cillcieucy, or that recent English ships nre ueccssnrily uuable to fight 
recent French ships hecause they are of smnllcr displacernent. 
" In the prcceding rcmarks I bave been cnreful to confine mysclf chiefly to the nayal 
architect's sidc of lhc subject, as it wpuld clenrly be out of place for mc to say much re· 
specting the artillerist's side. But, llaviug hud tbc grcat advantage of knowing the views 
of some of the most experienccd gun.m;tkcrs nnd gunnery otlicers, and having studied 
carefully whnt has bcen writteu on the su!Jject, I would venture to say a few worcls. 
"l•'irst, therc scems, as was previously rcmnrked, cvery reason for doubting, in tbc 
nctunl conditions of naval gunnery, wbethcr it would be possible, not merely in n few 
minutes, but in n considerable time, to produce the wholesale dcstruction of tbc uuar-
morcd parts of modern war·ships which has bcen assumed in the condemnntion of the 
.Admirat clnss. If the Oollingwood, or one of hcr successors, were simply treated ns a mov-
ing target in a sea-way for tbc Amirat Dupm'l'é or onc of her consorts, this would be a 
most improbable resull. But, rcmcmbering thnt the Oollingwood would hersclf be deliver-
ing lwavy blows in retum for thoso reccived, the chances of hcr disablement would uec-
essarily be decreascd. Secondly, it docs not seem at all evident that the introduction of 
rapid-fire guns has such nu important inftnencc on the question of shortencd bclts ns some 
writcrs bave supposed. So far as machine guns are coucerned, I well remember at the 
hoard meeting which decided to npprove the l.milding of thc C'ollingzcood the possible 
effccls of machine·gun fire WE'rc discussetl at some length, botb iu refereuce to the adop-
tion of the bnrbette system and to the system of bull protection. The rapid-fring guu 
whicb has since beco imroduced is now a formidable weapon; but it may be questioned 
whcthcr its etiects upon the unannored portions of modern war-ships would be so serions 
as those resulting from tbc shcll·firc of hcavier guns, and tberefure it cnnnot with cer-
tainty be concluded that it would bc advantngcous to make nrrangemeuts for keepi11g out 
the projecliles from the rapid-firing guus now in use at tbc e11ds of the .Admirat class. 
More especially is tbis truc wbcu it is considcred that already rnpicl·fire guns of mucb 
larger calibre and greater power than thc 6·pounder and 9·pouudcr nre heing made. To 
these guns thrcc inches of steel would be practically no bettcr defcuce than the existing 
thin sides, ancl the real defence lies in the stroug protective deck. Shell-fire from heavier 
guns will probahly be found the best form of attack against the unnrrnored or ligbtly 
armored pot-tions of battJ.e.sbips, especially now tbat the use of stcel shells with tbin walls 
and large bursting charges is being so rapidly devcloped. 
"I wonld ngai u say that on this sicle of the subject I do not profcss to speak with nu-
tbority, and it is undoubted that grcat dilrerences of opiuion prevnil ; l.Hit it must uot be 
forgottcn tlmt the Board of Admiralty, by its recent decision nnuonnced iu thc IIouse of 
Commous, hns renllirmed tbe opinion Lhat frorn the artillerist's poin t of view the exisling 
disposition of the armor in the .Aclmil'rtl class is satisfactory. This hns been done after 
the attention of thc Board nnd thc public has bcen most strongly dirccted to the supposcd 
dangers inddentnl to tbe rapicl destruction of the light snperstructmes lying nbO\'C tbc 
under-water decks of the Admirat class. It wou ld be folly to suppose that iu such n 
maller any merely personal cousidcmtions woulcl prcvent the Ronrd from authorizing a 
cbange wllich was proved to be necessary or aclvantageous. With respect to the possi-
bility of mnkiug experiments which should determine the poiuts at issne, I would only 
say that considcmble difficultics mnst ncccssarily al'ise in endcnvoring to represent tlte 
conditions of an actunl fight; but iu view o f the diametrically op posi te views which luwe 
heen expressed ns to the effect of gnn-fire upon cellular structurcs, it would certainly be 
advantageous if some scheme of thc kind could be arrangetl. 
"'l'Itere still remaius to bc considcrcd the qucstion of the uses of armor in future war-
ships. This lettcr has already extended to too great a length to permit of any nttempt at 
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a full discussion. It will be admittcd by all who are interested in the questions of naval 
design that an inquiry into tbe matter is urgeutly needed, even if it leads only to a tempo-
rary solution of tbe problem. in view o f the present means of ofience and defence. 
"Armor, by which term I understand not merely vertical armor, bot obliquo or borizon-
tal armor, is regarrled in different ways by differcnt authorities. For exnmple, I under-
stand Sir Edward Rccd to maintain that side-armor should be fitted in the form of a water-
line belt, exteuding over a very considerable portion of tbc length, and thnt such armor, 
in association with a strong protective deck, and armored erections for gun -stations, etc .. 
shonld secure the buoyancy, trim, and stahility of tbe vessel. At tbe other extreme we 
llave the view expressed in tbe design of the granel Italian vessels of tlle nalia class. 
Jn them the hull-armor is only used for the pUI·pose of asslsting thc cellular llull subdivi-
sions in protecting buoyancy, stability, and trim, taking the form of a thick protcctive deck, 
which is wholly under water, and above wbich comes a minutely subdivided region, wbicb 
Signor Brin a nd bis colleagues cousider sufficient defen ce agaiust gun-fi,·e. 
"In these Italian vessels the on ly thick armor is used to protect tbe gun-stations, tbe 
pilot-tower, and the comrnunicntions from those important parts to tbc mngazines aod 
spaces below the protective deck. The strong dcck, besides forming a base of the cellular 
subdivision, is of course a defence to the vital parts of tbc sbip lying below i t. 
"Between tbese two types o f sbips corne the Admirat class o f the English navy a nd !he 
belted vessels of tbe French navy, whose resemblances aud diiferences llave been described 
abovc. 
"In addition, therc are nota few authorities who maintain that tbe development o f tbc 
swift torpedo-cruiser, or the swift protected cruiser, makes the continued use of armor at 
leastquestionnble, seeiog tbat to at.tempt to protect ships by thick armor eithcr on decks or 
sides, aud to secure high speeds and !Jeavy armaments, in volves the construction o f large 
and expensive vessels, whicb are necessnrily exposcd to eoormous risks in nctiou frorn 
forms of undcr-water attack, agaiost which their nrmor is no dcfence. In view of such 
differenccs o( opinion, and of the heatecl controversics whicb ha ve arisen tbcrefrom. thc 
time S<'Cms ccrtninly to bave arri ver! wben somc competent body should be assembled by 
thc Admiralty for tbc purpose o f considering tbc designa o f our war-ships, a nd enabling our 
constructors to procccd witb greater assurancc t!Jrm tlH'Y canat present. Qucstions afiect-
ing t!Je efl!cicncy of the Royal Navy clearly ougbt not to be decided except in the most 
calm a nd disp!ISsionnte mnnuer. 'f he work done by .the Committee ou Designs for Ships 
of \Var fourteen yenrs ago was valunble, and has hac! importnnt results. I·Vhat is oow 
wanted, I venture to think, is a still wider inquiry iuto thc coudition of thc navy, anc! onc 
of the branchcs of that inqniry which will rcquire the most careful trcatment is embraceu 
iu tlle question, '\Vbnt arc the uses of armor in modern war-sllips ?' 
":tlly O\Yn opinion, rcached after very carcful study of tllc subject, is that very serious 
Jimitations bave to IJe accepted in the clisposition nnd general efficicncy of the armaments, 
i f thc principie of protcctiog the stabili ty at considerable ungles of inclination by means of 
thick armor is acceptcd, tbc size noc! cost of thc sh ips being kcpt within reasoMble límits. 
There is no difficulty, of course, apart from coosiderations of size and cost, in fulfilliug the 
condition of arrnor-protected stability; but it mny bc doubted whcthcr the results could 
prove sntisfactory, especially whcn thc risks f rom undcr-wntcr aitacks, as well as f rom gun-
firc, are borne iu mincl, and the fact is recogoizcd thnt cvcn the thickest armor carricd or 
cootemplated is not proof against existing guns. Ko vesse] can fight without running 
risks. It is by no meaos certaiu, howevcr, thut thc grcater risks to bc faced arc tl1osc aris-
ing from damage to the sides in the rcgiou of thc water-li ne nnd consequent loss of stabi l-
ity. So far as I bave beeu nble to judge, it nppears possible to produce a better fightiog-
mnchine for a givcn cost by abandouing the idea of protecting stability, buoyancy, and 
trim cntirely by thick armor, aud by the acceptnncc of the principie that unannorcd but 
specially constructed superstructures s!Jall i.Je trustcd ns contributories to the fiotation and. 
stability. Thick vertical side-armor, even over a portion of the leogtb, appears to be by no 
means o. necessnry conditioo to an efiective gum·antee of the li fe ami manageability of a 
ship whcn damaged in action; and it scems extremely probable tiJat iu futurc the grent dis-
lS 
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tinction between battle-sbips aud protected ships will not be fonnu in the nature of tbeir 
hull protection in the region of the water-line, bnt in the use of thick arruor over the sla· 
tions of the henvy guns in battle-shi~s. 
"'fhe dcci~ions ns lo futnre designs of our ballle-ships is a moruentous one. It can 
only be renc:hecl by tbc consideration of tbc relati ve advnntnges nnd disadvantages of alter· 
uutivc proposals. It cannot be dissociated from consitlcrations of cost for a single sbip. 
"On nil grounds, thcrefore, it is to be hoped that a full and impartia! inquiry will be 
nuthorizctl without delay; for it may be nssumed tlmt, however opin ions tliffer, tbere is the 
com mon desi re to secure for tbe British uavy the IJest types of ships and a sufficient num-
IJer to i11sure our marilime suprcmacy. I am, sir, your obedient servant, 
"W. H. WHI'l'E. 
"ELSWICIC \V'ORKS, March 26th." 
Thc following r eply by Sir Edward Reed appearcd in thc Times of April 8, 
188ó, the omitted portions being personal aBusions which have very little bearing 
u pon the discussion, and which arc of no intercst to a professional reader outside 
of England : 
"It is not 1\Ir. White's fault but his misfortune tbat lle is corupelled to ad mit the per-
fect correctness of the maiu charge whicb I bave brought against tbese six ships,viz., thai 
they ha ve ))ecu so coustructed, and bave been so stripped of armor protection, tbat thcir 
armor, evcn wben iutact anc! untouched, is wholly insulticient to prcvent them from cap-
siziog in batlle. :\lr. White cxpends a good dea! of labor in attempting to sbow that their 
unarmorcd parts would l.mve a better chancc of keeping the ships uprigbt and afloat tban 
I crcclit them witb, which is a seconcl.ary., althougb au importnnt, question; but bc fraukly 
nclmits thnt tbese six sbips of tbe Admiml typc nre, and arc aclmittcd to be, so built that 
thcir 'stai.Jility in the sense of the power to resist bciog capsized if inclined to evcn ruod-
erate angles of iuclinatiou is not guarantcecl by their armor-IJclts.' 
* * * * * ·!(- * 
"I bave no cl.oubt it would s nit tbc pm·poscs o f al\ thosc who arc or ~bo bnve been 
responsible for those ships if I werc to allow ruysclf to be drnwn, in connection with this 
question, nwny from the essential points just advcrted to into a controversy upon the 
ciforts made by tbc Admiralty to givc to tbcse ships, which hnvc been denied a reasonai.Jlc 
umount of nrmor protection, sucb relicf from the grave dnngers tbus incurred as tbin sbeet 
compartments, colfer. clams, coals, patent fuel, storcs, etc., cun afford. (Cork is what \\'fiS 
at first relied upon in tbis connection, but we heur no more of it now.) But I do not 
intend to be drnwn nsicl.e from my dcmund for properly nrmored ships of tbe fi rst clnss by 
any refercnces to these devices, and for a vcry simple renson, viz., all such devices, whether 
tbeir value be great or sruall, are in no sense spccial lo armored ships; on tbe contrary tbey 
arc com mon to ull ships, and nre more especially applied to ships which are unahle to car-
ry armor. The application of tbese devices to ships stripped of armor does not make lbem 
nrmorctl ships, any more than it mnkes a simple cruiser or other ordinary unarmored ves 
~el an armored ship; and wbat I desi re, and wbat I confidently rely u pon the country 
clemaudiug before long, is the construction of a few line-of-battle ships made reasonably safe 
hy armor, in lieu of tbc present ships, which. wbile cnlletlnrmorcd ships, in rcality depcnd 
u pon their thin nnarmored parts for tbeir al.>ility to kcep upright nnd afloat. Besides, I do 
not believe in these devices for sbips intended for close fighting. I evcn believe them like· 
Jy, in nota few cascs, to add to tbcir dangcr rather than to their safety. If, for example, 
a raking shot.or shell should !et the sca into the compartments on one sicle of tbe ship, 
while those on the other side remnin intnct nnd buoyant, tbis very buoyancy upon tbc 
uuinjurcd sicle of tbc sbip would belp to capsize hcr. 
"í\Ir. ·white snys tbat no vesse! can figbt without runlling risks, and tbinks tbat tbick, 
vertical side-armor, even over a portion of the sbip's length, is not a necessary gum·antee 
of thc life of a ship. Well, sir, we arc all at lii.Jerty to tbink, or not tbink, wbat we please, 
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so far as our sense and judgment will allow us; but Mr. White, Jike all other depreciators 
of side..armor, fuils utterly to show us whnt elsc there is whicb can bc relied upon to keep 
shell out of a ship, or what can be done to prevent sllell that burst inside a sbip from 
spreading destruction all around. He refers us to no experiments to sbow tllat the thin 
plate divisions and coíier-dams, and like devices, will prove of any avail for the pm·pose 
proposed. In tbe ahsence of any such experiments, he tells us, as others bave told us, that 
Signor Brin and colleagucs in the Italinn Aumiralty consider 'a minutely subdivided re-
gion' at and below the water-line 'sutBcient defence against guu-fire.' But I do not think 
Siguor Brin believes anything of tbe kind ; wbat he believes is that the ltalian goverumcnt 
cuunot a:fiord to build a fleet of propcrly armored liue·of.battle ships for llard aud closc 
fighting, and thnt, looking at their limitcd rcsources, a fcw exccssively fast ships, with ur-
mor hcre and tllerc to protect particular purts, and with ample capubilitics of retreat to a 
safe distance, will be!!t serve their purpose. I do not say thut be is wrong, aud I ccrtainly 
admire the skill which be has displuycd in carrying out his well·detined object. But that 
objectis totally different from ours, und our naval babits, our traditions, our nationalspirit, 
the very blood thnt fiows in our veins, prevent sueu an object from ever becoming ours. 
")Jr. White all through bis lettcr, in commou with some of Llis la te colleagues at tbe 
Admiralty, thinks and speaks as if naval warfare werc henceforth to be chiefiy a matter 
of dodging, gctting chauce shots, nuu lteeping out of tbc enemy's way; and tbis may be 
more or lcss truc of con tests between unarmored vessels. But why is not the Jiue.of.ballle 
ship Collin,qwood lo be supposed lo stenm stmight up to the cnemy, I should like to kuow? 
and i f she does, what is to prevcnt thc cncmy from pouring a rnking fire through hcr bow, 
and ripping up at ouce, e1•en witb a single shcll, every compartmcnt betwcen the stem and 
the traus verse armored bulkhead? 
"lt distresses me beyond mensure to sec our ships constructcd so ns to impose upon 
them the most terrible penalties whenevcr their commandcrs da re, as dare they evcr ha1•e, 
and dare they evcr will, to close wíth tbeir foe and try conclusions witb him. 'Why, sir, 
it lms been my paioful duty over nnd ovcr ngain to hear foreign officers entreat me to use 
all my infiucncc agninst the adoplion in thcir navy of ships with so little armored sm·fnce 
as ours. On one occasion the Colling1oood hcrself was imposetl u pon them as a model to 
be imitatcd, anc! I wus hesought to gi ve thcm a safer and bctter ship. 'J:Iow could 1 cver 
steam up to my enemy with any contldcoce,' said one of the oflicers concerncd, • with such 
a ship as that undcr my feet ?' 
* * * * * * * 
":;ur. White coolly tells os that tbc Collill[JlDOOd, witb fi ve hundred tons of water Jog-
ging her ends to a depth of seven or cight feet, will not be mncb worse oíi than n ship 
whose ai·m01·ed deck stands two aml a J¡alf or three feet above thc wnter's surfacc, and llis 
reason is that cven nbove this lattet· dcck tbc water would flow in whcn the ship was dril'-
ing ahend with au injurcd bow. \V'cll, sir, I will only say tltnt sailors of expcrience see a 
very grent diiTercocc between tbc t.wo cascs, nnd I cun bnt rcgard such theorizings as l'ery 
unfortnnnte basis for the dcsigus of hcr iHujesty's ships. 
"I bave said that l\Ir. vV'bite's ussumptions as to thc irnmunity of the above-water com-
pnrtmenls and coiTer-dams from widc·sprcnd iujury by shel l-fi re rest u pou no experimental 
datn; I go on to say tltat such duta ns \\'C hn1•c to my mi nd point vcry mucb the other way. 
The Hurzscctr was uot ao unarmored vesse!, a nd sucb shell as penctrated her harl first to 
pass througb somc thin armor aod wood backing; yet aftcr tbc Cocltrane and BlanC() En-
caloda hnd defeatcd hcrsbc prcsrntcd intcrnally abundant evidcnce of the general destruc-
tion which shell-lirc produces. An oflicer of the Cocltrane, who was tbe tirst person sent 
on bonn! by thc captors, in a letter to mc written soon aftenvards, said: 'll requi res seeing 
to believe tbe destruction done .... \Ye had to climb over heaps, t.nble·high, of déhrisand 
dead and woundcu .... \Ye :fired forty-Jhre Pnlliser sbcll, and Lhe engineers who werc on 
board say that cvcry shell, or nearly so, must bave struck, and tbat evcry one that struck 
burst on bonrd, doing awful destruction.' 
"Speaking of the injury wbich tbc Coclt1·an.e received from a sin¡!le shell of the Iluas-
car, he said: • It passed through tlte upper work!:' at commandcr's cabin, brea king f ore a nd 
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aft bulkhea<i of cahius, hreaking skylight a bo ve ward-room, tbwartship bulkhead of wood, 
pnsscd on, cut in two a 5-inch iron pillar, through a store-room, struck armor-plate, glanccd 
oti, passing through plating of cmbrasure closet at corner, finishing at after gun-port, and 
wcnt ovcrboard. This shell passed in at starboard part of stern and terminated at nfter 
battery port ou port sicle, which is finished with thc wide anglc-iron, carrying out a part of 
the angle-irou in its fligbt.' 
"This was a shell o f moderate size, from a moderate guu, but it is obvious tbat it would 
bave mnde short work of penetrating those very thiu shcets of steel whicl! constitute the 
compnrtmeuts, coficr-dams, etc., upon tbc resistnnce of whicll, to my extreme surprise, 
those rcgpousible for the power allll safety of ou•· fleets scem so ready to place their main 
ucpendcnce. 
* * * * * * * "For resistnnce to rams and torpcdoes, and for tbe limitation of tbc injuries to be 
t::fiectcd by them, as much cellular subdivision as possible should be supplied; lmt, as 
agninst shot and shell, subdivision by thcir sl!cet-stccl is no guarautee whatever of safcty 
iu any ship, least of all iu liue-of-battle sl!ips, which must be prepared for fight.iug at close 
quarters. 
" 1 must now ask for spnce to rcmnrk upon a few minor points in i.\Ir. Wbite's letter. 
ne seems to cousider that the seant armor of the Admirat class is somehow associnted 
with thc plncing o f the large, partly protected guus of these ships iu scparate positions,' iu 
ordcr to rcduce thc risks of complete disablement of the principal armament by one or 
two lucky shots, wllich may happen when the heavy gnns are concentrated on a single 
citaclel or battery.' Suffice it to reply that iu the proposed ncw designs o f the Admiralty 
sbips now before Pnrlinment, which bave almost equally scunt partia! belts of armor, the 
guns arc ncverthcless concentrated in a single battcry. 
"Again, lHr. White sa.ys the Admimlty ha ve cleclined to adopt my advice to protect 
thc Lldrniml class in certain unarmored parts with 3-inch platiog, and dedares that such 
piating wouhl practically !;e no better defcnce against mpid-tire guns tban existing thiu 
sides; but has he forgotten the faet that my snggestion has been adopted iu the new de-
signs for tl!c protection of tbc battery of G-inch guns, altbough it is perversely withhcld 
from tbose parts of the ship in wbich it might ussist iu some clegree in prolonging the 
ship's ability to flont and to resist capsizing forces? 
"i.\Ir. White makes one very singular statemeut. ne takes exceptiou to my claiming 
for thc Injlezible type of ship, on account of their armored citadel, a much better chance 
of retnining stability in battle thau the Adrniral typc possesses, because, l!e says, 'in botll 
classes the armored p01tions require the assistancc of the unarmored to secur~ such a 
range and amouut of stability as shall efiectually guarnntee their security when damaged 
in nctiou.' The fair inference to be drawu from this woulcl bc that wbere the principie 
long ago !aid dowu by me, aud supported by llir. Barnnby in tbc words previously qnoted, 
is once dcparted from, the danger must iu all cases be so great as to exclude all distinc-
tions of more or less risk. ;'\lr. White can hanlly menu tl!is; but if be does not, then on 
what grouuds are we told that a ship which bas no nrmor atall left above water at an iu-
clination say of six or eight degr~es is no worse ofi thau a ship which at those angles 
nnd at still greater ones has a water-tight citadcl over onc huudred feet long to belp llold 
her up? 
* * ~'i- * * * ·:f 
"I nm not nt all disposed to enter iu to a discussion as to the relati ve stabilities of the 
English and Frenell ships m1der various conditions. The Frenell sh ips bave armorecl bells 
two anc! a half to three feet above water from end to entl. That fact, other things being 
prcsumed equnl, gi ves tbem au immensc ndvantnge ovcr om ships, which iu batlle trim 
have bells scarcely more than a foot wide above water, nnd for less than hal f tbeir Jength. 
lt is quite possible that the Frenell constructors mny bave gilren their ships less init-iai sta-
bility thnn oms; from sucl! informatiou as I possess I believc they bave; but in so far as 
tbe ship below tbc armor-deck, and the ar.tion of shot aud shell upou thnt part of her, are 
conccrnecl, whatcvcr stability tl!ey start witll iu batLle they will retain nntil their armor is 
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pierced; wherens our ships mny hnve n lnrge proporlion of theirs taken f rom tbem with-
ont their nrmor being pierced, aocl tbeir armored decks are then less tllnn balf tbe heigllt 
of thosc of tbe Frenell sbips abovc water. 
* * * * * * * "I will ndd that I doubt if tbe Frenell ships nre dealt fairly by at Whitehall. I lately 
henrd a good dea! of tbe extreme taper of their armor-belts at the bow, noel tlle .Amirat 
JJttper1·é was al ways quoted in instau ce o f this. It is truc tbat tbis ship's armar does taper 
from fifty-five centímetres amidships r.o twenty-five centímetres at the stcm, but she stands 
almost :-lioue among recent important shíps iu this respect, as thc followiug figures will 
show: 
'l'biokocss Thickncss 
NAliE OF Sull'. of Armt>r of Armor 
Amidshlp. nt Bows. 
Ce.nUmelrtl. CenUmetru. 
Amil·nl Baudin ...................... . 55 40 
Formidable ......................... . 55 40 
IT oc he .............................. . 45 40 
45 40 
4;3 40 
i.'llugenta ............................ . 
) l ;trcen u ...... _ ..................... . 
Caiman _ ... _ ........................ . 50 35 
Fulminnnt .......................... . 33 25 




Indomptallle ............. . .......... . 
Requin ............................. . 
Terrible ............................ . 
"A friend writes me: • Comparing the .Amiral JJnperré witb the .Amiral Baudin, JJe-
!Jastation, Formül<tbte, aud Fou<lroyant, which are sllips of about ber sizc, the following 
peculiarities arc ol.Jscrval.Jle: TIJ e JJuperré is al.Jout three faet uarrowcr tiJa u the other sbips 
meutioued, aud has fully fifteeu inches lcss metncentric lwight. She is also slightly rlecper 
iu proportion to hcr hreadth than the o tiJ er ~hi ps.' 
"As unrrowness, small metacentric height, aud excessivc dcpth nil teud to reduce sta-
bility, it would appear that the Admiralty office has, ns 1 snpposed, becn careful to sclect 
a vesse! not unfavorable to their pm·pose. But bowever this may he, it is no business of 
mine to defenu the Frenell ships iu tbe details of their stability, uor even to defend them 
at all; aud, as a maller o f fact, the Frenell A.dmiralty, nltbough stopping far sbort o f ours, 
has iu my opinion gone much too far in the direction of reducing tbe nrmored stability 
at cousidcmblc angles of mcliuation. But their falliug into one error is no justification 
for our fnlling in to a much greater one, and deliberately repcating it in C\'cry sllip we lny 
clown. Iu this counectiou I will only add thn.t the experiments performed nt our Admi-
mlty ou models must be viewed with grent dístrust for a reasou not yet named. They 
dea! only, so far ns I arn acquninted with them, with models set oscillating or rolling by 
waves or otherwise. Bnt the danger tims dcnlt with is a sccoudnry one; the p rimnry onc 
is tbat duc to 'list' or prolonged inclination to o ne sicle. 1Vhat sort o f protection agninst 
the danger of capsiziug fmm tbis cause cau be posscssed by a ship thc entire nrmor on 
ench side of which becomes immersed even iu smooth water when the ship is inclincrl a 
cou ple of degrees ouly, noel which then has no side left to imrncr:;e, sa ve such as single 
shells can blow into holes teu by four feet? 
"It is to be ol.Jservcd that although i\[r. 'White docs not ,·cuture to join the only otller 
apologist for these ucficiently armorcd ships in stating tiJat lndia·ntl.Jbcr umhrella shot-
stoppcrs arc to be employed for tbcir prcscrvntion in hnttle, he does goso far as to tell us 
thnt thc spnces into which water would enter when thc unarrnorerl parts llave heen pcue-
tratecl bave been subòividcd 'to facilitate the work of stopping t~:mporarily shot-holcs in 
the sides,' and I know indepcndcutly that a good dea! of reliancc is plnccd at the Aòmi-
ralty upon thc prcsumed ability to stop such holes ns thcy nre mnde. But the wholc thing 
is a delusion. The officer of the C'ocltrane, bcfore quotcd, said, 'I wish to state thnt shot,. 
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plugs are out of tbc question nfter or at such a ñght. Tbey nre entirely useless. Not a 
hole was either rou nd, square, or oval, bnt differeut sbnpes-J'agged, jngged, anti torn, the 
inside parts and half-inch plating being torn in ribhons; some of tbc boles inside arc as 
large ns four by Llu·ce fcct, and of nil shapes. There arc many shot-plugs on board hcre, 
all sizes, conical shapes and long, but they arc of no use whatever.' 
•' ;\[r. White's !et ter invites mnny other com ments, bnt I bave said enough to show !lmt 
it in no way changcs my view of the question of armor-plated Jine-of-l>llttle sbips. In so 
far as it advocates a furtber abnndonment of armor and a further resort to doubtful de-
vices in lieu thercof, it is nlrcady answered by anticipation by the .A.dmiralty itself. U ntil 
I wrote my recent letters to you, our .A.dmiralty thonght ns :Mr. W hite still thinlts, and 
tcnded as he still tends. In tbc case of all our recent cruisers but two tbey had nbolished 
sidc-nrmor altogether. To my public appeal for armor-belted crnisers tbey bave, bow-
ever, respouded, nnd are about to order six of such ships. So far, so good. We onght to 
be gmteful for this concession to a most reasonable demand. I wisb these cruisers were 
to be faster, mucb faster, but in A.dmiralty matters tbe country mu~t be thankful for small 
mcrcics. 
"It only rema i ns fo r me to note with satisfaction on e or two of the points u pon which 
Mr. W hite is iu agreement with myself. He admits thnt it 'woultl certainly be ndvan-
tageous' to carry out tbose experiments whicb I rcgard tbc .A.dmirnlty as afraid to make, 
-uiz., experiments to test the eliect of gun-fire upon tbe subdivided bnt unarmored parts of 
ships. 
* * * * * 
"It may be taken for what it is worth, but I declare that the abaudonment of nrmor 
has notat all beco forced npou us by unavoidable circumstances, noris it from any intrin-
sic necessity that we go on refusing to provide our sbips with torpedo tlefence. On not 
immotlerate dimensions, at not immodemte cost, ships might be built, still practically in-
vulnerable to gun, ram, and torpedo nlike, ships which could dispose of the Admirat clnss 
of ships more qu ickly and certainly than she could dispose of the feeblest antngonist tbnt 
3he is likely to encounter. But in order to produce such ships we must revive tbc now 
:~bnndoned principie that armor, and armor alone can sa ve from destruction those sbips 
wbose business it is to drive our futu,re enemics from tbc European sens anc! lock tbem up 
in tbcir own ports." 
The Committec on Designs of 1872, previously alluded to, contaiued sixteen 
members, of whom six were naval officers. Two of those members, Admiral 
George Elliot, R.N., aud Rear-admiral A . P. Ryder, R.~. , dissented so far from 
their colleagnes that they could not sign the report, and according ly they snb-
mitted a very able minority report embodying their views. 
The first of the "general principies" laid down in their report is as follows: 
"Tbat it is o f thc !ast importance thnt the modifica tions in existing types of men·of-
war which tbc committee ha ve beco iuvited to suggest should bc calculated not mcrely to 
ctrectually meet the necessities of ntwnl warfare tl OW and in tbc immediate future, but in 
full view of the probable necessities of naval warfurc iu the mon' remo te future." 
It must be a source of satisfaction to these gallant offieers to observe in some 
designs of the present day a confirmation of their fo recast in many particulars. 
The following extracts from a letter bearing upon the present coutroversy, by 
Admira! Elliot, appeared in tho Times (Loudon) of .April 24, 1885, and contain the 
pith of bis oft-quoted arguments : 
")[y first impression on readiog these letters in the Times is one of disnppoiotment 
that the point at issue between these two experts has not been more closely confinerl to 
the comparativa merits of side-m·mor versus cellular-deck armor, but that their attention 
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bas been d irccted to this fcature of dcsign only as connectçd with a, particular type of 
ship, nnmely, tbc Collingwood, which vesse] is a by!Jrid, or cross bctween tbc two systems 
o f protcction to bnoyancy, aorl thcrefore o ot truly represeutati ve o f eitber. :Ur. \Vbitc's 
defeoce of tbe uoarmored ends of the C:ollingwl)()d is so far unsalisfactory tiJat iL trcals of 
a very imperfect developm!lnt of the cellular-dcck mode of protectioo, nod thereforc he ia 
notau exponent of tuc real merits of t!Jis system. 
* * * * * * * "I arn quite aware that tbe ma in point at issue betwcen thesc two distioguisbed naval 
nrcbitects has beeo more closely coofiued to thc question of stn!Jility than to that of tlotn-
tion as displayed iu the dcsign of the Collingwoocl, anc! iu this scieotific view of thc case I 
do not feel competent to offer any opinion, cxcept to point out that thc ccllular-deck prin-
cipie per se does notin vol ve any such danger as regards stability as is produced uy thc 
top weigbt of a central citadcl. Dir. Wbite aclwowledges that this top wcigbt will capsize 
his ship if deprived of the buoyaocy afiordcd by the uoarmored cods, ami ou this dangor 
point Sir Edwa1d Reed fixes his shnrpest wenpon of attack. 
* * * * * * * "Tbc great issue at stako is bow the weights available for tho protectioo of buoynncy 
an·d for gun defence are to be distributed to the best advantnge for defcnsivo pnrposcs, 
and in order to discuss Sir Edward Reecl's opinions in a concisc formI will dea! with the 
questiou solely ns conceroing tbe uso of sicle-armor of less than twclve ioches, beyond 
whicb límit of thickness I will, for tbc snke of argument, ad mit its practica! advantages; 
aud looking to tho demancl for iucrcnaed speed and coal-carryiug capacily, it docs not 
appear probaule tbnt if combined with ndcqua.to gun protection, and if of snfficieut dcpth. 
ao all-round belt of thkkcr thnu ten incbes can bc carried by any vcssels of war exccpt 
tllose of much grentcr displacomeut tban the Collingu;ood class. 1 feel justified, howe''!'l', 
in discussing thc qucstion on this basis, because Sir Edward Recd iucludçs in his category 
of approvod nrmorcd ships our recent beltcd cruisers, having a nnrrow belL of ten inrhcs 
maximum thickness, nod takes eredit for baving iuduced the Admiralty Lo nbandoo thcir 
original intcntiou of collular-dcck wuter-lioo protection in this clnss of war-sbip iu favor 
of this tbio armor-belt. 
"The rcl:ttivc vnlue of these two systems of water-li ne protoction, nnmoly, an all-rou nd 
belt -ve¡·sus a mft body, must oot only òc ruled by the displacemeut dccidcd u pon for cach 
class of vesse!, and by the power of the gnn which has to bo cncountercd, bnt by such 
tactical expedients as can be resorted to in batlle, ns beiug those llest suited lo the known 
ofiensive noel defensivc propertics of thc combatants. 
"Looking at this disputed question entiroly from the point oí view of nu artillerist 
and a practica! senman, I cau perceive vory great taclical ad,•nntnges to be obtained by 
the adoption o f the mode of protection proposeu as a substitute for obsolete armor, and I 
view with much rE'gret the one-sidcduess of thc conclusions arrh•cd at by thc oppooents 
of this system, and the clisparaging tcrms in which it is sought to turn it into ridiculc, 
such as · doubtful dovices' nncl 'uscloss contrh•nnces,' etc., uccause thcy indicato preju-
dice aud n wnnt of mature considcration of tlle incidents of naval baules. I cannot, ulso, 
help observing tllat while, on the ono sicle, prophesying tllc most fatal conscqucnces to 
ensue from wbnt is called 'slripping shipR o f armor,' on Lho ot hcr sicle no admissiou is 
mnde of tbc disnstrous results whicllmust follow from placing reliancc on such a. dolusive 
defensi ve agcncy a~ an armor-1)lnte known to be penetrable by ¡rnns certain to bc cncouu-
tered; a nd iu order to support this thcory wc arc called u pon to believe tlmt gunoers will 
be so excited in actiou or so unskilful thnt in no C.'ISC will they bit the large object aimcd 
at, uamely, tbc water-line of an advcrsnry passing oven at close quarters on their benm, 
but I shall refer to this feature of assumed impunity hereafter. 
"Sir Edward Recd's comparntivo remnrks on the cffcot of shot-holes ns betwcen tbc 
two systems of dcfencc are of the sa.mo one-sidcd eharactcr, notwithstanrling the eviclence 
of the fractureu coudition of armor-platcs suhjected to experimental firing; and it is al-
most apparcnt that in decrying the ono mode of protection he bns lost sight of tho fuet 
that a teu-iuch armor-plnte is all thnt will stand betweeu the li fe nod death oí a sbip-thut 
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is to sny, betwccn 9ne wcll-dircclcd shcll and thc magazincs and boilcrs-wbich plate can 
be easily penetralcd nnd smashed up by tbe guns which similar vessels will assnredly 
carry if so invilcd. Also, in referring lo the lJaneful effccts of mking fire and sbell cxplo-
sion inbonrd, the assumed inferiority is misplaced because one prominent advantage or 
tbc ccllular-dcck system is tbat lJy cconomiziug wcight at tbe witlcr-liue it enables the 
bow ant.! sl cru lo be armor-plntcd-a mntter or tbe highest tactical importance as a defen ce 
against ruldng fire, wbicb is uuobtainable iu a belted sbip of the same displaccmcut, nt 
least without eutniling a considerable rcduction of tbe tbickncss of nrmor on the belt. 
This fcuture of cnd-on clefeucc is not only nu esseutial element of snfely, but must prove 
most ciic<:tivc ns ennbling a combatant to close bis aclvcrsary at au advantagc, nud cnforce 
tbc bow-to-bow ram cncounlcr, or cornpcl him to resort Lo n stern tight, or otherwisc Lo 
pnss birn nt. such close quftrters as "\viii insnrc clirect b its ancl deprcssed fire nt !he waler-
line bclt, ancl by tbese tnctics tbe opportuuities for riddling the rnft body will lJe few and 
far bctwccn. 
"I mny a Iso cxpress the opin ion thnt for repairing damngcs in a rnft-boclied ship nt 
the watcr-line far more efficncious meaus can be resorted to than !he ordioary shot-plugs, 
and tiJat the use of cork bags for dosing shot-holes iu the co.IIcr-dam sides, if thcy urc 
open nt the top, is far from being nn uorcasonable or • stupid contrivance,' as iL is called, 
considcring thaL, as a gcneml rule, tbe perforations tbrough LIJin platiug would not be 
ragged or extensive. Sir Edwanl Rce11's wise suggcstion Lo makc the outer skin of the 
cofl'cr-dam of two-inch steel plates would render mnchine-gun tire of little avail. 'l'he 
injurious efl'ecls of sbell fi re woulcl, I reckon, be 'far more fata l i f the projectile explocletl 
in passing through the ten-inch lJelt than if it burst at somc dislance inlJoard aflcr pcne-
traLing thin plating. I tbink it will ue ndmitted without dispute that tbis feature of de-
sign must lJe governed to a great extent by tnctical coosidcnttions, Lhe object songht for 
heiog to sccure out of a gi ven weight of stccl the greatest nmount of fightiug vitnliLy con-
sistent with lhe power of manrenvriug available between skilful autagonists. 'l'bis vicw 
of the case is espccially applicalJie to single actions at sen, when a clevcr tacticinn will 
selcct his mode of tiglJt ing according to tbe offensive and dcfcnsivc properlies Jmowu to 
bc posscssed by llis opponent, nnd in this rcspect an annor- plated bow nod stcrn will 
aJiord enonnous arlvantages, botit for attack aud defence, if thc plaLing is extendcd as 
higlJ as thc upper dcck. 
"In Jlect uctions the ram nod tm·peclo will reqnire more altention thnn the gun atlncl<, 
noel thnL featnrc of batLle introduccs auothcr disputcd point, nnmely, the limit of size of 
sbip; but thnt queslion is outside the scopc nf the present discussion, nnd I shall conclude 
my arguments by a strong exprcssion of opinion that, ns gnnpowder hns so complctely 
mastercd thc pretensions of outside armor protcction, the direction in which prudcnce 
lenns towards defcnsive properties in futnre designs for ships-of-war is thnt of dcflcction 
rather Llum of dircct resistancc, and that in Lhis respect scieuce has not reached its utmost 
Jimit of invention. 
"The prevniling disposilion to rcgulatc I he power of the gun by tbc size of the vesse! 
is, I consider, a gr·cat mistake, seeing tbnt the aclditional weight of a powerful gun is not 
inadmissible, cven in such vcssels as our hcllecl cruisers, and looking to the strong indnce-
mcot hcld ont by the conlinucd usè of nrmor-platiug, even of such modcrnte tbickoess as 
ten inches. In the splendid stcamcrs purchased from thc mcrcnntile mnrine, whicb arc 
being nrmcd with light gnns only, one 25-ton gnn wonld grently add lo their fighling 
power. but thc canse of tbis omission mny probulJJy bc fouud in thc auswer to the ques-
tion, Where arc the guns?" 
The following reply appeared in the Times (Louclon) of i\fay 1, 1885: 
"Sm,-The lctter of Admira! Sir George Elliot . .. deals nbly and candidly with a 
subject of such fundameotal importancc to our navy thnt I ven turc to offer a few observa-
tions n pnn i t. 
"I nm glnrl to sec that thc gallunt admira! separates bis case anc! thc cell uJar or raft-
deck system from any connection with Lhe Collingwood or Admiral type of ship, !Jut I 
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regret tbat be bas treated my criticisms of that kind of sh ip just as if I bad applied thcm 
in tbe abstract to the system which he ndvocates. This is not fair either to the galJant of· 
ficcr himself or to me, as will presently appcar. 
"lf Sir George El !iot will rcmovc tbc cellular or raft-deck qucstiou completcly away 
f rom the very nnsatisfactory nnd unpleasant regiou of Admu·alty practice, and Jet it be 
treated u pon its morits, while I sllalJ still ha ve to respectfully submit to him some caution-
ary considerations, I shall also be prepared to make to h im some very considerable conces-
sions. O ne thing I sllould fi nd it clesimble to press u pon him is the absolute necessity of 
giving closer attention to tbc provision of stabili ty. H e treats the subject mainly as a 
question of 'buoyancy,' nnd wisely so f rom bis point o f view; bnt 'stability,' or the pow er 
of resisting Cttpsizing, comes fi rst, anc\ on this he declines to ofier an opinion. Again, 
whcn the gnllnn t olllcer spcaks of a 'mft ' deck, I wonld point out tbnt tbis may be a very 
different thing from a cellulnr- deck. 'fhe characteristic of a raft is tbat it is usually 
formed of solid buoyant materials; you may make it of cellular stecl if you please, lmt in 
that case wherever injury Jets in water the steel so far censes to be a raft, wbich belps to 
lloat its load, and becomes a weigbt to belp sink it. Now, cells formed of tbin steel do 
not upon the fnce of the maller appear to be safe materials for a raft wbich is to be suh· 
ject to the multitudinous fi re of small guns and the explosions of shclls of all sizes. It 
needs a very skilful artificer to build a safe floating raft of thin stcel for such a purpose, 
especially when rcgard is bnd to tbc dangers of raking fire, agninst which bow and sreru 
armor would uot sufficicully proviòe. 
" Having expressed thcse caut ions, I will go on to say thnt in my opinion the mnin 
idea o f your gallant correspondent. which he has so long a nd so stcadily developed, is nev-
ertheless a sound one, nnd one which has a grcat future. I do not, of course, for a mo· 
ment ndm it with him that the gun has yet mastered the armor. 1 belicve the Dreadnougld, 
thougb of oid design, wou ld still fight n good action agninst all ships now ready for sca, 
and bave to fcar only a very exccptional, and therefore cithcr n very skilful or very fortn· 
nate, shot. 'l'he recent Admirnlty ships, w hcre they arc armored. nre practically proof 
against almost evcry gun afloat. F urthcr, I have satisfied myself that if the existing re-
strictions imposcd upon us by the absence of lloating docks ndapted to receive ships of 
great brendth werc removcd (these rcstrictions crippling ns to a most unfortunatc dcgree), 
and if certain professional convcntionalities as to the forms of ships were set aside, it 
would be perfcctly practicable to build war-ships uo larger and no more costly tban the 
Injfe:cible, with enough side-armor more tban a yard (three f cet) thick to preserve their sta-
bility, and at the same time ronde r11m-proof nnd torpedo-proof. illeanwhile, of all tbe 
vulnerable objects atloat, the recent guns themselves, by reason of thcir absurdly long aud 
slcndcr bnrrels, left fnlly exposed to all fire, are among tbc most vulnerable. 
"Stil l, the rnft-deck system bas n widc field before it, a nd I nm quite prepared to admit 
that I believe in its practicability anc\ in its sufficient security for c-crtain classes of vcsscls 
if properly cari'Ïcd ou t. T his it bas not yet been iu any single iust¡lnce. Even in the case 
of the great lllllian shi ps, as in our own, there a re elements of wealwess wllich would bc 
fatal to the system in action, but whicb arc not unavoidahle. Allow me to a~sure Sir 
George E ll iot that I have Jm·gely nnd closely studied this subjcct, und tbat my main objec-
tions to it arc not objections of princi ple. 
"If tbc rnft-deck system is to be adoptcd, it must in my opinion be carried out in a 
much fullcr and more satisfactory mnnnet· than bitherto, and wilh the aid of arrangcments 
whicb I ha ve for a loog ti rne past secn the neccssity of, and been cngngcd upon. 
* * * * * * * "To my mind the Admimlty, while protccting certain parts and contents of their 
largcst ships from injury from shcll fire, hnvc madc thc fatal error of fniliug to protec:t 
the ship itself, which contains thcm nil , from hcing too rettdily deprivcd of stability anrl 
madc to capsize. 'l' he advocates of the allcrnutive system must notrepeat tbis error, or, i f 
they do, they must not expect mc to bccomc their ally. On the other baud, if they will 
join me in dcspising wbat arc merely spccious elements of safcty, and in demanding tbose 
which arc real, if tbey wiU insist tbat our principal aud most costly sbips at least shall be 
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so constructed as to keep atl.oat and upright for a rcasonnLie length of time in batlle. in 
spitc of any form of attack, so as to givc thcir gaBant crews a fair chauce of nchieving 
thcir objects, thcy will not find me averse to any improvement whatever. Wben a suita-
blc opportunity offers I shall be happy to show to Arlmiml Sir George Elliot tbat he has 
not been alone in seeking to develop the cellular or raft-deck system, and thnt it has, in 
fuet, capabilities which possibly he himself may not yet ha ve fully rcalized." 
The same nurnber of the Times contains a r cply to Mr. Reed's letter of April 
8, 1885, by Mr. \Vhite, mainly dcvotcd to a rcfutation of certain charges of no in-
iOl·cst io us, but contaiuing tltc following paragraphs : 
"I must refer to the passage in which Sir Edwanl Rccd quotes a description of thc 
damagc done to thc llu.ascar iu her action with tbc two Chilian irou.clads. 
" This dcscription seems to me ono o f thc llest possible illustratious of a remark in my 
previous lcttcr, that • the mitrailw which is drivcn back into n ship when an'nor is pene-
trnled is prob!~bly as desl.rncti ve as any kind o f projcctile can be.' Ilad the Iluascar not 
ltnd wcnk armor, but light sides only, thc local injuries might have becu less. The other 
casc citcd of a shcll which entered the unarmored stcru of the (Joclu·ane shows how little 
damogc may be done wheu a projecti lc passes through thin plating. A.t the bombardment 
of Alexandria there were many snch examples on bMrd our ships, although it must be 
frankly admitted that the cngagement is no sullicient indication of whut shell fire may do. 
A good dee.l o f use has been mude of the single case wherc a shell in bursting blew a hole 
ten by four fect in the thin side-plating of the Superb. The casc was quite exceptional, 
wbethcr it be compared with the other bits ou the samc ship or with the injuries done to 
the unarmored sides of other ships. ?!Ioreovcr. in that case exceptional injury is traceable 
to spccial structurnl arrnngements nt the embrnsure nenr the bnttery port, where the shell 
struck. Thcsc cases do not prove thnt the light unarmorerl strnctnrcs in tho .Admiral cluss 
ore likcly to be destroycd in such a rapid ami wholosnle manner os has been asscrted. 
Nor, on the othcr hand, do they iudicate conclusivcly whut damagc sheJI.fire may do in 
futut·e uctions. On these points, as I have beforc remarkcd, experiment might bc mude 
with ndvnntage. But, on the other Jmnd, there is good evidcncc lhat urmor so thiu as to 
bc rcadily penetrable to many guns may ben scrions dnngcr, and that urmor over thc vital 
parts of ships should be strong if it is to bo a real dcfence. 
* * * * * * * "In mntters of ship design the constructors of thc navy ore only the servants of the 
Bonrcl, and while they most take solc responsibility for profcs~ional work, the governing 
fentmcs in the designs arc determined by higher authori ties, among whom arc officers of 
lnrge expcrience. both as seamen anc! guuners. Anc! it is certoinly not the practice of the 
constrnctive department to intrude themselvcs or their advicc into matters for which nei-
thcr their training uor their expcrieuce Jits theru to gi ve an opinion. 
* * * * * * * " I make no attempt to be either a suilor or a gunncr, but nm content to seek informa-
tion from the llest authorities in both branches. As thc result. of this stndy of tactics und 
gunuery, I huvc been led to the belief tbut the sea.fights of the ful u re are not Jikely to be 
sculed altogether or clliefly hy the effecls of guu-firll. This is not quite thc same thing os 
Sir Edward Reed attributes to me when he says that 'l'lfr. White thiuks nuc! spenks as i f 
naval warfare henceforth were to be merely a matter o f cloclging, getting chance sbots, und 
kecping out of un enemy's way.' 
"Nor do I thin k that the designers of the llalian \\"Br-ships will indorse the deRcrip-
tion of their views and intentions, witll which Si r Edwanl Recrl has favorcd us in his Jet-
ter and (:lsewhcre. I llave the honor of knowing bis cxcellcncy Signor Brin (now Jlliuister 
of l\>ladnc) ami other members of the constructiva corps of the l tnliau nnvy, aud from 
their statcments, iocluding the powerful pnblications of Signor Brio, 'La Nostra l\larina 
Militaire,' I have no hesitation in say iug that in spencling lm·ger surns ou single ships thnn 
llave cver beforc been spent, the Italian nutboritics think , anu are not alone in thinking, 
that they arc producing the most powerful fighting sbips afloat." 
APPENDIX III. 
RANGE OF GUNS. 
Jilrom Repo1·t oj U. S. Fortification Boa1·d. 
GUNS AFLOAT RANGING POSSIBLY NI:-IE 'fO 'l'EN MILES. 
NATJON. Ship. .Mnximum Dmugbt. Guns. _ C~ibrc., Anuor. 
luchea. Feet. In. Number. lncbcs. 
Inflexible ............... . 
Friedlancl .............. . 
24 2ó 4 4 16 
7t 29 4 2 10.6 
Englnnd ...... . ..... . 
Frnncc ............. . 
Rcdoubtable ............. . 14 24 10 4 10.6 
Duguesclin ............ l 
Bayard ................ ~ 
Tu ren nc ............... J 
Vn.uhan ............... . 
Fulminant ...... . ...... t 
1'onnen·e .............. f 
Dnilio .................. . 
Dandolo ................ . 
9t 24 10 4 9.5 
13 21 4 2 10.6 
21.'7 28 4 1'7 
21.7 28 9 4 17 
I tuly ............... . 
Gct'many . ........... . Sachsen .............. . 
Baiem ........... ..... . 
Würtembcrg .......... . 
Baden ......... ...... . . 
17.25 19 8 4 10.2 
\Vespe ... .. .......... . 
Viper ................ . 
Biene ..... .. .. ....... . 
Mücke ................ . 
Scorpion ....... . .... . . . 
Dusilisk .... ... .... . . . . 
Camcleou .............. j 
Crocodil .............. . 
Riachuel4J ... .. ......... . 
" :::::::::::: :¡ 
:: :::::::::::: :¡ ~nzil .............. . 
8 10 2 12 
ll 20 4 
Dcsides ~~ ltu·ge numbet· on unarmorcd vcssels aud on tmnorcd l'c;scl; not yct completeu. 
GUNS AFLOAT RANGING POSSIJ3LY 'l'E:'< )liLES OR UP\\'ARD. 
N-'.TIO~. Ship. 
Mnximum 
Armor. I Drnugbt. Guns. Calibre. ---- --------
lncht1'. r~t. In. 1\umbtT. Jnebd. 
En~l:tnd ...... ..... .. Conqueror ....... . ....... 12 2-! o 2 12 
" ............. Colos~us ................ "j lS 26 3 4 12 
" ... .......... Etlinhur.gh ............... 18 26 3 4 12 
France . .. •• •• • o ..... Ami ral Dnpenó .......... 21.6 26 !I 4 13.4 
Dévastation nnd Fondro.1·:wt. ¡¡¡ 24 11 { 2 10.6 ....... ·-··· .. 4 13.4 
" ...... . ....... Terrible ................. 19 2-! 7 2 1Ga 
o ••••••••••••• 'ronnant ........ .... .. .. . 17t 16 !J 2 13.4 
. .. . . ... . .. ... Vengcur ................. J:lf HI 9 2 13.4 
T1nll' ................ Tt:di:t . . ... .. .. .. .. . ...... 18.9 30 3 4 17 
Gcnnnny ..... .. .. .. .. Ralnmn.nder ... ... . . .... } ... . .... .. Nntter ....... . .... ... . 8 JO 2 12 
" .... ... ...... Hummel. . .... ... ...... 
Chinn ••• ••• o o ••••••• Ting Ynen ••• •• o • . .. . } u 20 4 12 " Chen Yuen ......... • ... ............... 
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